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Abstract 
 
Individual autonomy is crucial to both liberalism and feminism and, to some extent, for similar 
reasons: that is, the insistence on everyone being able to shape her own life and not just have it 
shaped for her. As it is currently understood, however, this ideal is a source of great 
dissatisfaction for feminists. For one, it is blind to the ‘problem of oppression’ –that is the way 
social factors, such as oppressive gender norms, can affect individuals’ capacity to lead a self-
governed life. In addition, on the political level, autonomy is aligned with individualism, 
independence and rationality. This makes it an exclusionary ideal, which, under the cover of 
universalism, promotes a prejudiced and narrow vision of what agents and preferences should 
be seen as worthy of respect. I refer to this as the problem of exclusion. 
My thesis is an attempt to reframe our understanding of autonomy in order to answer 
these two problems. I argue that the relational accounts of autonomy feminists have articulated 
should be understood as motivated by the need to address these key concerns (Ch. 1). 
However, none of the relational accounts developed so far truly succeed in simultaneously 
addressing the problem of oppression and the problem of exclusion (Ch. 2). I suggest that this 
is because they are still too individualistic in their focus and remain fixed on the question of 
what individual agent and/or preference should be considered autonomous. In order to ensure 
we avoid the problem of exclusion, I propose we remain agnostic towards this question. This 
results in a systematic presumption of autonomy, which commits us to demonstrate respect to 
all agents (especially vulnerable ones), as well as to their declared preferences. Such a 
commitment, however, should not lead us to overlook the problem of oppression. In order to 
address this problem, I argue that we should devote our attention to the way the socio-relational 
context structures how agents can plausibly exercise their autonomy. In other words, in order 
to address the problem of oppression without reproducing the problem of exclusion, we need 
to stop focusing on the question of who should be considered autonomous and instead refocus 
on the question of what structural changes might promote the autonomy of all (Ch. 3). 
I call the resulting account an ‘agnostic and structural’ understanding of autonomy.  I 
argue that such a conception of autonomy is promising as it offers an inclusive conception of 
self-government, which nonetheless gives us grounds to vindicate substantial emancipatory 
policies. I then present a set of case studies in order to show how such a conception of 
autonomy could help us deal with entrenched gender inequalities. Doing so enables me to 
illustrate the difference adopting an ‘agnostic and structural’ conception of autonomy could 
make in the areas of our legal system that are underpinned by an individualistic understanding 
of autonomy. Legal frameworks surrounding parental leave (Ch. 4), divorce and separation 
(Ch. 5), domestic violence (Ch. 6) and even our understanding of criminal responsibility (Ch. 
7), I argue, could be effectively reframed using the kind of understanding of autonomy I 
propose.  
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Introduction 
Feminism has a conflicting relation with the ideal of individual autonomy. Historically, much of 
feminists’ efforts were devoted to opposing the exclusion of women from the realm of 
autonomous agency. Because autonomy served as the grounds to refuse them political and 
legal equality, early feminists attempted to disprove the idea that women were too emotional to 
be considered properly self-governed. In A Vindication of the Rights of Women, for instance, 
Mary Wollstonecraft attacks the presumption that women are less reasonable and capable of 
responsible decision-making than men, which she regards as legitimising their lack of political 
rights and as supporting their confinement to subordinate roles.1 Her discourse, however, 
exposes a fundamental ambivalence that still marks feminist views of autonomy. Given the 
oppressive patriarchal social system that was in place, it was factually true that women’s minds 
were formed so as to be ‘weak and wretched’. As Wollstonecraft regretfully admits, women’s 
education and socialisation turned the assumption that women were less capable of rational 
self-government than men into a reality. This, in turn, justified denying equal rights to members 
of the ‘fair sex’, while simultaneously fostering women’s indulgent collusion in their own 
oppression. 
The two concerns Wollstonecraft expresses with regard to women’s autonomy have not 
disappeared with modernity. They still mark and structure feminists’ complex relationship with 
autonomy, especially given the centrality of this ideal in the liberal political system. On the one 
hand, even if they are no longer so crudely institutionalised as they were during the previous 
centuries, patriarchal systems of domination have yet to disappear from our societies. Gender 
roles and norms, oppressive stereotypes, constrictive social expectations and popular imagery 
that conveys expectations of ‘proper’ femininity still affect women’s ability to lead a life of their 
own choosing. These social forces still create desires, preferences and structures of choices that 
render women complicit in the reproduction of gender inequality on the social level. Yet, their 
incidence of self-determination is often ignored due to the liberal focus on individuals and its 
failure to sufficiently acknowledge the social forces that affect individual self-determination. 
The liberal imperative of respect and non-interference in the autonomous choices people 
make for themselves, in turn, often serves to justify the political status quo, which perpetuates 
systemic inequalities between the sexes. I call this concern the ‘problem of oppression’. 
                                                 
1
 Women, she states, ‘are treated as a kind of subordinate beings, and not as a part of the human species, when 
improveable reason is allowed to be the dignified distinction which raises men above the brute creation, and puts a 
natural sceptre in a feeble hand’ (Wollstonecraft 2014 (1792), 30). 
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On the other hand, however, feminists also express their dissatisfaction with the 
exclusionary dynamics that autonomy serves to promote and justify. Under the cover of 
universalism and neutrality, autonomy can serve to marginalise subjectivities that do not 
correspond to a prejudiced and narrow vision of what constitutes a properly self-governed 
individual. This is the ‘problem of exclusion’. Even if the gendering of autonomy is no longer 
explicitly inscribed in legal documents, this ideal still retains its problematic association with 
masculinity. Feminists thus criticise autonomy as its alignment with independence and 
individualism implicitly denies autonomy to types of agency coded as ‘feminine’. In practice, 
this feeds a problematic gender hierarchy of value on the political and legal level, which 
systematically frames women’s gendered preferences and social roles as less valuable and 
worthy of respect than those of men. This issue is further complicated by the fact that feminists’ 
focus on the detrimental effect of oppressive norms on women’s autonomy can have the 
unfortunate effect of further reinforcing these exclusionary dynamics. Hence, denouncing the 
way oppression structures women’s agency can serve to justify ignoring women’s declared 
preferences and can further the idea that their autonomy is somewhat more fragile and easily 
eroded by social circumstances than that of men. This is especially problematic given the 
culturally diverse and globalised world in which we live. As the ideal of autonomy remains 
firmly grounded in a situated liberal conception of the good, this dynamic of exclusion is 
reproduced along existing lines of power and privilege that exceed that of gender.  
Wollstonecraft’s conundrum is, in this respect, still very much at the core of feminist 
discourses and debates on autonomy. On the one hand, given the role autonomy serves on the 
political level, it is imperative to acknowledge the autonomy women manifest. In this respect, a 
feminist understanding of autonomy should refrain from feeding problematic exclusionary 
dynamics that frame women, women’s social roles and women’s agency as somehow less 
worthy of respect than that of men. On the other hand, however, it remains important for 
feminists to arrive at a concept of autonomy that can serve as grounds to denounce and 
alleviate the oppression women suffer. The tension between the conflicting roles autonomy 
serves produces vexing problems that have led some feminists to avoid relying on this concept 
as a foundation for feminist politics.  
Among other things, it has prompted what Sumi Madhok, Anne Phillips and Kapana 
Wilson (2013) referred to as the feminist ‘turn to agency’. Moving away from the normatively 
loaded term of autonomy is not purely symbolical here. Though it is sometimes employed 
interchangeably with autonomy, the concept of agency acquires a radically different 
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connotation in the work of feminists such as Saba Mahmood (2005) and Lila Abu-Lughod 
(1990, 2002).2 Mahmood, for instance, argues that it is crucial to detach the notion of agency 
from the goals of progressive politics that are usually linked with autonomy within feminist 
discourses. Keeping alive the affiliation of agency with the teleology of emancipation, she 
claims, leads us back to the exclusionary binary of resistance or subjection. Doing so is 
problematic, first, because it simplistically ‘elides dimensions of human action whose ethical 
and political status does not map onto the logic of repression and resistance’ (Mahmood 2oo5, 
14). Second, and more importantly, it reproduces exclusionary imperialistic views that 
‘arrogantly assume that secular forms of life and secularism’s progressive formulations 
necessarily exhaust ways of living meaningfully and richly in this world’ (Mahmood 2005, xi). 
Using Judith Butler’s criticism of the humanist conception of agency, she moves away from the 
liberal presumption underlying the notion of autonomy that agents are ‘endowed with a will, a 
freedom, and an intentionality’ which can then be ‘thwarted by relations of power that are 
considered external to the subject’ (Mahmood 2005, 20). Instead of offering a basis to 
prescribe emancipatory change, the notion of ethical agency she proposes is rather descriptive 
and seeks to enable a fine-grained understanding and analysis of the lived reality of the subjects 
she studies.3  
As for Nancy Hirschmann (2003), she argues that the concept of freedom offers a 
better basis to vindicate emancipatory changes than autonomy. While she admits there are 
several concerns and features common to autonomy and the conception of freedom she 
develops, she maintains that freedom is less conceptually constrained than autonomy. Even the 
conceptions of autonomy that seek to remain neutral with regard to what an autonomous 
choice should look like, she argues, are extremely value-laden ‘echoing the essence of 
Enlightment rationality’ (Hirschmann 2003, 38). They continue to equate autonomy with the 
expression of a ‘true self’ that can stay somewhat impervious to the impact of external 
influences. This presumption that underlies the concept of autonomy, she states, is a problem 
for feminists, as it remains blind to the ‘more subtle influences of social construction’ as well as 
                                                 
2
 In this thesis, I will differentiate between agency and autonomy. I will consider the term ‘agency’ to  be a 
descriptive term in contrast to autonomy which is explicitly non-normatively neutral.  
3
 In many parts of her book, Mahmood stresses the need for a conception of agency. which, rather than being 
prescriptive, helps foster a better understanding and analysis of the mosque movement. For instance, in Politics of 
Piety, she writes that she seeks to emphasis ‘two interrelated points: first, that it is impossible to understand the 
political agency of the movement without a proper grasp of its ethical agency; and second, that to read the activities 
of the mosque movement primarily in terms of the resistance it has posed to the logic of secular-liberal governance 
and its concomitant modes of sociability ignores an entire dimension of politics that remains poorly understood 
and undertheorized with the literature on politics and agency’ (Mahmood 2005, 35). 
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to the presence of oppressive barriers that constrains the choices we make and the preference 
we adopt. By contrast, freedom offers a better means to liberate women ‘from the multiple, 
intersecting, and overarching barriers that pervade patriarchal society’ (Hirschmann 2003, 39). 
Taking seriously social construction and the way it challenges the possibility of an essential and 
authentic self (which the idea of autonomy seems to presuppose), she contends, entails 
acknowledging that freedom should be seen as a precondition to autonomy, and not the other 
way around. If there is such thing as a true and authentic self, women must first be freed from 
patriarchal constraints in order to determine what this autonomous self might be.  
In this thesis, my goal is to rehabilitate autonomy as a useful normative tool in the 
feminist arsenal. I seek to show that autonomy can serve to address the problem of oppression 
and ground emancipatory feminist policies, while simultaneously avoiding the reproduction of 
discriminatory exclusion. However, I contend that if it is to be of any use to feminists, this ideal 
needs to be reconceptualised in order to take into account the important role social context 
plays in self-determination. As Hirschmann (2003) points out, an understanding of autonomy 
that fails to devote sufficient attention to the way norms and social expectations affect and 
structure vulnerable individuals’ self-determination offers no means to vindicate the 
emancipatory goals of feminism. A social conception of autonomy is also necessary to alleviate 
the problem of exclusion and to avoid feeding into existing systems of domination (gendered as 
well as imperialistic) that feminists such as Mahmood denounce. Arriving at an inclusive 
conception of self-government necessitates the explicit recognition that caring relationships are 
a precondition of an autonomous existence and that dependence is an integral part of 
autonomous human life. Acknowledging that socio-relational conditions shape all of us also 
encourages a humbler stance vis-à-vis our own tendencies to restrict the attribution of 
autonomy to only those agents and preferences that manifest a form of agency we recognise.  In 
this respect, I see my own attempt to arrive at a feminist reconceptualisation of self-
determination as belonging to the relational accounts of autonomy.4  
Before reviewing the current relational accounts of autonomy and justifying my own 
attempt to reframe autonomy, I begin this thesis by exploring the role and form the ideal of 
autonomy takes within the liberal political and legal system. In Chapter 1, I suggest that 
feminists should indeed be concerned with autonomy given its central role in a liberal political 
and legal system. I seek to show that feminists are justified in their efforts to reframe autonomy 
given that this ideal underpins the regime of power that is currently in place. I then expose, in 
                                                 
4
 These feminist attempts aim at reconceiving autonomy by accounting for the social dimension of self-
determination. 
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more depth, the two key concerns I see as structuring feminist dissatisfaction with autonomy: 
the problem of exclusion on the one side, and that of oppression on the other. I argue that far 
from being mere symbolic issues, these problems have consequences for the ways women are 
treated and perceived on the political, and legal levels. I conclude this chapter by introducing 
the relational accounts of autonomy. In contrast to the more restrictive definition John 
Christman (2004) offers, I suggest that we should not understand relational accounts as defined 
by a particular formal feature. Rather, we should understand them as characterised by their 
normative aims —that is, as integrating concerns relating to the socio-relational context as a 
means to address the issue of oppression as well as that of exclusion. 
 In Chapter 2, I then offer a critical review of the existing families of relational 
understandings with respect to three criteria: 1. whether they enable us to address the problem 
of oppression, 2. without falling back into the problem of exclusion, and 3. whether they are 
operationalisable and could be of use on the political and legal levels to replace the 
individualistic ideal that is the object of feminist criticisms. Each of these frameworks, I 
contend, has its strengths and advantages. Some provide inclusive conceptions of autonomy 
that are adequately mindful of the exclusionary dynamics that denying autonomy to certain 
types of preferences or agents can have on the political level. Others offer a strong basis to 
ground an emancipatory feminist agenda and enable us to account for the ways oppressive 
social influences can diminish self-government—by warping people’s desires and by limiting the 
way they can plausibly exercise their autonomy. However, in spite of the important 
contributions they make, I contend that none of the accounts devised so far entirely succeeds 
in addressing the problems of exclusion and oppression. I suggest that this is because there is a 
real normative tension between these two goals, which is impossible to avoid if we remain fixed 
on the question of what individual agent and/or preference should be considered autonomous. 
The focus on offering criteria to assess the competency for autonomy of agents either globally, 
or as linked to a particular local preference, I argue, causes relational conceptions to be either 
too thin to successfully address the problem of oppression or too thick to avoid the problem of 
discriminatory exclusion. For some other relational accounts, the problem is rather at the level 
of their potential use on the political level. Some theorists, indeed, avoid offering any clear 
normative guidance concerning what makes some social conditions autonomy-promoting and 
what makes others autonomy-undermining.  
In Chapter 3, drawing on the strengths of the different frameworks reviewed in Chapter 
2, I develop and defend my own understanding of autonomy. In order to ensure we avoid the 
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problem of exclusion, I argue that we should maintain a careful analytical distinction between 
autonomy as a mental or emotional competency and the external conditions necessary for the 
exercise of autonomy. Autonomy is usually mainly understood in the first sense—that is, as 
designating the set of mental abilities. It is conceived as a sort of competency that autonomy is 
regarded as a precondition to receiving the status of full-fledged agent worthy of respect and 
consideration. In this regard, I suggest that avoiding the problem of exclusion necessitates that 
we remain agnostic towards autonomy in this first sense and avoid formulating criteria to assess 
the competency for autonomy that agents possess. This results in a systematic presumption of 
autonomy, which commits us to demonstrate respect to all agents (especially vulnerable ones, 
given the prevailing tendencies not to do so), as well as to their declared preferences. Such 
commitment, however, should not lead us to forget the problem of oppression. In order to 
address this problem, I argue that we should devote our attention to the way the socio-relational 
context structures how agents can plausibly exercise their autonomy. In other words, addressing 
the problem of oppression without re-establishing the problem of exclusion necessitates that we 
stop focusing on the question of who should be considered autonomous and that we focus 
instead on the structural changes that might promote the autonomy of all. I call the resulting 
account an ‘agnostic and structural’ understanding of autonomy.  I argue that such a conception 
of autonomy is promising as it offers an inclusive conception of self-government that 
nonetheless gives us grounds to vindicate substantial emancipatory policies. 
In Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, I then present a set of case studies in order to show how such 
a conception of autonomy could help us deal with entrenched gender inequalities. This enables 
me to demonstrate that the ‘agnostic and structural’ conception of autonomy could offer a 
plausible replacement for the ideal that underlies our political system and could make a 
valuable difference in the areas of our legal system that are underpinned by an individualistic 
understanding of autonomy. Legal frameworks surrounding parental leave (Ch. 4), divorce and 
separation (Ch. 5), domestic violence (Ch. 6) and even our understanding of criminal 
responsibility (Ch. 7), I argue, could be helpfully reframed using the kind of understanding of 
autonomy I propose. 
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Chapter 1: Individual Autonomy, the Problem of Oppression 
and the Problem of Exclusion 
 
Autonomy is fundamental to both liberalism and feminism and, to some extent, for similar 
reasons: that is, the resistance to paternalism and the insistence on everyone being able to 
shape her own life and not just have it shaped for her. As it is understood within the liberal 
tradition, however, the ideal of autonomy is a source of great dissatisfaction for feminists. 
In this chapter, I seek demonstrate three things. First, that we should indeed be 
interested in autonomy given its fundamental role in our political system. This chapter thus 
begins with a brief overview of the different roles individual autonomy has on the political and 
legal levels within a liberal society. Second, that feminist dissatisfaction with autonomy is not 
merely descriptive: it is properly normative and has to do with the inadequacies this ideal gives 
rise to on the political level. The problem feminists have with autonomy, I argue, is not merely 
that it is an abstraction that ‘brackets’ the contingent predicates of concrete agency, and fails to 
accurately depict the reality of human agency.5  Rather, the problem is that the selective 
omissions this ideal operate do have problematic implications and consequences in practice. 
First, because they often serve to reinforce current systems of domination. They lead to what I 
call the ‘problem of exclusion’: they encourage all the ways in which women or women’s social 
roles are demeaned and excluded as not really autonomous. But these selective omissions also 
lead to a second type of inadequacy, which I call the ‘problem of oppression’. Because it 
‘brackets out’ the way social conditions affect autonomy, this ideal fails to provide us with the 
necessary tools for distinguishing between social conditions that enable self-government and 
those that undermine it. As a result, it often serves to justify political laissez-faire in oppressive 
socio-relational context. These concerns, I argue, are not so much aimed at particular 
philosophical understandings of autonomy. They are political: a matter of the way autonomy 
functions as a political, regulatory ideal. What this suggests— and this is the third point I seek to 
make in this chapter—is that mainstream accounts of autonomy fall short not only because they 
understate the importance of the social but also because they do not get to grips with the two 
key concerns of feminist politics: that is, how to avoid reproducing exclusionary dynamics on 
the one hand, while alleviating oppression, on the other. I seek to show that it is the will to 
address these key concerns that should be seen as the defining feature of the relational 
accounts of autonomy that have emerged in the literature.  
                                                 
5
 On the difference between idealisation and abstraction, see O’Neill (1987) as well as Schwartzman (2006), who 
critically explores this divide. I will return to it in the second part of this chapter. 
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I.  Autonomy from a Political Perspective.  
Personal autonomy is crucial for liberalism both as a philosophical doctrine and as the political 
framework guiding the organisation of our laws and policies. Used as a status marker that 
enables one to be regarded as worthy of respect, autonomy is usually thought to confer 
normative authority over one’s life. In this regard, individual autonomy sets the boundaries to 
legitimate state actions: it gives rise to negative duties of non-interference in autonomous self-
determination and to positive duties of intervention when this auto-determination is threatened. 
In short, autonomy can be seen as a regulatory ideal that structures and justifies the whole 
organisation of liberal societies. Yet, in spite of its political importance, autonomy remains 
something of a portmanteau word (Conly 2013, 16) used to make sense of a ‘tangled net of 
intuitions, conceptual and empirical issues, and normative claims’ (Dworkin 1988, 7). It is a 
‘woolly’ concept (Raz 1986, 409) that is used and characterised in a multitude of ways that are 
not always readily compatible with one another.  
 Autonomy comes from the Greek words ‘autos’ (self) and ‘nomos’ (law). Broadly 
defined, it means to be the author of one’s own law, in one’s thoughts and actions. It is a 
‘deontic status’ which, unlike dignity, is not something individuals are born having (Anderson 
2014).  It is usually assimilated to either one particular mental competency, or to a set of 
mental skills, that one needs to have developed enough to count as autonomous. These skills 
are usually of two types (Christman 2015). On the one hand, there are the abilities necessary to 
be viewed as competent to direct one’s own life. These generally include things such as the 
capacity for rational thought, being adequately receptive and reactive to reasons for actions (i.e. 
reasons-responsiveness), the freedom from debilitating pathologies and the capacity to keep 
one’s heteronomous impulses under control (Wolf 1990; Fischer & Ravizza 1993). Being 
autonomous is thus not simply a matter of being governed by oneself. It is a matter of being 
governed by the ‘right’ parts of oneself. As Berlin (1969, 178) explains, in order to count as 
properly self-governed, one needs to be moved only by one’s own conscious reasons and 
purposes and ‘not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside’. On the other hand, 
there are competencies necessary to claim one’s thoughts and actions as genuine. These 
include critical self-reflexion, self-consciousness and the independence of thought (Dworkin 
1988; Frankfurt 1987). These authenticity skills are thought necessary to endorse one’s desires 
independently of external influences and values in order to claim them as genuinely ours.  
 Being seen as competent enough to be attributed the status of autonomous agent is 
important in various social practices. As Anderson (2014, 357) writes, ‘[w]hen we attribute 
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autonomy to someone, we are not just identifying general properties of the person but are 
situating those properties relative to the relevant thresholds for how it is appropriate to treat 
him or her’. Used as a global characterisation, it acts as a status marker that marks a person as 
worthy of respect, responsible for her own choices and competent enough to make her own 
decisions without undue interference. It can also be used locally to characterise particular 
choices or preferences that are understood as stemming from the exercise of the right 
competency (Christman 2015). To characterise a choice as autonomous, in turn, raises the 
liberal duty of respect and non-interference regarding it.  
 Autonomy is also thought to require external conditions to be properly exercised. The 
first one is the absence of coercion, which prevents the agent from exercising self-government 
by forcing her to do another’s bidding. Manipulation, deceit and brainwashing are also often 
cited examples of external conditions that interfere with the agent’s capacity to formulate and 
act upon autonomous desires. 
Thus understood, autonomy amounts to a demanding standard of self-determination 
that we cannot so easily expect of real individuals. As indicated by Sarah Conly (2013), real 
people regularly act impulsively in an irrational and thoughtless manner. Yet, on the political 
level, autonomy functions more like a regulative ideal rather than as an actual standard by 
which to assess agents. However, in certain areas of our political and legal system, autonomy 
does prescribe minimal competency thresholds that individuals need to satisfy in order to 
count as properly autonomous. Criminal responsibility, for instance, requires that an agent be 
seen as sufficiently competent to be regarded as responsible for her deeds in order for these to 
be attributed to her.6 Yet, most of the time agents are simply presumed to be autonomous. The 
attribution of autonomy to an individual is, in turn, necessary to consider her a full-fledged 
political agent. In this regard, autonomy is closely linked to both equality and respect within the 
liberal system. Respect for persons is mainly understood as expressive of the recognition of 
individuals’ fundamental moral equality, which, in turn, is grounded in their status as 
autonomous agents. Autonomy thus plays a chief role in justifying democracy, as the way to 
operationalise the liberal duty of equal respect for individual’s autonomy is thought to be 
through a democratic decision-making process (Valentini 2013).7  
On the political and legal levels, the normative liberal commitment to respect individual 
autonomy gives rise to two types of political duty for the state. First, it gives rise to negative 
                                                 
6
 We will return to the link between criminal responsibility and autonomy in Chapter 7. 
7
 John Rawls can be considered as one of the most prominent contemporary liberal thinkers. As Thomas Nagel 
(1995, 125), puts it, ‘The fundamental attitude toward persons on which justice as fairness depends is a respect for 
their autonomy’.  
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duties of non-interference, as it sets the limits to state action. Respect for autonomous self-
determination thus underlies the liberal ideal of state neutrality (Dworkin 2007, 445). Indeed, it 
is thought that in order properly to recognise and respect the autonomy of its citizens, the state 
should not justify its actions on the grounds of a certain encompassing conception of the good.8 
One reason for this is that respect for autonomy is thought to require individuals to be free to 
form, change or revise their own conception of the good in contrast to having a particular 
conception imposed on them (Kymlicka 1990). In this respect, it is often argued that the state 
should not promote some conceptions of the good as better or more valuable than others. The 
principles guiding the state’s actions ought to be compatible with the pluralism of values 
inherent to the liberal state. They should represent the interests of autonomous agents, 
independently of the vision of the good they adopt (Rawls, 1971). This, in turn, gives rise to a 
duty of non-interference in the private choices that only affect the individuals making them.  
 Autonomy thus serves as the main justification against state paternalism. ‘Paternalism’ is 
broadly defined as a practice or policy that restricts the freedom of citizens on the grounds of 
their own (supposed) interest (Kleinig 1984, 18). Following most liberals, as long as the choices 
people make affect only themselves, the state ought not to intervene in them. Mortimer Sellers 
(2008, 6), for instance, writes that ‘the essence of autonomy is the ability to make bad choices 
for oneself. Good choices are demeaned when they are not freely chosen’. Intervening in 
people’s private choices is thought to constitute a failure to acknowledge the authority 
individuals have in making their own choices for themselves (Darwall 2006, 268). It is 
tantamount to treating a full-fledged rational agent as if he were a child incapable of making his 
own choices, which is both demeaning and arrogant (Feinberg 1986, 22; Anderson 1999, 301-
2). In short, it implicitly denies that this person is worthy of equal respect and consideration.  
 In this regard, even if research shows that smoking or eating fast food is objectively bad 
for one’s health, it is generally considered that the state cannot legitimately prevent citizens 
from accessing these options.9 As Conly notes (2013, 1), respect for autonomy implies that ‘[i]f 
some people choose poorly, that is unfortunate for them, but it is their own responsibility, and 
interfering, even with the most benevolent intent and the most beneficial effect, ignores that 
these are rational agents who have the right to make their own choices’. Likewise, autonomy 
often serves as the main justification for reforming laws that infringe on individual self-
                                                 
8
 We will return to this idea in Chapter 4. 
9
 We will return to this in the following subsection. 
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determination by promoting certain views of morality.10 Respect for individual autonomy is 
regularly invoked in liberal jurisdictions in attempts to challenge laws that target citizens’ 
morality, such as legislation concerning pornography, the regulation of citizens’ sexual 
practices11 and medical decision-making.12 Finally, autonomy also grounds legal arrangements 
that protect individuals’ private lives. Privacy and autonomy are intimately linked given that the 
private is thought to be the privileged sphere of the exercise of autonomy.13 While the state 
might legitimately constrain the autonomy of its citizens in the public sphere, interferences in 
the private lives of individuals are generally understood as much more difficult to justify 
(Schouten 2013). As we will see in the second half of this thesis, this divide between the private 
and the public has important consequences for the way we understand the permissibility of 
state action within the family, among other things (Fineman 2004). 14  
 In contrast to the negative duties of non-interference in citizens’ private affairs, the 
second type of duty to which autonomy gives rise is positive. The state has to set and enforce 
the boundaries of the legitimate sphere of self-determination of its citizens to ensure they do 
not infringe on each other’s autonomy. The harm principle, first articulated by John Stuart Mill 
in On Liberty, is generally understood to set the boundaries of individual self-rule.15 When an 
agent coerces another by preventing her from freely exercising her autonomy, this amounts to a 
criminal offence under liberal laws (Ashworth & Horder 2013, 23-27). The state has a positive 
duty to intervene in order to punish this type of infraction and to protect the autonomy of its 
citizens. 
 Concerns for non-autonomous agents, or agents otherwise perceived as not competent 
enough to be considered autonomous, also raise the positive duties of intervention. It is usually 
considered part of the liberal state’s duties to protect agents whose competency for autonomy is 
still in development. Children are subject to legitimate paternalistic state intervention such as 
                                                 
10
 For instance, the Wolfenden Report stated, against the conventional ideas of its time, that ‘homosexual 
behaviour between consenting adults in private should no longer be a criminal offence’. This decision was based 
on personal autonomy, –that is, in the Report’s language, on the idea that the law should ‘give to individual[sic] 
freedom of choice and action in matters of private morality’. 
11
 It has served, for instance, as the basis for arguing against a ban of the Montreal club L’Orage, whose purpose 
was to ‘permit couples and single people to meet each other for group sex’ (R.v. Labaye). 
12
 See, for instance, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (No. 71-1051) on pornography and the US Patient Self-
Determination Act. 
13
 Indeed, as Sellers (2008, 2) writes, '"Privacy” is the negative expression of the positive value expressed by 
“autonomy.” Autonomy signifies the right to decide for oneself. Privacy signifies that zone in which no others may 
interfere’. 
14 It has also influenced the development of privacy law, which regulates the use of personal information about 
individuals and is generally designed to protect individuals from unwanted breaches of their privacy.  
15
 Mill (1859) formulates the harm principle as the following: ‘The only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’. 
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mandatory state education, and they are placed under the tutelage of guardians (usually their 
parents) who are held responsible, under the law, for the children’s welfare (Diduck & Kaganas 
2012, 174-6).16 A momentous loss of competency provoked by psychosis or altered mental 
states can also justify paternalistic interventions. For instance, when a patient refuses a medical 
treatment, her desire can be bypassed if she is not considered competent at the moment of the 
decision (Buchanan 2004). Likewise, judges can order long-term psychiatric treatment when an 
agent is seen as not competent enough to be declared criminally responsible (Morrissey 2003, 
71).  Finally, state action can also be justified in cases of imperfect autonomy. This can happen 
in one of two cases. The first one is when it is considered that an agent does not possess 
sufficient knowledge to make an informed decision.17 Laws preventing people from buying 
potent medicine without a prescription fall within this category (Conly 2013, 4).18 The second 
case is when citizens’ cognitive biases and impulses are thought to prevent them from satisfying 
important interests. Recent research on our (arguably) heteronomous bias has made ‘soft 
paternalism’—that is, incentives, and nudges—increasingly and widely accepted as legitimate in 
crucial areas of our lives.19 For instance, while curtailing the option of smoking altogether is not 
considered permissible in liberal countries, it is now common practice to disincentivise this 
habit by making it wildly expensive, restricting smoking areas in public spaces and displaying 
gruesome images on cigarette packs.20 
 
 
 
II. Feminist Dissatisfaction with Autonomy 
Precisely because of its importance, autonomy and the conception of the political agent it 
underlies have attracted much of the feminist criticism directed towards liberalism. For 
instance, Jennifer Nedelsky (1989, 8) writes the following:  
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 In some jurisdictions, serious mental illness or mental disability also generates positive duties to ensure the 
welfare of the agents thus affected. See, for instance, Alberta’s Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, SA 2008, 
c A-4.2. 
17
 Even John Stuart Mill, one of the most ferocious opponents of paternalism, states that stopping someone from 
crossing a bridge was legitimated, if he does not know it is broken.  
18
 Given the complexity of modern medicine, the lengthy study required to become competent at identifying and 
treating illnesses, as well as the high risks implicated by a mistake or a misdiagnosis, it is thought legitimate for the 
state to restrict the autonomy of its citizens in this area. 
19
 As noted by Sarah Conly, recent research in behavioural science tends to show that far from being rational, self-
conscious and reflexively critical, we are rather fragile heteronomous beings with imperfect capacities to make 
good decisions for ourselves.  
20
 Other interesting examples of nudges that some liberal countries have adopted are making organ donation the 
default option and making the subscription to a universal health-care regime mandatory. See Thaler & Sunstein 
2008.  
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The notion of autonomy goes to the heart of liberalism and the powerful, yet 
ambivalent, feminist rejection of liberalism. The now familiar critique by 
feminists and communitarians is that liberalism takes atomistic individuals as 
the basic units of political and legal theory and thus fails to recognize the 
inherently social nature of human beings. Part of this critique is directed at 
the liberal vision of human beings as self-made and self-making men […]. 
The critics rightly insist that, of course, people are not self-made. We come 
into being in a social context that is literally constitutive of us.  
 It may seem exaggerated to reject liberalism as a whole because the conception of 
autonomy it favours does not encompass the social dimension of our lives. At first glance, this 
criticism might seem to be merely descriptive, pointing to the unrealism of understanding self-
determination without taking into account the importance of social influences.21 In response, 
one might be tempted to argue that autonomy is a work of abstraction and that abstract ideals 
necessarily ‘bracket out’ and exclude the contingent characteristics of real world agents, such as 
the ‘inherently social nature of human beings,’ in order to emphasise the relevant normative 
features of self-determination. One might point out that such an abstraction is unavoidable for 
normative theorising (or even theorising as such) in order to make sense of the world, and to 
formulate the principles that should guide our reasoning and actions.22 These observations 
would be true indeed. The work of abstraction that concepts such as that of ‘individual 
autonomy’ presuppose is necessary if we want them to serve their normative goals. As noted by 
Onora O’Neill (1996, 40), this work of abstraction is ‘theoretically and practically unavoidable 
[…] All uses of language must be more or less abstract; so must all reasoning’. This means that 
the understanding of autonomy we adopt will necessarily ignore aspects of concrete individual 
self-determination, such as the fact that human beings are neither ‘self-made’ nor ‘self-making’.  
 What I mean to show in this section is that understanding feminist criticisms as 
primarily directed towards the unrealistic portrayal of agency the liberal ideal of autonomy 
presents misses the point. What feminist criticisms point to is that the selective omissions this 
ideal operates are neither normatively neutral nor harmless. Likewise, what is picked out as the 
salient features of idealised autonomous self-determination is not problematic mainly because it 
is unrealistic and assumes, for instance, ‘transparent self-knowledge’ or ‘archangelic insight into 
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 Additional examples of such criticisms are the charge that human beings are not self-creating or independent 
from one another and that we need others in order to become autonomous and to exercise our autonomy in 
meaningful ways (Code 1991). Yet another criticism is that the nature of the human psyche makes it nearly 
impossible to possess the self-consciousness, self-transparency or internal coherency thought necessary to direct 
ourselves following our autonomous desires (Friedman 1986).  
22
 John Rawls (1993, 45–46), for instance, stresses that ‘the work of abstraction . . . is not gratuitous: not abstraction 
for abstraction’s sake. . .the deeper the conflict, the higher the level of abstraction to which we must ascend to get a 
clear and uncluttered view of its roots . . . formulating idealized, which is to say abstract, conceptions of society and 
person . . . is fundamental to finding a reasonable political conception of justice’. 
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others’ preferences’ (O’Neill 1987, 56). It is because it has problematic consequences on the 
political and legal levels. Addressing these criticisms, therefore, is not simply a matter of 
correcting the misleading sociological or/and psychological picture that this ideal draws. Rather, 
it is a matter of reframing this ideal in order to ensure that it does not inadvertently reproduce 
problematic symbolical, social and political consequences.  
 In this section, I regroup and summarise feminist dissatisfaction with autonomy under 
two broad categories. Criticisms regrouped under the ‘problem of exclusion’, point to the ways 
the liberal ideal of autonomy contributes to the reproduction of a problematic gender, class 
and race exclusionary hierarchy of value, which privileges and valorises dominant social 
identities (that is, among other things, identities such as ‘men’, ‘white’, ‘upper-middle class’) and 
denigrates others on the political and legal levels. They underline how what the ideal of 
autonomy emphasises as well as what it excludes undercuts, in practice, the liberal equality of 
respect as it implicitly contradicts the postulate that everyone should be seen as equal.  The 
second type of criticism I examine in this section is regrouped under the ‘problem of 
oppression’. This type of criticism underscores the inadequacies individualistic understandings 
of autonomy lead to with regard to oppressive norms/social context/relationships.  As Lisa 
Schwartzman (2006, 566) notes, ‘[t]he effects of oppression can be deep seated and yet 
invisible, and […] attempts simply to ‘‘abstract’’ from all knowledge about the social structure 
may backfire and implicitly endorse the effects of dominant ideologies’. Thus, criticisms 
pertaining to the problem of oppression point to the fact that excluding considerations relative 
to the socio-relational context cannot be justified because these features are not necessary nor 
normatively relevant to people’s autonomy. The fact is that our socio-relational context is 
fundamental to our ability to lead a self-governed life, and ignoring this fact can lead us to turn 
a blind eye towards the way social structures unequally restrict and/or enable our autonomy.  
  
 
A) The Problem of Exclusion 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, to ‘exclude’ someone means 1. to deny her access to a 
place, group, or privilege and/or 2. to remove her from consideration. In the case at hand, the 
exclusion I refer to can apply either to the agent or to her preference. Autonomy, indeed, is 
either used as a global qualifier, which applies to the agent as such, or it can be used locally and 
attributed to a particular preference the agent adopts or to a given choice she has made. In this 
regard, to exclude someone as not properly autonomous entails denying her the status of 
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autonomous agent and the political privileges that go with it (e.g. equal respect and 
consideration, attribution of the rights and freedoms necessary to make one’s own decisions 
unimpeded). When applied locally, the exclusion of a particular preference or choice entails 
not considering them as stemming from the autonomous will of the agent, and thus as not 
raising the liberal duty of respect and consideration.  In practice, this may mean excluding the 
preferences and interests that are deemed non-autonomous from political considerations.  
 Criticisms regrouped under the ‘problem of exclusion’ can thus be summarised as the 
following: adopting an individualistic conception of autonomy is problematic because it can 
lead us to deny certain people the status of autonomous agent and to remove their desires from 
political consideration. Given how autonomy is linked to equality and respect, excluding 
someone as not properly autonomous thus implies denying her status as a moral equal, who is 
as worthy of respect and consideration as we are.   
 The fact that the concept of autonomy is exclusionary may not, in itself, be a problem. 
In order to be useful, concepts have to possess a determinate application: they ought to apply 
only to the class of entity or phenomenon they aim at characterising, thus excluding others. 
The problem is that individualistic conceptualisations of autonomy lead to patterns of exclusion 
that are unfairly discriminatory towards particular social groups.  
 Thus, feminist criticisms regrouped under the problem of exclusion point to the 
following: what gets selected as the normatively relevant features of idealised autonomous self-
determination favours dominant identities. Moreover, what gets excluded and omitted renders 
it more difficult to manifest recognisable autonomy for women—especially those from minority 
groups. This, in turn, leads to problematic consequences on the political and social levels, as it 
participates in the systematic devaluation of preferences and social roles coded feminine and 
indirectly reinforces current systems of domination.  
 
 
1. Symbolic Exclusions  
Feminists have often underscored how autonomy is modelled after attributes symbolically 
associated with masculinity. This, in turn, opposes this ideal to traits, values and modes of self-
determination symbolically associated with women. Lorraine Code (1991, 359), for instance, 
argues that autonomy is associated with the ideal of the ‘autonomous man’ who is ‘self-
sufficient, independent, and self-reliant, a self-realizing individual’. Based on this understanding 
of autonomy, other people are conceived mainly as threats to the independence of the 
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autonomous man: his autonomy depends on protecting himself from their undue intrusion 
(Nedelsky 1989). Autonomy-as-independence can then be said to reproduce a gender 
hierarchy of values in which masculinity is associated with independence while femininity is 
primarily linked to dependence. Feminists such as Simone de Beauvoir have stressed how, on 
the symbolic level, women are primarily defined by their relationships to others: they are the 
‘second sex’, dependent on men for their self-definition (de Beauvoir 1949; Friedan 1963).23 
A related and often voiced concern stresses the alignment between autonomy and 
individualism. The fact that independence is seen as a condition of autonomy seems to imply a 
certain form of rational selfishness (Code 1991) that is radically opposed to responsibility, 
consideration and care for others. ‘Men’, writes Friedman (2000, 36) ‘are supposed to “stand 
up like a man” for what they believe or value, including the simple assertion of their self-
interest. By contrast, women are supposed to “stand by [their] man”’. They are, in other words, 
supporting, secondary actors whose primary function is to care for others. One of the most 
recurrent virtues symbolically associated with femininity is, after all, selflessness: the entire and 
absolute dedication of ‘good women’ to others. One needs only to recall the archetypal figure 
of feminine virtue haunting Virginia Woolf in Professions for Women (1942): the ‘utterly 
unselfish’ Angel in the House, who is ‘so constituted’ that she prefers to ‘sympathize always 
with the minds and wishes of others’.  
A third object of feminist criticism is the association of autonomy with rationality. 
Genevieve Lloyd (1984), for instance, demonstrates that the common philosophical 
presumption of rationality as a neutral and universal ideal can be seriously questioned. She 
shows that rationality has historically been conceptualised so as to exclude anything that was 
perceived as feminine. Whereas reason is male, argues Lloyd, its antithesis –irrationality and 
emotionality—is female.24 Rather than being a clearly identifiable faculty, universally possessed 
by humankind, reason is thus a culturally situated ideal; it is a normatively loaded term that has 
served as a status marker for (white) men from Western cultures.25  
 In addition to being construed as against femininity on the symbolic level, the 
autonomy ideal also problematically excludes certain types of subjectivity. Nancy Chodorow 
(1978) and Carol Gilligan (1982), who can be considered as major influences in the 
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 Similar criticisms are formulated by communitarians. See, for instance, Sandel (1982).  
24
 Likewise, Susan Hekman (1991, 57) notes that ‘[f]or centuries the conception of the feminine subject as 
irrational, passive, and emotional has been influential in excluding women from the political sphere’. 
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 Rationality has also served in colonialist discourses claiming the superiority of Western culture on others and 
legitimising imperialism. Kipling’s poem (1899), ‘The White Man’s Burden’, provides evidence of this. For other 
discourses legitimising colonialism on the grounds of white men’s duty to bring rationality to people deemed 
‘primitive’/’irrational’/‘childish’, see the anthropologist Levy-Bruhl (1926).  
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development of the relational conceptions of autonomy, were the first to formulate this type of 
criticism. To put it simply, they argue that the psychic development of males and females 
differs, given that mothers tend to assume the role of primary caregiver. Whereas the 
relationship of the mother with her son encourages the individuation and differentiation of the 
infant boy from his female caregiver, daughters tend to identify with their mother and develop 
fuzzy egos (Chodorow 1978). This, in turn, leads to different types of subjectivity and to 
different types of self-determination. Following Evelyn Fox-Keller (1985, 97), men adopt the 
model of autonomy-as-independence (which Fox-Keller calls ‘reactive autonomy’), whereas 
women’s sense of self is derived from others, which make them empathetic, conscious of their 
dependence on others and open to their needs. This is not necessarily due to innate 
characteristics but rather to the combination of the gender norms which structure individual 
subjectivity and the way sexual differentiation operates. In practice, the result is that autonomy, 
as traditionally conceived, is ill-equipped to account for the subjectivity and type of self-
determination of many women.26 
 Critical race theorists and post-structuralist thinkers formulate a similar criticism. 
Specifically, they argue that the ideal of autonomy, requiring as it does a sort of internal 
coherence achieved through critical self-reflection, problematically excludes the subjectivity of 
‘intersectional subjects’ and ‘border dwellers’ (Meyers 2000a; Lugones 1990). In addition to 
pointing to ways in which the self-transparency and reflexive self-consciousness demanded by 
the autonomy ideal is unrealistic, some feminists seek to show that internal coherence is much 
easier to achieve for members of the dominant group, who have little reason to question the 
desires and norms stemming from their group affiliation (Barvosa-Carter 2007, 10). As Gloria 
Anzaldúa explains, someone with a ‘mestiza consciousness’ will have to grapple with 
contradictions among her identities and negotiate between competing value systems and sets of 
meanings linked to these identities in her everyday life: she will experience daily struggles 
between her different desires. Maria Lugones (1990) presents a compelling illustration. As a 
lesbian, she is committed to combatting heterosexism. She also strongly identifies with her 
Latina identity, which is structured by traditional gender norms that are not quite compatible 
with homosexuality. This situation leaves her no alternative but to maintain a divided identity 
and ambivalence towards her conflicting identities. Diana Tietjens Meyers (2000a, 157) stresses 
that having such a conflicting identification can also present one with difficult ‘political 
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 This line of argument, which regards 1) men’s and women’s self-determination as significantly different and 2) 
presents feminine modes of self-determination as somewhat more valuable than men’s, is not without critics 
among feminists. See, for instance, Hirschmann (2014).  
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conundrums’. For instance, a black woman might find herself in an identity double bind as her 
‘commitment to antiracist politics may entail tolerating sexism, and commitment to feminist 
politics may entail tolerating racism’ (Meyers 2000a, 157). In this respect, linking autonomy to 
internal coherence problematically excludes the subjectivity of border dwellers who identify 
both as members of a specific minority and as members of the larger community. Yet, the 
cognitive struggle encountered by agents with multiple identity commitments can, in fact, 
provide precisely the critical distance from which to reflect, endorse, reject or transform the 
norms and outlooks stemming from her affiliations (Barvosa-Carter 2007, 8). This internal 
negotiation, in turn, can be interpreted as more conducive to autonomy, given that it forces the 
agent into the creative process of finding her own law (Meyers 2000a). 
 
2. Political Inadequacies 
Of course, even though rationality, independence and individualism are not symbolically 
associated with femininity, this does not mean that real women are necessarily less 
rational/independent/individualist than men. Likewise, women’s tendency to have (arguably) 
more trouble developing a psychological sense of independence does not entail that they 
should not aspire to be independent (Hirschmann 2014). The problem is that these symbolic 
exclusions translate, on the political level, into concrete forms of injustice and discriminatory 
exclusions. The ideal of the ‘autonomous man’ is still taken as a model to emulate in our 
society. It still underlies politics, laws, as well as popular culture, while the binary construction 
of male/female continues to structure the gender models that are available in our society and 
continues to influence social perceptions of both men and women. The fact remains that in our 
current social order, the association of autonomy with independence and individualism 
factually excludes more women than men. Gender norms still make it far more likely for 
women to be dependent on others, as their role as the primary caregivers of their family often 
leaves them dependent on the income of their partners. Moreover, the type of traits socially 
valorised in women —that is, empathy, care, and generosity— seem to be incompatible with 
autonomy, when this ideal is aligned with individualism. This, in turn, makes it more difficult to 
emulate autonomy for people who are not Western (white) males. More importantly, however, 
it also makes it more difficult for others to acknowledge and recognize the autonomy women 
manifest. Exclusions on the symbolic level thus contribute, in practice, to reinforce and 
reproduce gender inequalities.  
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Historically, autonomy has been mobilised to justify the exclusion of women from the 
political sphere. Seen as emotional, irrational and incapable of thinking for themselves, women 
were considered as eternal minors, unworthy of bearing the status of autonomous agents. The 
same has been true for members of many minority groups. Even if such a gross discriminatory 
exclusion is no longer acceptable or possible, women’s autonomy, especially the autonomy of 
women from minority groups, is still often assumed to be somewhat more fragile than that of 
men. I use concrete cases to further demonstrate this point in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  However, 
to offer a quick and evocative example here, one need only think of the recurrent controversies 
surrounding the veil, where it is often assumed that women cannot autonomously choose to 
wear such a religious symbol.27 This, in turn, partly supports arguments in favour of paternalistic 
bans, in spite of women’s claims that wearing the veil is their own choice.28 Women are thus still 
the main targets of paternalistic interventions, and their autonomy is much more likely to be 
put under scrutiny and questioned than that of men, as debates surrounding domestic violence, 
prostitution, surrogacy and the like demonstrate.  
This leads to an epistemological problem: the association of the ideal of autonomy with 
symbolically masculine traits leads to a failure to recognise manifestations of autonomy by 
women. This, in turn, reinforces testimonial injustices against women. This type of injustice 
occurs when a speaker is given less credibility than deserved because of prejudices related to 
her identity (Fricker 2007, 27-8). Epistemic authority is linked to receiving the status of 
autonomous agent, given that such status gives its bearer the authority to make his own 
decisions and have his desires taken into account. By contrast, putting an agent’s autonomy 
under question or identifying her desire as non-autonomous gives others no duty to take this 
desire into account or to grant her epistemic authority. As Beate Roessler (2015) argue, this 
type of injustice can destroy the agent’s sense of self-trust, which, in turn, further undermines 
her autonomy.29 In this respect, the association of autonomy with traits associated with 
masculinity reinforces bias against women and contributes to robbing women of their epistemic 
agency and autonomy. Among other things, some feminists argue that it contributes to the 
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 The recent debate on the burkini in France is illustrative of this. 
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 See Hirschmann (1997) and Djavann (2003). 
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 In Roessler’s words (2015, 79): ‘[e]pistemic injustice can undermine or destroy the basis of autonomy in 
undermining the self-knowledge and the self-worth of a person, which are constitutive for her autonomy. Without 
self-worth or self-respect and without “knowing herself,” a person cannot act autonomously as a rational agent, 
cannot reflect on what she wants to do, and cannot follow her project in the necessary self-confident way’. 
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systematic disbelief that the testimonies of victims of gender crime, such as domestic violence 
and sexual assault, encounter.30  
Autonomy has also been criticised because of the way it leads us to understand the role 
of the state. For instance, some take issue with its fostering of a demeaning attitude towards 
people who are dependent on the state for their subsistence. As Jonathan Herring (2014, 17) 
puts it, ‘[t]he assumption […] is that everyone is responsible for their own well-being. We 
should be self-sufficient […] being dependent on others or offering care to dependants is seen 
as antagonistic to the autonomous ideal’. This assumption, in turn, leads to framing women on 
welfare or women seeking child support as inadequately autonomous. On the political level, as 
Jennifer Nedelsky argues (2011, ch.3), it encourages legislators, administrators and politicians 
to treat these individuals in demeaning and paternalistic ways.  
Finally, autonomy is perceived as problematic due to its tendency to devalue care work 
and represent it as not properly part of an autonomous life. This type of work, in turn, goes 
unrecognised and unsupported on the political level, further reinforcing inequalities of 
economical means and power between the sexes (Herring 2014, Nedelsky 2011). Yet, care 
work is not just one of the options among the many available to autonomous agents. It is a 
necessary and integral part of human existence. Hence, Nedelsky (1989, 12) writes that ‘[i]f we 
ask ourselves what actually enables people to be autonomous, the answer is not isolation, but 
relationships —with parents, teachers, friends, loved ones-that provide the support and guidance 
necessary for the development and experience of autonomy’. In this respect, if the ideal of 
autonomy excludes responsibility and care for others, then it seems that it is conceptually 
flawed. We need caregivers and responsible agents in order for society to function and for 
individuals to become autonomous. If our conception of autonomy leads us to deny autonomy 
to the very types of actions that make it possible to become autonomous in the first place, it 
seems that this is both untenable and incoherent. 
 
B) The Problem of Oppression 
If there is an important need to fully acknowledge the types of agency that are mostly associated 
with women as worthy of respect, there is also a need not to reproduce the status quo of 
‘gender subordination, in which ‘women’ were coerced into particular roles and identities 
through socialization’ (Hutchings 2013, 16). In this respect, another important line of criticism 
concerns the failure to consider the implication of socialisation for autonomy. That we cannot 
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 See, for instance, Schneider (2000, 80-83) regarding the types of epistemic injustice encountered by female 
victims of domestic violence. We will return to this issue in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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become autonomous in a void implies that we need meaningful emotional connections with 
others and, more generally, a cultural context in order to become autonomous. Yet, this social 
context without which we cannot become autonomous or exercise our autonomy in any 
meaningful way can also reduce our autonomy in certain ways. In this regard, failing to devote 
sufficient attention to the social context leads to ignoring the power dynamics and (oppressive) 
norms existing within it. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (2000, 21) describe this as the 
socialisation problem, which they view as underlying ‘the impetus toward the development of 
relational approaches to autonomy’. As the socialization problem specifically concerns the 
threat oppressive socialisation poses to personal autonomy, I refer to this issue as ‘the problem 
of oppression’ in this thesis. 
 
1. What Is Oppression? 
While oppression constitutes a major concern for feminists (James 1998, 576), it remains 
difficult to find a clear and comprehensive definition of this concept. I propose a general 
characterisation of oppression here, based on Iris Marion Young’s account (1990, Ch. 2), as it 
can account for the types of phenomena feminists would generally want to characterise as 
oppressive. I will return to this topic in Chapter 3.  
‘Oppression’ is a group harm: it designates the structural disadvantage and injustice 
some people suffer as members of a social group. A ‘social group’ is a collective of persons 
who share similar traits, practices and/or ways of life.31 Oppression is also a structural harm. 
This means that for an injustice to count as oppressive, there is no need to identify a particular 
group or person as the oppressor. This enables us to acknowledge that everyday practices of 
well-intentioned members of society can create systemic, though not necessarily intentional, 
constraints on some groups of people (Young 1990, 41). If these constraints are unjust, then 
they are oppressive. Cultural stereotypes, unconscious bias underlying the everyday interactions 
of well-meaning people and structural features of social and political institutions can all have 
the unintended effect of systematically and unfairly disadvantaging members of a social group. 
In this respect, they can be called oppressive.  
The notion of ‘unfair disadvantage’ is a bit more difficult to define. As Judith Shklar 
(1990, 16) remarked, while philosophers debate how to define the concept of ‘justice,’ they 
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 As noted by Amy Cudd (2006, 37-50), the association of an individual with a group can be voluntary (religious 
communities, friendship groups, teams, etc.) or non-voluntary (culture, sexual orientation, gender, ethnic 
background). 
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have mostly ignored the issue of ‘injustice’.32 For our purpose, however, it remains important to 
adopt at least a minimal characterisation of injustice. Given that what constitutes a ‘just’ 
inequality is mostly a matter of justification, let us define ‘injustice’ as an unjustified inequality. 
Although injustice and inequality are often regarded as synonymous, the two terms are not 
equivalent: there are certainly some inequalities that can be justified.33 Of course, what 
constitutes a justification is likely to be subject to debate. For now, however, let us recognise 
that there are many inequalities, especially inequalities that affect individuals because of their 
group affiliation, that are widely recognised as unjustified and, therefore, as unjust. This 
intuitive understanding of ‘unfair disadvantage’ should be sufficient for the argument I will 
make later in this chapter. 
 
2. Conceptual Inadequacies 
Feminists have been dissatisfied with the ideal of autonomy as it is blind to the problem of 
oppressive socialisation. This ideal presumes that human beings can be independent from one 
another and leads to problematically ignoring the role that social context plays in the 
constitution of the capacities needed to be self-determined. Marilyn Friedman (2003), for 
instance, highlights the inadequacy of hierarchical theories of autonomy in dealing with the 
problem of oppression. As she points out, these accounts either ignore the problem of 
oppressive socialisation or tend to assume the existence of an authentic higher self, which emits 
preferences that remain untainted by the influence of the oppressive social context. Yet, there 
seems to be no reason to assume that someone’s higher-order preferences are not also 
produced by the social context in which she finds herself. Likewise, Paul Benson (1991) and 
Jennifer Warriner (2015) point out that a person who has been thoroughly socialised to 
internalise certain oppressive norms is unlikely to revise her desires as a result of critical 
reflection. In other words, mainstream liberal theorists are said to ignore what some feminists 
view as the gist of the problem of oppressive socialisation. As Marilyn Frye writes, ‘[e]fficient 
exploitation requires that those exploited be relatively mobile, self-animating and self-
maintaining’ (Frye 1983, 59). Hence, oppressive structures can maintain themselves through 
time only if they successfully convert (at least some of) the very people they oppress.  
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 For the most part, it has simply been assumed that it was the concept ‘justice’ that enabled us de facto to define 
the contours of injustice. As pointed out by Shklar, this assumption seems both unhelpful and inaccurate: such a 
definition does not, for instance, enable us to differentiate between misfortune and injustice. 
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 Rawls (1971) second principle of justice, is a good illustration of this point.  
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3. Political Inadequacies  
The fact that the ideal of autonomy ignores or fails adequately to account for the problem of 
oppressive socialisation leads, from a feminist perspective, to profound political inadequacies. 
Respect for voluntary choices is indeed a central feature of liberalism. Yet, as we have seen, 
preferences, attitudes and values tend to be differentially distributed on the basis of sex. This 
results in gendered choices that perpetuate income and power disparities among men and 
women and, in turn, reinforce the existing gender hierarchy. When it problematically ignores 
the impact socialisation can have on people’s choices, liberalism gives these gendered choices 
the same normative weight as other desires. These choices are understood as raising the same 
duty of respect and non-interference as other individual preferences, even if they reinforce and 
perpetuate injustice. This is not to say that feminists would necessarily want all desires that 
reinforce the global gender structure to be considered non-autonomous. The issue, as Diana 
Tietjens Meyers points out, is much more complex.34 Yet, the status of those choices, and what 
can be legitimately done about them, should be addressed within a theory of autonomy if it is 
to be of any use to feminists.  
 Another problematic feature of the mainstream liberal understanding of autonomy 
further reinforces this problem. As Nedelsky (2011) notes, because it assumes independent 
and self-sufficient agents who are capable of living their lives independent of others, the ideal of 
autonomy creates a problematic dichotomy between the individual and the collective. This 
ideal suggests that measures that promote the common good can only be brought about by 
infringing on individual autonomy. This, in turn, leads to a framing of any interference in the 
lives of individuals as illegitimate and paternalistic even when it can potentially help foster 
greater autonomy. It leaves no possibility to justify interventions in oppressive contexts—at least, 
as long as there is no gross discrimination or violence—as such an intervention is seen as 
illegitimate infringing on individual autonomy. In this regard, the liberal commitment to 
respecting people’s choices, paired with its lack of attention towards the effect of gendered 
social structures on individuals’ autonomy, make it impotent at best and complicit at worse, in 
reproducing the subjection of women (Levey 2005). 
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 Meyers poses it in terms of a conundrum (1989, xi): ‘If women's professed desires are products of their inferior 
position, should we give credence to those desires? If so, we seem to be capitulating to institutionalized injustice by 
gratifying warped desires. If not, we seem to be perpetuating injustice by showing disrespect for those individuals’.  
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III. The Relational Conceptions of Autonomy 
A) Why Keep Autonomy? 
As its feminist critics argue, the liberal ideal of autonomy that underlies our political and legal 
systems can be understood as fundamentally flawed as it proves hostile to women and to 
women’s interests. Why, then, is there an on-going reliance on this ideal if it leads to such 
grievous problems? There are at least three reasons that justify the continued vested interest 
feminists have in this ideal. These reasons, in turn, explain why many feminists have attempted 
to reframe autonomy rather than abandon this concept altogether. They also point to the fact 
that in spite of its current flaws, autonomy is still an important ideal for feminism that we 
should be wary of dismissing or disinvesting.  
 The first of these reasons is the fundamental role autonomy plays in Western societies. 
Whether we like it or not, within a liberal political system, autonomy still defines what 
constitutes a full-fledged agent, worthy of respect and consideration. It is crucially linked to 
both equality and to respect on the political level, which are two concepts that remain central 
for feminists. Autonomy determines what interests are worthy of consideration on the political 
level and, conversely, what options should be given to citizens as well as what preferences raise 
the liberal duty of respect. We can, of course, deplore the centrality of autonomy to liberalism 
and either reject liberalism as such or the importance it attributes to autonomy. Yet, it is 
difficult to avoid discussing autonomy altogether, especially if, as theorists, we are concerned 
with gender inequalities within Western liberal societies. Given how autonomy is woven into 
the very fabric of our political life, it seems unlikely that it will lose its place as one of the 
defining features of liberalism anytime soon. As feminist criticism notes, as it currently stands, 
this ideal is intrinsically linked to patriarchy and to the reproduction of an unjust and 
hierarchical social order that demeans and marginalises certain social identities. It thus seems 
problematic to ignore this ideal or to simply wish away its political importance and its 
normative consequences. Simply rejecting autonomy is unlikely to do much in terms of 
alleviating the normative imports this ideal has in our political system. In this respect, it remains 
important to redefine autonomy if we do not like the way it has been defined for us.  
 Second, autonomy remains central to feminism, insofar as feminist theorising remains 
centrally concerned with women’s emancipation.35 Being concerned about emancipation means 
ensuring that women do indeed have the ability to lead lives of their own choosing and do not 
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the power of another’; 2. ’to release from paternal care and responsibility’;3. ‘to free from any controlling 
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have their lives defined for them.  Yet, the working of feminist politics itself can sometime 
inadvertently reproduce the very paternalistic dynamics that feminists criticise as prohibiting 
women’s emancipation. Without the will to respect women’s autonomy, feminist politics faces 
the risk of merely displacing the coercive constraints that the patriarchal social order places on 
women. In this regard, it remains important not to abandon the ideal of autonomy as a central 
concern for feminism. Respect for autonomy can act as a necessary safeguard against our own 
pretentions to raise, as universal dictates, our own situated conception of the good. Thus, 
whether it is explicitly admitted or not, concern for autonomy remains central for feminists who 
believe that women’s emancipation should be able to take a plurality of forms.  
 Third, autonomy is also vital for feminist theorising insofar as it enables us to study and 
understand subjection, oppression and agency (Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000, 3). It can be argued 
that feminists do not need a concept of autonomy that accounts for the problem of oppressive 
socialisation in order to denounce norms and social conditions that lead vulnerable individuals 
to reinforce their own vulnerability. What we need instead is to study oppression directly. 
However, identifying oppression is intrinsically linked to understanding autonomy. One of the 
reasons why oppressive social structures are so difficult to uproot and eliminate is, indeed, 
because they are often invisible. As Nancy Hirschmann (2003, 77-93) explains, an oppressive 
social structure does not merely constitute a ‘misrepresentation of reality’ which artificially 
deforms our ‘authentic’ desires and our ‘true’ selves. When oppressive ideologies such as 
sexism are normalised, they become an integral part of our understanding of the world and of 
who we are. They acquire a material reality and become constitutive of our social identity, and 
self-conception. They give shape to our desires and meaning to our actions, and determine 
how we interpret our social reality.  Given the way oppressive norms become imbricated in the 
fabric of our social reality, it is highly difficult to identify them directly or to denounce them as 
problematic. It is often indirectly, through their effects on individual self-determination, that 
one can identify such problematic norms. When members of a given social group seem to 
adopt preferences for options that are socially devalued, and when they are significantly less 
likely to occupy socially valorised positions, suspicion should be high that oppression is at play 
as much in the social construction of value and meaning, as it is in the creation of constraints 
and barriers. 36  
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 As Nancy Hirschman (2003, 94) writes, ‘[t]he social choices that we make, the fact that certain options are 
available and others are not is thus a social construction in the most obvious, tangible sense. The availability of 
options relates most obviously to the concept of restraint or barrier, which is also socially constructed in this same 
sense […] They are not “natural” or “inevitable” but rather reflect cultural assumptions of how women should 
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 Of course, as it currently stands, the ideal of autonomy often serves to reinforce our 
current blindness to oppression. Because it leads us to regard the choices people make as 
detached from the social context in which they are made, an individualistic understanding of 
autonomy cannot be of much use to identify the oppressive structures of norms and 
expectations that constrain women’s self-determination. Yet, as many feminists postulate, rather 
than abandoning concerns for self-determination, this observation should motivate us to 
redefine the ideal so as to include concerns for the social forces that construct and constrain 
individual choices and preferences.  
 
B) The Relational Accounts of Autonomy 
In consideration of its central role for both feminism and liberalism, autonomy remains an 
important ideal for feminists. It acts as a bridge between the need, on the one hand, to offer 
legitimising grounds to tackle oppression without, on the other hand, abandoning the 
commitment to emancipation that feminism has in common with liberalism. Yet, as it is 
currently understood and conceptualised, autonomy can hardly serve these twin goals. Ignoring 
the social hierarchy of value that currently underlies this ideal and the way it favours dominant 
social identities both serves and supports the reproduction of exclusionary patriarchal dynamics 
on the political, social and legal levels. Likewise, ‘bracketing’ considerations relative to the 
social context out of autonomy can serve to hide oppressive dynamics and legitimate the status 
quo. This is why many feminists have tried to reframe autonomy in order to alleviate these 
problems. 
 These attempts to refigure autonomy in a way that captures the social dimension of 
agency have received the name of ‘relational autonomy’ in the literature. As Catriona 
Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar (2000) point out, ‘relational autonomy’ constitutes an ‘umbrella 
term’ and does not designate a single unified type of account. Rather, relational accounts 
present an eclectic collection of understandings of self-government. What these accounts share, 
however, is an emphasis on the social dimension of auto-determination and the will to arrive at 
an account of autonomy that is useful to feminist goals. Apart from that, relational views diverge 
widely (Mackenzie 2008, 519). As we will see in the following chapter, some frame personal 
autonomy as ‘relational’ mainly because they consider that social relationships contribute to the 
development of this capacity and can constitute a distorting influence in the formation of 
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certain preferences. Others view the social context as constitutive of the capacity itself. Some 
relational accounts focus on autonomy as a local property of certain preferences, whereas 
others frame it as a global attribute of individuals that can only be assessed when one looks at 
the social conditions that structure the agents’ lives as wholes. There are also many debates 
among relational theorists concerning what social conditions are necessary for autonomy. 
 Precisely because there is no easily identifiable formal feature that makes an account 
relational, these attempts to recast autonomy have been received with a healthy dose of 
scepticism within the literature. John Christman (2004, 146), for instance, writes that ‘there is 
nothing about a social conception of ‘self’ that is incompatible with an individual conception of 
autonomy’. Indeed, it is not always clear what relational accounts have to offer that is 
fundamentally different or new compared to mainstream understandings of autonomy. Clearly, 
we might criticise the individualistic focus of some liberal conceptions of autonomy.37 Yet, there 
are others who explicitly claim a compatibility of autonomy with caring relationships and social 
interdependence. The accounts devised by Joseph Raz (1986) and Gerald Dworkin (1988) 
constitute good examples of this. There is also a general acknowledgement, in the liberal 
literature on autonomy, that the competency for autonomy can be threatened and damaged by 
social obstacles such as coercion, manipulation and brainwashing. If existing accounts of 
autonomy can accommodate the social dimension of autonomy relational theorists have 
emphasised, is there any room left for alternative understandings of autonomy that would be 
distinctively relational?  
 In response to these questions, Christman (2004) has suggested that only those views 
that treat social relationships as conceptually necessary for autonomy offer something that is 
distinctively relational. He thus proposes to define ‘relational accounts’ as frameworks in which 
socio-relational factors play a constitutive role in the definition of autonomy itself. Conceptions 
of autonomy in which the socio-relational context merely makes a causal contribution to the 
development or sustenance of the capacity for autonomy would not count as relational 
(Westlund 2009, 26).  
Christman is right to point to the fact that most liberal conceptions of autonomy, if they 
do not already explicitly incorporate considerations regarding the social dimension of 
autonomy, are nonetheless compatible with such concerns. He is also correct in his assessment 
that there is nothing radically new or different with the accounts relational theorists have 
devised —that is, with the exception of those that consider certain social conditions as 
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constitutive of autonomy. Yet, I want to argue that trying to find a characteristic specific to 
relational accounts misses the point and leads to define such accounts in terms that are much 
too narrow. Many accounts of autonomy associated with the relational literature do not fit the 
characterisation offered by Christman.38 More importantly, as I have attempted to demonstrate 
in this chapter, attempts to detach autonomy from its individualistic connotations are primarily 
motivated by the will to avoid the problematic normative and political consequences that result 
from such characterisation. In this respect, the relational focus of the accounts devised by 
feminists can be framed as a by-product of the normative aims they had in mind: to address the 
problems of oppression and avoid that of exclusion.  
I therefore do not subscribe to Christman’s narrow definition of relational autonomy. 
In this thesis, I define ‘relational’ conceptions of autonomy as accounts designed to address the 
problem of oppression and the problem of exclusion, by integrating considerations pertaining 
to the social context. This general characterisation has the merit of being inclusive, as it can 
apply to all the theorists who are typically associated with the literature on relational autonomy. 
Yet, contrary to Christman’s more precise definition, it does not identify any specific formal 
feature of a framework that would make it distinctively relational and distinguish it from 
‘regular’ autonomy understandings.39 As I have suggested, feminists are not dissatisfied with 
autonomy merely because of some formal features that make it unrealistically individualistic. 
Rather, they criticise this ideal because by omitting the social dimension of auto-determination, 
it leads us to ignore oppression and can serve to unfairly exclude women (as well as members 
of other marginalised social groups) from political consideration. Attempts to reframe 
autonomy should therefore be understood as aimed at addressing their dissatisfaction with this 
ideal. For this goal, it is not enough to say that social context influences the development and 
the exercise of autonomy.  
 First, it is not sufficient to avoid feeding into problematic exclusionary dynamics. Most 
liberal accounts primarily associate autonomy with independence, rationality and internal 
coherence. Though these accounts do not make traditionally feminine values and modes of 
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interest does not lie in the ‘relational’ marker per se. Rather, I am interested in formulating a conception of 
autonomy that avoids the important inadequacies feminists have underlined.  
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determination incompatible with autonomy, they nonetheless do not consider them as a 
necessary part of an autonomous life. This, in turn, does not answer feminist concerns, as it 
reasserts the hierarchy of values that potentially reinforces exclusionary power dynamics on the 
political level.  There is a difference between arguing that autonomy should not be viewed as 
incompatible with social and relational commitments and explicitly reclaiming modes of agency 
traditionally coded as feminine as autonomous. Redefining autonomy in a way that explicitly 
negates the gendered hierarchy of values that has historically grounded understandings of 
autonomy seems to be, in this regard, what is needed to satisfactorily avoid the problem of 
exclusion. 
 Second, it is insufficient to address the problem of oppression. While most liberal 
theorists readily acknowledge that social obstacles such as manipulation and coercion threaten 
individual autonomy, few concern themselves with milder forms of oppressive socialisation.40 
Yet, gender norms are rarely enforced by manipulation or overt coercion. However, given the 
way they affect individual self-determination, in addition to the socio-economic inequalities they 
lead to on the political and social levels, it is important to answer the question of what can 
legitimately be done about them. Given that respect for autonomy defines the contours of 
legitimate state action, it remains important for an autonomy framework to directly address the 
status of gendered choices and preferences if it is to be useful for feminist purposes.  
 More importantly, however, philosophical conceptions of autonomy are not the main 
target of feminists. While it might be true that many liberal theorists are now careful not to 
exclude relational modes of agency, individualistic understandings of autonomy still very much 
underlie our political and legal systems, as well as our popular culture.41 In this respect, the 
main interest of relational accounts of autonomy is not that they satisfactorily replace 
mainstream philosophical understandings of autonomy. Rather, their main interest is that they 
attempt to transform the individualistic ideal that underlies many of our laws and policies on 
the political level to avoid its problematic social and political consequences (Nedelsky 2011). 
As argued earlier, feminist theorising requires autonomy, as an ideal, to underpin its normative 
projects. Therefore, the criticisms regrouped under the problems of exclusion and oppression 
do not point to the need to abandon this ideal altogether.  What they point to, instead, is the 
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 See Jennifer Nedelsky’s book (2011) and article (1989), which powerfully demonstrate how individualistic 
understandings of autonomy still shape bureaucracies, legal systems and various policies.  
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need to acknowledge that, as an abstraction, autonomy can never merely be ‘neutral’. It is 
always a normative ideal, and, as an ideal, it is subject to criticism and revision.42 Given the 
problems autonomy leads to, we have good reasons to attempt to revise and reform this ideal. 
Schwartzman (2006, 575) states the following:  
The solution […] is not simply to do away with all abstraction (and focus only 
on the concrete  particularities of each and every individual), nor is it to 
eliminate all conceptions of the person or all use of ideals. The best way to 
approach this problem may be to pay attention to the kinds of abstractions, 
ideals, and conceptions of the person that the theory employs and to disallow 
those that are sexist and that reinforce or perpetuate women’s oppression. 
Given the ramifications of autonomy on the political level, it is important to work towards 
conceptualisations of the ideal that neither ignore the problem of oppression nor reproduce 
the problem of exclusion. Understood in this way, feminist criticisms do not justify rejecting 
liberal accounts of autonomy altogether. A more accurate way of viewing relational 
reconceptualisations is to understand them as efforts to reform —rather than reject— liberal 
understandings of autonomy in a way that makes them more adequate for feminist aims. An 
important consideration is whether they succeed in offering better alternatives than mainstream 
accounts to guide political and legal praxis in a way that does not feed into and reinforce 
oppressive and exclusionary sexist dynamics. 
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Chapter 2: Existing Relational Frameworks 
 
Jennifer Nedelsky was the first theorist to spell out the idea of relational autonomy. In 
‘Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibility’, she argues that the individualistic 
understanding of autonomy that underpins our political system yields problematic results as it 
is transcribed into juridical and bureaucratic frameworks. Women, she states (1989, 10), need a 
conception of autonomy that incorporates their ‘experience of embeddedness in relations, both 
the inherent, underlying reality of such embeddedness and the oppressiveness of its current 
social forms’.  She argues for the adoption of a relational understanding of autonomy in which 
relationships are conceived as constitutive of individuals’ autonomy to guide both practice and 
theory, leaving the question of how such a conception ought to be developed open. Twenty-five 
years later, this compelling article has provoked the hatching of a growing and diverse body of 
literature on the concept of relational autonomy.  
 In this chapter, I critically examine the different relational accounts of autonomy that 
have developed so far. I evaluate them with respect to three criteria: 1. whether they enable us 
to address the problem of oppression; 2. whether they do this without falling back to the 
problem of exclusion; 3. whether they are operationalisable and could offer a credible 
replacement to the ideal of autonomy that currently underlies our laws and policies. I seek to 
demonstrate that none of the existing frameworks fully succeeds in satisfying these three 
criteria. I suggest that this is because most relational reconceptualisations remain too 
individualistic in their focus. They remain fixed on evaluating the individual competency of 
autonomy and mainly try to answer the question of what individual agent and/or preference 
should be considered autonomous.  
 Multiple attempts at definitions and classifications have been made to make sense of 
the growing diversity of these accounts. The more common classification divides them into two 
broad types: procedural and substantive (Stoljar & Mackenzie 2000). While the procedural 
accounts are seen as value neutral, the substantive accounts explicitly imply ‘non-neutral’ 
normative conditions.43 In this chapter, I follow this general division. I understand the 
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procedural accounts as those that frame autonomy as pertaining to the mental processes that 
underlie agency. These accounts can be local and concern particular preferences, desires or 
choices. Under a local account, if the mental process that led to the formation of a preference 
involves the right kind of competency, then it is properly autonomous and worthy of respect. 
They can also be global: if an agent possesses the right kind of emotional or mental 
competency, then she should be considered ‘globally’ autonomous.44 I suggest that even in their 
most demanding form procedural accounts remain unconvincing as a means to address the 
problem of oppression.  
 By contrast, substantive accounts of autonomy are explicitly devised to deal with the 
problem of oppressive socialisation. Here too, autonomy can be viewed as a local property of 
certain preferences or as a global attribute of individuals. I argue that precisely because they are 
substantive and treat certain preferences, actions and/or social conditions as incompatible with 
autonomy, this type of account cannot avoid reproducing the problem of exclusion.   
 Finally, the last section of this chapter is dedicated to an account that evades this neat 
typology. Instead of focusing on ways to identify non-autonomous agents or non-autonomous 
preferences, relational accounts of autonomy developed by legal theorists such as Nedelsky 
seek to reframe laws and institutions in a way that would be more hospitable to autonomy-
enabling relationships. Such a framework, I argue, offers valuable insight regarding the relation 
between individual autonomy and the socio-relational context. However, as it fails to offer clear 
normative guidance concerning what makes some social conditions autonomy-promoting and 
others autonomy-undermining, this type of framework does not fulfil its promises to serve as a 
suitable replacement for the individualistic ideal that underlies our laws and policies.   
 
1. Procedural Accounts 
The most common account of autonomy developed in a relational perspective is the 
procedural one. This kind of account aims to be content-neutral. In local conceptions of 
autonomy, this means that the contents of a person’s choices, preferences and beliefs are 
irrelevant to the issue of whether she is autonomous with regard to them. In global conceptions 
of autonomy, this means that whatever the conditions in which an agent exercises her 
autonomy, or the form taken by her agency, she can be still be autonomous. What is important 
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of autonomy’ as ‘the idea of living a self-governed life, the idea of autonomy as a global condition of persons rather 
than a transient characteristic’. She notes that there is a tendency to conflate this global state, which characterises 
the whole person with local autonomy—i.e. ‘autonomy with respect to some act or decision’ (Oshana 2002, 262). 
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for autonomy is whether the agent possesses and utilises the right kind of competency when she 
adopts a given preference or, more generally, when she exercises her agency.  
 
A) The Minimalist Model 
Marilyn Friedman’s (2003) account constitutes a good example of a minimalist-procedural 
conception of relational autonomy.45 She has developed what can be seen as a variant of Gerald 
Dworkin’s (1988) approach. In her view, autonomy primarily implies a form of self-reflection. 
It is a competency that allows a person to take an evaluative stance towards her desires: if the 
agent endorses these desires, these desires are to be viewed as autonomous. Similar to 
Dworkin, she states that ‘[w]hat autonomy requires […] is the absence of effective coercion, 
deception, manipulation, or anything else that interferes significantly with someone behaving in 
a way that reflects her wants and values’ (2003, 5-6). Given the relational dimension of her 
account, she states that ‘it does not matter whether someone’s concern is itself the product of 
her socialization or otherwise the result of circumstances over which she has no control’ (2003, 
11). What counts for autonomy is whether a person considers her commitments and goals to 
be ‘her own’. She distinguishes between different levels and kinds of self-reflection to show that 
autonomy is a matter of degree. However, she states that ‘[a] self who is at all minimally 
reflective has crossed a threshold’ and is autonomous. Likewise, for a desire to be considered 
autonomous, ‘[p]ractically any self-reflective reaffirmation will do’ (2003, 7), and it does not 
even have to be (fully) conscious.46  
The minimalism of this conception is strongly guided by the will to avoid categorising 
certain agents and subjectivities as non-autonomous. In this respect, Friedman (2003, 23) writes 
the following: 
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 Like Friedman, both Uma Narayan and Sarah Buss can be seen as utilising a minimalist conception of 
autonomy. Hence Buss (2005, 215) writes that ’[t]he key to […] self-governing agency is the distinction between a 
healthy human being and a human being who suffers from some psychological or physiological ‘affliction’ (e.g., 
intense pain, fear, anxiety, fatigue, depression, and obsession)’.  As for her, Narayan (2002, 429) writes that ‘[a] 
person's choice should be considered autonomous as long as the person was a ‘normal adult’ with no serious 
cognitive or emotional impairments and was not subject to literal outright coercion by others’. In both 
conceptions, autonomy is seen as endangered only when the agent presents abnormal psychological and emotional 
characteristics or is a victim of a serious form of coercion. The default position is thus that agents are autonomous. 
46
 Indeed, as Friedman (2003, 8) writes, ‘[t]he self-reflections that make choices and actions autonomous need not 
be conscious. Someone can be self-determining on particular occasions without representing her deep concerns to 
herself with conscious awareness at the time. As well, the commitments constituting the standpoint from which 
someone self-reflects need not be consciously accessible to her. What a person cares about may influence her self-
reflection and, from that, her behavior, subconsciously. So long as a person’s choices and actions reflect and issue 
from the self-reflections on her deeper wants and values that she undertakes from her overall perspective at some 
level of thought, they have at least a minimal degree of autonomy’.  
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In practice, someone’s failure to manifest recognizable autonomy, or, what is 
more important for theories of oppression, the failure of others to recognize 
her behaviour as autonomous, may well promote the conviction in others 
that she is not really capable of autonomy and, therefore, does not deserve 
the respect that is premised on a capacity for it […]Thus, an account of 
autonomy with fewer requirements has, independently of other 
considerations, the advantage of promoting a more inclusive sense of equal 
worth.  
In this regard, her account is explicitly designed to avoid the problem of exclusion.   
Attempts to articulate a minimalist definition of autonomy are important because they 
seek to stay clear of the cultural and rationalist biases that can be seen as informing liberal 
conceptions of autonomy. Doing so, they seek to avoid the problem of discriminatory 
exclusion and to challenge the assumption that behaviours that seem alien to liberals are de 
facto non-autonomous. Strongly guided by egalitarian concerns, they are sensitive to the effects 
of labelling someone non-autonomous on the political level. Given that the status of 
autonomous agent is coextensive, within liberal society, to being seen as an equal as worthy of 
consideration and respect as ourselves, Friedman seems right to point to the need to adopt a 
conception of autonomy with very minimal requirements.  
However, as Éléonore Lépinard (2011, 210) notes, ‘because it conceptualizes relations 
between the self, the social, and the individual action in a way that does not imply clear-cut 
decisions, self-awareness or self-determination’, it ‘casts some doubt on the vocabulary of 
“choice”’. The will to avoid denying autonomy to as many agents as possible leads proponents 
of a minimal conception of autonomy to redefine self-determination in the most inclusive 
terms possible. However, in doing so, this understanding of autonomy posits criteria that are 
too thin to address the problem of oppression. Such a minimalist conception of autonomy 
leaves us no tool to judge situations, norms or practices that could be problematic for personal 
autonomy. This seems unsatisfactory, as it leaves us with no grounds to either identify 
oppression or vindicate intervening in social contexts that are deleterious to individual 
autonomy. As it fails to devote sufficient attention to oppressive social conditions, adopting 
such a minimal conception of autonomy on the political level might equate leaving it to the 
individuals to negotiate over the constraints and abuses they encounter. In a nutshell, while it is 
adequately sensitive to the problem of exclusion, it nonetheless problematically neglects the 
problem of oppression. 
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B) The Historical Model  
John Christman (1991, 2005, 2009) has developed a more stringent criterion to assess whether 
a given choice, preference or value is to be viewed as autonomous. Like Friedman, his 
conception of autonomy is primarily guided by the will to avoid rejecting forms of agency that 
may seem at odds with the liberal idea of self-determination as non-autonomous. Although 
Christman does not understand his account to be relational, I consider his account in this 
chapter, as it seems guided by the will to address the two key concerns that underlie relational 
approaches to autonomy.47 Indeed, his version of the procedural approach seeks to take into 
account the social dimension of autonomous agency.48 His conception of autonomy readily 
admits that all our preferences are produced and influenced, to some extent, by our social 
conditions.49 Moreover, (and in contrast to proponents of the minimalist model), Christman 
wants to provide grounds to reject desires that are a product of the sort of ‘fierce conditioning’ 
that causes one to lead a ‘life of complete subservience’ (1991, 6). It is, in this respect, guided 
by the will to address the problem of oppression, as well as that of exclusion. 
 Oppressive socialisation is a problem for mainstream hierarchical autonomy accounts 
such as those developed by Gerald Dworkin (1988) or Harry Frankfurt (1987). In their 
accounts, a first order preference is autonomous if it is coherent with one’s second order 
preferences (Frankfurt 1987, 12-25; Dworkin 1988, 59). However, this view omits the role that 
oppressive socialisation can also play in conditioning agents’ second order preferences. 
Christman’s model can be seen as an attempt to remedy this problem. His account is historical 
because in order to avoid the problem of the hierarchical accounts of autonomy, he brings out 
the ‘historical’ or diachronic dimension of preference formation. His theory of autonomy thus 
‘focuses on the manner in which the agent came to have a set of desires rather than her attitude 
toward the desires at any one time’ (1991, 1). This view, in turn, entails that a person is 
autonomous with respect to a given preference if, upon becoming aware of the process that led 
to its formation, she did not resist its development or counterfactually (if she were to become 
aware of it) would not resist it. Autonomy, in this view, is thus a matter of reflective 
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 I am not the only one who views his account as relational. Mackenzie (2008, 519), for instance, notes that 
‘[a]lthough Christman sometimes represents procedural views as standing in opposition to relational theories, his 
version of the procedural approach could well be characterized as relational, since in his recent work he 
acknowledges the socially embedded, interpersonally constructed and historically situated nature of the self and 
the role of these factors in the constitution of agency’. 
48
 John Christman does not affiliate his historical and procedural account as relational. Indeed, as we have seen in 
Chapter 1, the narrow characterisation of the relational accounts he adopts leads him to oppose relational theories 
to procedural ones.  
49
 ‘Our values and preferences are explained by essential reference to a variety of influences that have come to bear 
on our development throughout our personal histories’, thus writes Christman (1991, 1). 
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endorsement that is directed towards the historical formation of preferences. Following 
Christman, this ‘counterfactual criterion’ offers a good guide to discover preferences that are 
the result of oppressive socialisation since an agent is likely to reject her preferences (or feel 
alienated towards them) if she were to discover that they were the result of an oppressive form 
of socialisation.50 This rejection constitutes the ground for an effective differentiation between 
autonomous and non-autonomous preferences (2009, 144-7). 
 One of the strengths of Christman’s account is the nuanced understanding of agency 
under the oppressive conditions it offers. The introduction of the diachronic dimension in his 
account of autonomy is, indeed, most helpful in understanding the constraints oppression can 
pose to self-government. It adequately captures the ways autonomy develops and is exercised 
over time, with the past always structuring the way this competency can be exercised in the 
present. It is also sensitive of the fact that agents can come to autonomously endorse 
preferences that were initially formed in an oppressive social context. As Christman (2004, 
155) writes, ‘[i]nsofar as the self is socially constituted, it is counter-intuitive to claim that such a 
self is only autonomous if she can break away from those very social conditions, authoritarian 
though they are, that constitute her being’. This, in turn, ensures that his account avoids 
excluding the preferences of agents because they were formed in conditions deemed 
oppressive. His account, in this regard, is adequately mindful of the problem of exclusion with 
respect to agents in oppressive social conditions. To stipulate that the declared preferences of 
agents embedded in oppressive social conditions are necessarily non-autonomous seems to 
introduce a radical and unfair divide between the preferences of agents who are deemed 
oppressed and our own preferences. On the political level, this would seem to imply that the 
preferences of agents socialised in oppressive conditions can never be seen as genuine, and as 
worthy of respect. By contrast, Christman states that provided that an agent maintains the ability 
to reflect, in an adequate manner, on the conditions that led to the acquisition of her 
preferences and still chooses to embrace them, these preferences are worthy of respect. In this 
regard, his account seems adequately mindful of the problem of exclusion, as it seeks to avoid 
unfairly excluding the preferences of agents struggling with oppressive constraints from 
consideration.  
 However, in spite of his efforts to offer a basis to address the problem of oppression, 
the account of autonomy Christman offers remains unconvincing in this respect. The counter-
factual criterion seems unlikely to help us much in identifying the kind of warped and non-
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 This ‘alienation’ is not necessarily reflective. It can also take the form of a negative emotional reaction to the 
desire (Christman 2009, 144, 155–6). 
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autonomous desires that oppressive circumstances produce. First, relying on this criterion 
seems to imply the same sort of implausibly transparent self-knowledge or ‘archangelic insight 
into others’ preferences’ criticised in mainstream hierarchical accounts of autonomy (O’Neill 
1987, 56). Indeed, it seems that only the possession of such inhuman skills would make it 
possible confidently to trace the origins of preferences and identify those that are produced by 
oppressive socialisation. Second, even if an individual were able to effectuate the counterfactual 
analysis and came to discover that her preference was the result of the integration of an 
oppressive social norm, it is unlikely that she would ever repudiate it on this basis. As Benson 
(1991) points out, it seems implausible that a person who has been thoroughly socialised to 
internalise a given norm would reject what came to be her high-order preference, even if she 
was aware that it was the result of oppressive socialisation. In this respect, Christman seems to 
ignore what some feminists view as the very gist of the problem of oppression: it is precisely the 
agents whose autonomy is the most impaired by their oppressive circumstances that are the 
least likely to repudiate the desires and preferences that an oppressive script imposes on them. 
As a result, this criterion for assessing the autonomy of a choice or preference comes across as 
an implausible mechanism for identifying precisely the sort of preference produced by ‘fierce 
conditioning’ that Christman describes as non-autonomous (Benson 1991; Stoljar 2000; 
Warriner 2015). In short, it seems that the will to formulate an account that cannot be used to 
de facto exclude or dismiss the preferences of agents struggling with oppressive circumstances 
leads Christman to formulate a criterion which, in practice, proves too thin to be of much help 
in identifying the warped desires that oppression produces.   
 Moreover, for Christman, it seems that apart from their effect on creating preferences 
that are not genuinely endorsed by agents, oppressive social conditions are not much of a 
concern for autonomous self-determination. Christman’s account integrates concerns for the 
social dimension of autonomy, but these concerns are indirect and provide an insufficient basis 
to identify oppression. In his account, oppressive conditions become visible only when an agent 
possesses the kind of lucidity necessary to repudiate the desires she conceives as stemming 
from problematic social forces. This, in turn, seems to transform the identification of 
oppression into an individual and subjective matter: what might be considered oppressive for 
one particular agent might not be considered as such for another. His focus on individual 
internal competency for reflexive critical thinking and endorsement thus reproduces the 
problem of mainstream accounts and makes his understanding of autonomy blind to the actual 
oppressive forces which exist independently of individuals’ perceptions, and constrain the kind 
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of desires they can endorse. This, in turn, makes his account unsatisfactory to address the 
problem of oppression. It provides no grounds to vindicate political action when oppressive 
conditions are effective before they create the kind of ‘fierce conditioning’ Christman wants to 
avoid. Such an account is thus unsatisfactory to address the problem of oppression, given the 
central role autonomy has in justifying political action and preventing it.  
 
C)  The Self-Regarding Attitude Model 
In contrast to Christman’s account, the self-regarding attitude model of autonomy does not 
presuppose critical self-reflection or even self-consciousness to be a sufficient guarantee for self-
government.51 Proponents of such an understanding of autonomy thus disagree with Christman 
on the type of characteristics that should be associated with autonomy. Paul Benson, for 
instance, contends that individuals’ ‘status as agents […] is not guaranteed by their abilities to act 
freely by reflectively authorizing their wills and their actions’ (1994, 650). Rather than linking 
autonomy to abilities such as rationality or critical self-reflection, proponents of this kind of 
account seek to acknowledge ‘the place of emotionally textured, reflexive attitudes in persons’ 
capacity to take ownership of what they do’ (Benson 2005, 119). Autonomous agency is thus 
understood as a form of self-ownership that stems from emotional attitudes such as ‘self-worth’, 
‘self-esteem’ and ‘self-care’.52 In Benson’s account (1994, 2000, 2005), autonomous agents are 
those who have the competence to claim their actions as their own, as well as the authority to 
speak for themselves in justifying these actions (Benson 1994, 2005).53 This ownership implies 
both an emotional disposition—the self-worth necessary to regard ‘oneself as being competent’ 
(1994, 660)—and a more active competence to  ‘actively claim or seize’ ownership of their 
actions (Benson 2005, 110).  
 Accounts that view autonomy as residing within a certain emotional disposition towards 
the self incorporate more straight-forward considerations pertaining to the social context than 
do more classically internalist understandings of autonomy such as Christman’s. A self-
regarding understanding of autonomy, explains Benson, is relational in at least two respects. 
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 Self-regarding attitude accounts are sometimes classified as weakly substantive accounts (Benson 2005). I classify 
them as procedural accounts here, as these understandings of autonomy aim at being content neutral with regard 
to the kind of desires that are endorsed. Westlund (2009), who adopt a conception of autonomy that is very close 
to that of Benson, regards her own account as procedural.  
52
 Among the other contenders of such an approach to autonomy are Paul Benson (1994, 2000, 2005), Andrea C. 
Westlund (2003, 2009), Carolyn McLeod and Susan Sherwin (2000), Catriona Mackenzie (2000, 2001, 2008) and 
Robin S. Dillon (1992, 1999).  
53
 Contrary to John Christman’s historical account, Benson’s model is therefore not based on identity or 
authenticity, as he explains that the autonomous action ‘need not be authorized as belonging to or expressing what 
[the agents] really care about’. Rather, an agent’s motives are his own because the agent possesses a certain kind of 
authority regarding them, which entails that he feels entitled to claim ownership over them.  
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First, the self-worth required for autonomy is relationally enabled and partly created by others’ 
recognition (2005, 112). For this reason, oppressive socialisation or negative stereotypes 
regarding an aspect of one’s identity should be considered a serious threat to autonomy, as they 
can corrode self-worth and indirectly harm an agent’s ability to take ownership of her actions 
(Benson 2005, 2015). Second, the ability to take ownership of one’s action is intrinsically 
linked to one’s social position.54 Thus, oppressive social conditions can still pose a problem for 
autonomy, even if the agent were able to retain her sense of self-worth and has successfully 
resisted internalising demeaning views about herself. Given that an oppressive social order 
functions by implicitly negating the equal social standing of those it oppresses, it often ends up 
affecting the ability of an agent to speak for herself and to be adequately listened to by others. 
However, neither of these two problems that oppression creates is truly inescapable according 
to Benson. An agent can successfully reclaim her self-ownership by ‘taking a new stance toward 
[her] social position as an agent’ and by deliberately ‘and perhaps in some public way’ 
reclaiming it ‘in order to secure in [her] own mind [her] regard for [her] competence and 
worthiness to speak for [herself]’ (Benson, 2005, 115). 
 In Benson’s view, the self-regarding attitude model is the best suited to account for the 
problem of oppression without, for all that, becoming too demanding. Indeed, similar to 
minimalist and historical models, this account does not reduce the range of preferences an 
agent can autonomously endorse and leaves room for the possibility that she might 
autonomously abide by ‘subservient’ norms of behaviour.55 It also leaves open the possibility 
that an agent could restore her autonomy, even if she is struggling with oppressive social 
conditions. Taken together, these two aspects of the understanding of autonomy that he offers 
seem indeed promising to avoid the problem of discriminatory exclusion. As it leads to an 
understanding of this competency mainly in terms of being able to speak for oneself and see 
oneself as responsible for one’s own actions, a self-regarding understanding of autonomy does 
not deny autonomy to the expressed preferences of agents. Provided an agent sees herself as 
adequately competent to speak in her own name, this kind of account yields the conclusion 
that we should consider her as autonomous and treat her as such. As the relational dimension 
of the account stipulates, refusing to do so would contribute to the oppressive dynamics that 
threaten her autonomy. This realisation, in turn, neatly captures what is so troubling in 
discriminatory exclusion: denying the status of autonomous agent to an individual because she 
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  ‘Intuitively, this position is captured in the idea that those who take ownership of their intentions and actions are 
appropriately positioned to own up to them, or to speak for them’, Benson explains (2005, 108). 
55
 On this particular topic, see Westlund (2003). 
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is oppressed can sometimes end up reinforcing and reproducing the very oppressive dynamics 
that reduced her autonomy in the first place.  
 As Stoljar and Mackenzie (2000, 21) state, this kind of account also ‘[p]rovides a good 
starting point in explaining why agents who are operating within oppressive institutions and 
structures exhibit failures of autonomy’. As it addresses the social and discursive dimensions of 
autonomy (Benson 2005, 112), the account Benson offers is more sensitive to the way adverse 
social conditions can threaten autonomy than most procedural understandings of this 
competency. Interestingly enough, it is also one of the rare understandings of autonomy that 
enables one to capture and theorise the threats that social factors such as negative stereotypes, 
unequal social standing and unequal social recognition can pose to an individual’s autonomy. 
In this respect, self-regarding understandings of autonomy can potentially offer a valuable 
normative guidance as well as a justificatory basis to ground political actions aimed at reforming 
aspects of the socio-relational contexts that prove deleterious to agents’ self-worth. However, 
the main issue with this kind of account is that identifying these problematic aspects solely 
through the deficits they create in self-worth insufficiently addresses the problem of oppression.  
 More specifically, self-regarding accounts of autonomy function on the basis of two 
assumptions that can be questioned: first, that autonomy is to be equated with the competency 
to take ownership of one’s actions; second, that oppression harms autonomy mainly as it 
erodes the agent’s self-worth and self-ownership. To understand self-government merely as the 
possession of the self-worth necessary to regard oneself as a competent agent responsible for 
her desires and actions seems to render autonomy akin to Berlin’s sinister ‘freedom of the 
stoic’.56 It implies that whatever external constraints I might face and whatever social roles I am 
coerced into, I can still be autonomous provided I continue seeing myself as an agent and can 
reclaim what was forced on me as my own choice. This ignores the vested psychological 
interest most of us have in seeing ourselves as agents. It also overlooks the fact that what often 
makes oppressive social orders particularly pernicious is that the system of beliefs and norms 
they impose are reclaimed by individuals as their own and become an integral part of their 
sense of self-worth. Jennifer Warriner, for instance, notes the following (2015, 37): 
[S]ubordinate individuals have an interest in seeing themselves -and having 
others see them- not as slaves who cannot act for their own reasons but as 
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 Berlin talks about the ‘freedom of the stoic’ in his influential essay ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ (1969). See, in 
particular, part III where Berlin criticises positive freedom (and thus autonomy) because it is conceived mainly as 
a set of internal attitudes. This, in turn, makes it possible to still be autonomous (provided one adapts her own 
desires and internal attitudes) when encountering terrible constraints.  He notes that ‘every form of autonomy, has 
in it some element of this attitude. I eliminate the obstacles in my path by abandoning the path’. 
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individuals who authorize and exercise their will for their own reasons […] 
dominant individuals also have an interest in ensuring that the subordinated 
individuals view themselves as having agential authority. This is because 
oppressive social relations are best maintained and have the best possibility 
of continuing not when subordinated individuals are forced to accept a 
subordinate status, but when subordinated individuals exercise (and view 
themselves as exercising) their agency to willingly accept their subordinate 
status.  
 Reviewing Kathryn Joyce’s study of the Christian Patriarchy Movement (2009), 
Warriner notes that oppression, far from being necessarily destructive for the subordinate’s 
sense of self-worth and agential authority, can provide her with a narrative that glorifies her own 
subservience and enables her to posit it as freely chosen. However, as she stresses, when 
subordinate individuals possess no other viable option besides abiding by the ‘script’ they are 
given, it seems legitimate to entertain doubts concerning the choices that perpetuate their 
‘subordinate status’. When such cases arise, it seems unsatisfactory simply to state that such 
imposed choices should be viewed and respected as autonomous because the individuals were 
able to claim ownership over their compliance with oppressive norms. In sum, as it considers 
oppression mainly as a threat to an individual’s self-worth, this type of account seems too thin 
to properly address the problem of oppression.  
 
D) The Competencies Model 
The main proponent of a competencies model of autonomy is Diana Tietjens Meyers (1987, 
1989). For her, autonomy requires the ability to formulate and identify desires of the ‘true 
autonomous self’, as well as sufficient internal and external control to realise these desires.57 
Like other procedural proponents, Meyers is deeply concerned with the issue of exclusion and 
explicitly rejects the traditional association of autonomy with rationality and independence.58 
Like Christman, she links autonomy to authenticity. However, in place of a counterfactual 
endorsement, for her autonomy requires the exercise of a ‘repertory of coordinated skills that 
makes self-discovery, self-definition, and self-direction possible’ (1989, 76). This repertory 
includes, among other things, skills such as memory, imagination, instrumental and critical 
reason, the disposition to consult oneself and the capacities to both resist external pressures 
                                                 
57
 She indeed explains that ‘the explanation of a competent person’s flawed use of this competency [for autonomy] 
can be external or internal’. In her view, ‘social structures or more can defeat autonomy skills’ (1989, 89). 
58
 By contrast, she writes that ‘‘[j]ust the reverse of promoting embattled isolation, autonomy competency fosters a 
form of affection that is compatible with reciprocal dependency and care’ (1989, 85). 
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and act following one’s own judgement (1989, 80-91).59 In contrast to most autonomy theorists, 
she does not regard the particular repertory of skills she mentions as necessary for all 
individuals’ self-government. Rather, they are meant to exemplify the types of competencies 
that might be of use in self-discovery, self-definition and self-direction. In her view, since there 
is a large variety of people and circumstances, ‘to affirm a list of universal personal goods […] 
and to maintain that every autonomous life must realize such goods is to deny the uniqueness 
of individuals’ (1989, 82). Her conception of autonomy is, in this respect, explicitly articulated 
so as account for the variety of forms authentic and autonomous agency can take. Hence, in 
contrast to the coherent and unitary self often implied in mainstream conceptions of autonomy, 
Meyers’ account readily admits that our identity is always an evolving and fragmentary 
assortment of attributes that emerges through the exercise of our autonomy and the on-going 
use of our skills for self-discovery, self-definition and self-direction (Meyers 2005, 49).60  
 For Meyers, autonomy requires external conditions insofar as such conditions are 
necessary to ensure the acquisition of the autonomy competencies. Reflecting more specifically 
on the issue of feminine socialisation, Meyers argues that traditional Western gender 
socialisation may foster the emotional receptivity and perceptiveness needed for self-discovery. 
It can nonetheless simultaneously hinder the skills for self-direction and self-definition that are 
also needed for self-government (Meyers 1987 & 1989, 3.2).61 Therefore, one of Meyers’ main 
goals is to offer a conception of autonomy that can account for the ways gender socialisation 
and oppressive social circumstances may curtail an individual’s autonomy without, however, 
extinguishing it. If, like the other procedural autonomy proponents, she does not want to 
dismiss the ‘traditional women’ type of agency as non-autonomous, she nonetheless takes the 
issue of oppression to heart. She thus devises a framework that would enable us to push 
emancipatory goals independently of whether the preferences imposed by feminine 
socialisation become autonomously endorsed by individuals. In this respect, even if 
traditionally feminine roles cannot be excluded as non-autonomous, ‘insofar as feminine 
socialization impedes the development and the exercise of autonomy competency, feminists 
must seek to overhaul these socialization practices’ (1987, 628).62 For example, in order to 
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 In Meyers’ account, the capacity to resist pressure and to act following one’s own judgement are both ‘volitional 
modes of agency’ and are respectively called the ‘resistance’ mode and the ‘resolve’ mode (1989, 83). 
60
 See also her article ‘Intersectionality Identity and the Authentic Self?: Opposites Attract!’ (Meyers 2000). 
61
 Men do not, however, fare much better than women: gender socialisation also hinders some of their autonomy 
skills (Meyers 1989, 141-55). 
62
 Indeed, given Meyers account of content neutrality, even if a woman abides by the most traditional gender 
norms, she still cannot, for all that, be judged non-autonomous. Provided that she makes a correct use of her 
autonomy skills, she can even be more autonomous than one who refuses these norms and traditions (1989, 90). 
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counterbalance the potentially deleterious effect of gender norms, Meyers argues for the 
importance of education programmes that ‘augment autonomy’ by mobilising, for example, 
women’s introspection and imagination (Meyers 2000a, 485).63 
 There are many merits to the nuanced and sophisticated account of autonomy that 
Meyers develops. Its complexity and open-endedness enable her to account for the multiplicity 
and diversity of autonomous behaviours. In contrast to most procedural theorists, she readily 
acknowledges that associating autonomy with one particular characteristic is problematic, 
insofar as it implicitly links self-government to particular conceptions of the good life. Thus, 
when critical self-reflection and self-worth are seen as the main skills needed to autonomously 
endorse or reclaim desires as one’s own, these skills become elevated as the virtues that make 
us full-fledged agents worthy of respect and consideration. This implicitly frames certain 
conceptions of the good as superior (or at least more autonomy-enhancing), and thereby 
valorises these traits.64 Yet, as Meyers convincingly argues, it remains unclear as to why a 
particular competency should be conceived as the fundamental marker of the capacity to lead a 
life of one’s own choosing. While possessing the self-worth necessary to see oneself as an agent 
or being self-reflective enough to endorse one’s desires might help one lead a self-governed life, 
it seems doubtful that any of these particular skills should be considered as the sole marker of 
autonomy. As Meyers’ account acknowledges, leading a life that is truly one’s own can involve a 
multiplicity of competencies, and identifying only one of these as salient for autonomy leaves us 
with a one-dimensional and simplistic portrait of what it means to be self-governing. In this 
regard, her framework seems truly immune to the problem of discriminatory exclusion. 
This multidimensional portrayal of autonomy also leaves more of an opportunity to 
recognise oppressive forces and the complex ways they operate. It makes it easier to 
acknowledge that socialisation and norms can be oppressive in certain respects and autonomy-
promoting in others. This, in turn, potentially vindicates emancipatory policies aimed at 
ensuring the development of the skills needed for autonomy. Given Meyers’ focus on skills 
acquisition, her autonomy account could serve as a powerful guide to create educational 
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 This citation is taken from Meyers’ article on the practice of female genital cutting (2000a). Outside of this 
particular context, however, education is also seen as an important means to promote individuals’ autonomy. 
Hence, she writes (2004, 55), ‘I can't resist putting in a plug for liberal education here, for it seems to me that 
education […] has a pivotal role to play in strengthening self-definition skills and thus in securing autonomy. I 
would stress, moreover, that liberal education should not be confined to colleges and universities; grade schools 
and high schools should also see liberal education as their mission’. See also 1989, 189-202. 
64
 It also opens the door to scalar comparisons between individuals, which could enable the situating of agents on 
an autonomy scale depending on the degree of competency they seem to manifest. In this respect, these 
conceptions risk indirectly reinforcing the problematic exclusionary dynamics of which they seek to steer clear. I 
will return to this point in the following chapter. 
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programmes aimed at promoting and fostering the autonomy of children (and vulnerable 
adults).  
 Meyers’ account, however, also has certain faults associated with its qualities. Precisely 
because of its open-endedness and the complex picture it offers of the interaction of social 
forces and individual self-determination, it fails to convince as a means to address the problem 
of oppression. While she argues that her account can help identify oppression and justify 
political action, this claim becomes difficult to sustain in the face of her open-ended conception 
of the skills needed to lead an autonomous life. Indeed, if Meyers is right that gender norms do 
foster the development of certain skills needed for self-government, how can we justify trying to 
reform them? The claim that we can do so because they tend to hinder other skills needed for 
self-direction or self-discovery does not seem very convincing. It seems that all social practices, 
as well as all forms of socialisation, will foster certain skills while hindering others. In this 
respect, instead of providing us with normative guidance to identify oppressive constraints and 
ground political action, Meyers’ open-ended framework seems instead to open the door to an 
ad hoc intuitionist approach to political action. Moreover, many real-life cases that arise in the 
political sphere revolve around the question of how to assess the autonomy of vulnerable 
individuals. What are we to do, for example, with the battered woman who wants to stay with 
her abuser in spite of the abuse and refuses to press charges against him? 65 If her desires are to 
be seen as autonomous, then it seems that they ought to be respected. If not, then this might as 
a reason for the state to prevent further contact with her abuser and orchestrate a prosecution 
that does not hinge on her consent. Given that, for Meyers, ‘only the individuals can be the 
measure of their own autonomy’(1989, 82), it becomes very difficult, in practice, to use her 
approach to identify oppressive constraints and to assess concrete cases.  
 This latter problem is not confined to Meyers’ competency model. Indeed, it seems 
that by virtue of its nature, any versions of the procedural approach will find itself with this 
difficulty. Because it is committed to content neutrality, procedural accounts rely on the 
assessment of the mental and emotional procedures associated with autonomy in order to 
determine if a preference is worthy of respect or if an agent should be considered as globally 
autonomous. However, since this kind of criterion focuses exclusively on the agent’s interiority, 
it fails to devote sufficient attention to the way the socio-relational context might, in fact, ‘force’ 
an agent to adopt a preference. There thus always remain legitimate doubts regarding whether 
self-worth, critical reflection (or the exercise of any given skill) actually ensure that a preference 
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 I will return to this kind of case in Chapter 5.  
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is truly autonomous. Moreover, in all of the variations we have seen in this section, procedural 
criteria only enable us to judge preferences as non-autonomous in the cases where the agent 
readily admits her own heteronomy and alienation towards them. This makes procedural 
accounts ultimately unconvincing as means to address the problem of oppression given that we 
do not have the sort of epistemic access to the agent’s psyche that would allow us to verify if her 
preference was, truly, properly endorsed. In short, while assessing autonomy on the basis of the 
kind of relation the agent has with her preferences allows the sort of content neutrality needed 
to avoid the problem of exclusion, it also internalises the criterion used to assess autonomy. 
This has the effect of making autonomy a matter of individual perception. What might 
constitute a non-autonomous preference for any given agent might not be problematic for 
another, even if the content of the preference is the same and if it was acquired in the same 
way. This makes this kind of account unsatisfactory as a way to properly address the problem 
of oppression. 
 
 
II. Substantive Accounts  
A) Strong Substantive Accounts 
In contrast to procedural accounts, strong substantive accounts are developed as an explicit 
means to address the problem of oppression. This kind of account aims at identifying 
preferences that might seem authentic and autonomous to the agent who endorses them but 
are, in fact, the result of an oppressive socialisation. Theorists working within this framework 
put forward substantive criteria to assess the autonomy of a preference. Such criteria are 
explicitly non-normatively neutral. They stipulate that the content of certain preferences 
renders them incompatible with autonomy.66 Proponents of such a substantive view contend 
that limiting the range of preferences that can be called autonomous is necessary to detect the 
kind of warped desires that oppressive social conditions induce. Natalie Stoljar, for instance, 
argues that only a substantive criterion can account for what she refers to as ‘feminist intuition’: 
namely that ‘preferences influenced by oppressive norms of femininity cannot be autonomous’ 
(Stoljar 2000, 95). Thus, in a strong substantive account of autonomy, insofar as preferences 
are found to be coherent with an oppressive norm or script, they are to be judged non-
autonomous. 
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 Among the proponents of a substantive account of autonomy are Natalie Stoljar (2000) and Jennifer Warriner 
(2015). Before adopting a procedural (or weak substantive) model of autonomy, Paul Benson (1991) also 
identified with such an account of autonomy.  
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 In order to demonstrate that strong substantive accounts alone can account for the 
problem of oppressive socialisation, Stoljar uses Luker’s study of fifty women who attended an 
abortion clinic in California as a result of failing to use a contraceptive. This study was aimed at 
understanding why women, who presumably had freely available methods of contraception, 
nonetheless failed to make good use of them and ended up with unwanted pregnancies. Stoljar 
shares Luker’s presentation of these women as acting in a way that is both rational and 
reasonable given their understanding of their situation. Yet, she argues (2000, 96) that these 
cases nonetheless ‘trigger the intuition that they are not autonomous’. Analysing Luker’s 
interviews, she aims to show that the preferences the women exhibited —and the contraceptive 
risks they took— stemmed from the internalisation of oppressive norms of femininity that made 
the option of taking contraceptives costlier and increased the benefits of risking an unplanned 
pregnancy. She states the following: 
The overall picture derived from these interviews is one of women motivated 
in large part by the following norms: it is inappropriate for women to have 
active sex lives; it is unseemly for women to plan for and initiate sex; it is 
wrong to engage in or be seen to engage in premarital sex; pregnancy and 
childbearing promote one’s  worthiness by proving one is a ‘real woman’; […] 
women are worthwhile partners only if they are capable of childbearing. 
(Stoljar 2000, 99)  
 In Stoljar’s view (2000, 109), ‘[w]omen who accept [these] norms […] accept something 
false. And because of the internalization of [these norms], they do not have the capacity to 
perceive [them] as false’. It is thus not the reasoning through which Luker’s subjects arrived at 
their decision to engage in risky behaviour that attracts Stoljar’s feminist intuition, nor is it the 
irrationality of their decision-making process. The problem is that oppressive norms were 
taken for granted in their reasoning. It is thus the internalisation of oppressive norms that 
constitutes the main cause of their contraceptive failure. This, she argues, implies that the 
examination of the mental process that led to the formation of their preference cannot, in and 
of itself, reveal whether or not a preference is autonomous. Given its premises, the decision to 
take contraceptive risks was both adequately reflective and rational. What this suggests, she 
argues, is that unveiling the internalisation of oppressive norms necessitates looking directly at 
the content of preferences. When a preference proceeds from such an internalisation, it should 
not be considered autonomous.  
 Strong substantive accounts of autonomy are interesting because they stipulate that 
oppressive norms are a problem for individual autonomy, independently of whether the 
individuals abiding by such norms endorse them. They avoid framing oppression as a matter of 
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individual perceptions and provide a way to assess individuals’ preferences that does not hinge 
on their emotional or subjective take on it. They stipulate that when the content of a preference 
is congruent with an oppressive norm, then this preference should not be viewed as 
autonomous, nor should it raise the liberal duty of respect. This, in turn, provides an attractive 
and intuitively plausible answer to a conundrum that feminists with liberal leanings encounter. 
Diana Tietjen Meyers (1989, xi) neatly captured this conundrum: 
If women’s professed desires are products of their inferior position, should 
we give credence to those desires? If so, we seem to be capitulating to 
institutional injustice by gratifying warped desires. If not, we seem to be 
perpetuating injustice by showing disrespect for those individuals. 
If preferences congruent with oppressive norms are part of individuals’ considered conceptions 
of the good, then it seems that not respecting these preferences would simultaneously 
disrespect individuals who adopt them. This has led some to argue that liberalism is impotent 
to truly remedy the inequalities between the sexes, given the way it ties respect for individuals to 
respect for their avowed preferences. Ann Levey (2005, 128), for instance, contends that 
‘[t]aking feminism seriously enough means giving up liberalism in the following respect: it 
requires us to take seriously that justified political action may fail to respect the considered 
choices of some women’. Stoljar’s solution is thus convenient, as it provides feminists who do 
not wish to abandon the liberal duty of respect towards autonomous choice with a strong 
justificatory basis to ground political actions that might interfere with preferences that (arguably) 
stem from and reinforce oppressive norms. If these preferences are not autonomous but rather 
produced by oppressive norms, then such preferences are not autonomous. As such, they do 
not raise the liberal duty of respect, and interfering with them cannot be seen as a mark of 
disrespect.      
The first problem with this kind of account is linked to the difficulties of correctly 
assessing the norms that guide an agent’s behaviour. Since, in Stoljar’s account, certain norms 
are seen as ‘incorrect’ or ‘false’, preferences or choices that are produced by these problematic 
norms cannot be seen as autonomous. In theory, this enables us to judge the autonomy of a 
given choice or preference from an external standpoint.  However, in practice, it leads to 
important epistemological difficulties. Given that we have no access to an agent’s ‘real’ 
motivations, the account forces us to make assumptions and suppositions based on appearance 
and on the limited information we possess. This is evidently a problem since there are many 
cases where an agent might adopt behaviour coherent with a problematic norm of behaviour, 
without the behaviour actually being the result the norm. Distinguishing between a behaviour 
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that is truly motivated by an oppressive norm and one that is not is therefore more difficult 
than Stoljar presents it as being. In fact, even her own assessments of certain cases give rise to 
doubt regarding whether or not the agent’s behaviour was actually motivated by the 
internalisation of problematic norms. 
For example, it seems plausible, as Stoljar claims, that the woman in Luker’s study who 
cites her strong maternal urge and desire to take care of a baby as justification for her 
contraceptive risk-taking behaviour is in fact influenced by the internalisation of the idea that 
maternity is a fundamental component of femininity (Stoljar 2000, 99). However, the reverse 
seems equally plausible: her desire might be authentic and not linked to the integration of a 
gender norm. Given that becoming a parent is, arguably, often motivated by such maternal (or 
paternal) urges, it would be odd to imply that children are always the product of their parents’ 
unfortunate integration of oppressive norms. Sometimes one might just want a baby. If we 
accept this, then we cannot assume —based either on the woman’s behaviour or on the 
information we possess on her motivation for taking contraceptive risks— that the integration of 
oppressive gender norms caused her contraceptive failure. Thus, the fact that this woman’s 
behaviour and motivations are consistent with an oppressive gender norm does not guarantee 
that they are caused by it. The same could arguably be said about other cases where 
preferences and behaviours are consistent with an oppressive gender norm but are not 
necessarily caused by it.67 
 Moreover, contrary to what Stoljar assumes, even if the woman were to provide, as an 
explanation for her behaviour, an account that seems to endorse what others might see as an 
oppressive gender norm, we can still not assume that the way people describe their behaviour 
—even to themselves— adequately captures the real reasons behind it. As argued earlier, we do 
not possess the transparent self-knowledge that is often assumed within mainstream 
conceptions of autonomy. Even if we are able to rationalise them afterward, we do not always 
know why we do the things we do.  
Now, there are cases other than the one Stoljar presented where it is much clearer that 
a choice is the product of an identifiable gender norm. Paul Benson (1990, 389), for instance, 
gives the example of an eighteen-year-old college student who excels in her studies but 
nonetheless feels compelled to devote a lot of time, energy and money to her physical 
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 To offer another example, many feminists have argued that the norm consisting of wearing a hijab is an 
oppressive one because it implies a certain idea of gender hierarchy (Zelensky & Vigerie 2003; Djavann 2003).
 
 
Now, if I have a preference for wearing a hijab—and consequently do so—can we really assume that it is by virtue of 
the gender norm that underlies it? There seem to be many other reasons why I should hold this preference: many 
women do so nowadays for political reasons (Takolia 2012).
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appearance.68 Given the way Benson construes this case, it seems self-evident that the student’s 
behaviour is causally linked to the gender norms associated with women’s appearance. 
However, even if it is the case that her actions aimed at ‘fixing herself up’ are the effects of 
oppressive norms of femininity, it still seems unclear that they should be judged as non-
autonomous.  
As Benson explicitly mentions, given that gender norms linking women’s success and 
prospects in life to their appearance are effective in the student’s social context, her belief that 
her appearance does impact on her opportunities in life is factually true. In this context, it is 
both reasonable and rational for this bright student to devote a lot of time and energy to her 
physical appearance. Certainly, using Benson’s case, Stoljar would be right to point out that the 
pressure to comply with these femininity norms constrains this student’s self-determination. 
Gender norms, like all norms, restrict the way agents can plausibly exercise their autonomy by 
adding social costs to the option of not complying with what they prescribe. However, Stoljar 
implies more than that when she claims that behaviours motivated by oppressive norms are not 
autonomous. She also implies that, because they become internalised, oppressive norms 
effectively damage the autonomy competencies and lead to the agent being unable to perceive 
the ‘falseness’ of oppressive norms. This represents both Benson’s bright student and Stoljar’s 
contraceptive risk takers as having an impaired capacity to make their own choices; they are 
seen as the victims of oppressive norms.  
 Benson’s case is construed in such a way that the student’s critical consciousness of the 
norm seems extremely minimal. Nevertheless, looking more closely at the student’s case, we 
can hardly see her as a passive and uncritical victim of the norm. As Benson (1990, 389) notes, 
‘[p]eriodically, she has tried not to care so much about all of this, but in each instance, 
something arose to remind her that others attach significant value to a woman's appearance’. 
Uma Narayan (2002) would call this kind of behaviour ‘bargaining with patriarchy’. She argues 
that it ought to be differentiated from being a mere ‘dupe’ of oppressive norms. In the 
‘bargainer’ case, even if the oppressive environment that forces compliance with the oppressive 
norm constitutes a constraint on the exercise of autonomy, we can hardly view this compliance 
as stemming from an impaired capacity for autonomy. Often, it is only through this bargaining 
with oppressive norms that individuals within oppressive social-contexts can exercise their 
autonomy: excluding this type of agency from the realm of autonomous behaviour thus seems 
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 I use this case because Stoljar herself refers to it in order to demonstrate the need for a substantive account of 
autonomy (Stoljar 2000, 101). 
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to overlook the point. It is not the agent that lacks autonomy; her behaviour is not the result of 
the uncritical acceptance of problematic norms. Rather, it is her social context that constrains 
her autonomy exercise and forces her to conform to problematic norms. As Stoljar herself 
acknowledges, ‘[f]ocusing on deficiencies in agents' psychologies may end up “psychologizing 
the structural” —that is, putting causal responsibility for oppression inappropriately on the agent 
rather than appropriately on unjust social conditions’ (2014, 249). However, if she agrees that 
such an individualistic focus is misleading and better avoided, the account she develops seems 
to have such an effect. 
The second problem with the strong substantive account is that the feminist intuition is 
presented as a ‘given’ that automatically stems from a feminist perspective —as if certain norms 
were intrinsically and objectively ‘incorrect’, ‘false’ or fundamentally ‘oppressive’. 69Yet, it 
remains unclear why, and in what respect, a given norm could be considered ‘false’. Norms of 
femininity have acquired a material reality: they cannot, in this respect, be considered ‘false’. 
They exist objectively, and effectively constrain individual self-determination. The statement 
that these norms are nonetheless ‘false’ seems, therefore, to concern their normative content. 
However, this seems to presuppose a form of moral realism that would enable the framing of 
certain norms’ content as evidently false. Of course, it would be convenient if truths concerning 
normative matters were self-evident and if we the kind of epistemological access to them that 
would enable us to declare certain norms as patently false. However, the fact is that we do not 
possess such epistemological access, nor do we possess uncontested standards to assess 
normative matters. In this respect, identifying oppressive or false norms is far from being as 
self-evident a matter as Stoljar would have it. In fact, as theorists such as Kimberly Hutchings 
(2013) or Nancy Hirschmann (2003) argue, what one hold as self-evidently true in such 
normative matters is likely to be considered as such by virtue of one’s own culturally situated 
conception of the good.70 There is, in this regard, reasons to be wary of considering certain 
norms and preference content as self-evidently ‘oppressive’ and, consequently, as ‘false’.  
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 Indeed, Stoljar (2000, 95) does not justify the ‘feminist intuition’ and simply states that even if some preferences 
satisfy the standard of critical reflection, many feminists would still regard them as non-autonomous because they 
attract the feminist intuition.  
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 As noted by Nancy Hirschmann (2003, 94), ‘Choices are discursively constructed as well; whether particular 
social formations are defined as barriers, what social arrangements seem “natural,” what possibilities can be 
imagined, are historically and culturally variable, pertaining more to language and differing understandings of 
reality. Hence, women who choose to wear the chador or head scarf as a mark of cultural membership, or to 
demonstrate a solidarity of political resistance, may not view cultural sanctions against those who do not veil as a 
barrier to their liberty. By contrast, Westerners who read about the enveloping burqa that Afghan women wear 
(not to mention the Taliban beating up women for showing their ankles) will be likely to assume that veiling 
restricts women’s liberty’. 
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This concern could have been at least partly alleviated if Stoljar had separated the issue 
of truth from the issue of oppression and had unveiled the kind of standards we could use to 
identify oppressive norms. However, given that she does not do so and frames the 
identification of oppression as a matter of intuition, her analysis runs the risk of identifying 
oppression where there is simply a different conception of the good. This, in turn, reproduces 
one of the major pitfalls regarding current conceptions of autonomy that feminists have 
extensively criticised: the problem of discriminatory exclusion. The image of the woman who is 
too emotional and irrational to count as properly autonomous is substituted with the image of 
the women who accept ‘norms of religion, femininity, and sexuality’ (Stoljar 2000, 100) that 
certain feminists would intuitively consider inadequate. This problem is particularly 
troublesome, as framing certain preferences and choices as non-autonomous has a political 
effect on the agents that bear these choices and preferences. To say that a given preference is 
autonomous implies that the liberal commitment of respect and non-interference applies to it. 
Moreover, to say that an agent is autonomous is to judge him/her as competent to speak for 
him or herself and as worthy of being listened to and respected. On the contrary, to identify an 
agent as not fully autonomous is an effective way of discrediting her discourse: it means a return 
to a state of ‘minority’, which may entail that someone else has to speak ‘for her’ since she 
cannot be seen as having a correct understanding of her own experience.71 In other words, 
while it is adequately mindful of the problem of oppression, a strong substantive account of 
autonomy leads us back to the problem of exclusion.  
 
B) Structural Substantive Accounts  
At first sight, Marina Oshana’s structural account bears a close resemblance to the strong 
substantive accounts.  In fact, Oshana herself associates her conception with the substantive 
understandings of autonomy, stating that she parts ways with proceduralists when they allege 
that people can be autonomous ‘despite having desires for subservient, demeaning, or even evil 
things’ (2006, 42). However, in contrast to strong substantive understandings, her structural 
account does not imply ‘that the autonomous agent cannot internalize oppressive norms, or 
that she cannot value subordinate roles’ (2014, 152). In her account, when a preference is 
deemed incompatible with autonomy, it is because of the consequences it has on the de facto 
possibility of leading an autonomous life given the social context. For example, she explains 
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 As Code (2000, 183) has noted, ‘[i]n its Kantian origins, autonomy is an achievement of Enlightenment, 
understood as man’s “emergence from…self-incurred immaturity,” where the immaturity endemic to heteronomy 
manifests itself in an “inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another”’. 
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that the Marine who ‘expresses a preference to conform to the will of another, and pursues a 
lifestyle that will compel him to have (or at least give expression to) desires that may not be his 
own’ (2006, 42) is not autonomous. However, it is not by virtue of his choice or preference in 
itself that the Marine lacks autonomy. It is because of the way the exercise of his autonomy is 
restricted and submitted to the will of another as a consequence of his choice to be a Marine.  
 What matters for autonomy, then, is the effective control over one’s life that a given 
agent possesses given the socio-relational context in which she exists. This means that the 
compatibility of a given preference with autonomy should always be assessed in reference to 
the socio-relational context of the agent who adopts the given preference. Preferences that 
imply that one loses effective control over one’s choices and actions, even if they are made in a 
seemingly autonomous fashion, cannot be seen as compatible with autonomy. To illustrate her 
point, Oshana contrasts the situation of two fictional women who share a similar preference for 
being perfect homemakers, akin to Woolf’s Angel in the House.72 Both live in a manner 
consonant with their desires, and the choices they make are exclusively guided by the will to 
always defer to the needs and wishes of others. Both also satisfy the criteria of psychological 
authenticity and procedural independence and give us no reason to doubt that their preference 
has been authentically and reflectively endorsed. The sole difference between these two women 
is the social and relational context in which they live. One woman (Oshana calls her Harriet) 
lives in a context similar to our own, where her choice of life ‘afford[s] her less financial 
flexibility, less social mobility, and fewer opportunities for intellectual and creative 
development’ and where there exist no economic of political institutions that might empower 
or protect homemakers (2006, 59). By contrast, ‘the personal relations in which Wilma [the 
second woman] finds herself, and the social institutions that affect her life, afford her control 
over her choices’ (2006, 60). For Oshana, the different circumstances in which these two 
‘angels’ find themselves should lead us to different conclusions concerning the compatibility of 
their desires with autonomy. Thus, Wilma’s dedication to others is consistent with autonomy, 
as she retains her capacity of control over her life and ‘is treated by others as one whose needs 
and wants deserve to be respected on independent grounds’ (2006, 60). However, someone 
like Harriet can no longer be described as autonomous given that she cannot be considered in 
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 This is how Oshana describes these women’s preference: ‘[t]here is nothing she values more or wants more than 
to be the angel in the house’ (Oshana 2006, 58). Here is how Woolf describes the Angel: ‘She was intensely 
sympathetic. She was immensely charming. She was utterly unselfish. She excelled in the difficult arts of family 
life. She sacrificed herself daily. If there was chicken, she took the leg; if there was a draught she sat in it –in short 
she was so constituted that she […] preferred to sympathize always with the minds and wishes of others’ (Woolf 
1979, 58).  
 59 
control over her life.  
 For Oshana, autonomy is thus not a matter of the subjective take the agent has on her 
life and choices. For her, whether an agent has reflectively and authentically endorsed her 
desires and whether she is content and/or satisfied with the kind of life she lives have no 
relevance for her autonomy.73 This establishes a radical distinction between the substantive-
structural account she proposes and the procedural accounts.  She explains that, in contrast to 
the proceduralists, her objective is to construct an entirely ‘naturalized’ conception of 
autonomy, which provides objective ways to assess autonomy.74 In her view, ‘a completely 
naturalized account must treat autonomy as, in part, a function of a person’s status and 
relations that are extrinsic to facts about her psychological history and occurrent psychological 
state’(2006, 5). She does not deny that autonomy requires the exercise of a set of 
competencies.75 However, within a structural and substantive account, it is ultimately by looking 
at the socio-relational context that one can determine if an agent is autonomous. To explain her 
views, she  states the following (Oshana 2006, 49-50): 
On the social-relational analysis I defend, it is possible for two individuals to 
satisfy all the psychological, historical, and competency conditions we have 
been discussing but to differ nonetheless with respect to their status as 
autonomous beings […] in addition to whatever can be said of a person’s 
psychological history, there are social criteria according to which we judge 
someone as autonomous. These external criteria are independent of facts 
about the individual’s internal state: autonomy is not decided ‘from within’ or 
on the basis of the evaluational perspective of the individual whose 
autonomy is at stake. External criteria constitute autonomy and external 
criteria measure it.  
 These external criteria consist mainly of 1. adequate control, which entails that the 
person ‘must enjoy a social status that safeguards her right to manage key aspects of her life 
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 Autonomy, for her, mainly has to do with the agent’s effective ability to be in control of her life, and this ability 
mainly concerns the possibilities her socio-relational context affords her. To illustrate this point, Oshana gives the 
example of the ‘would-be surrender woman’ who would rather be subservient but is ‘propelled…to a life as a self-
supporting successful professional woman’. Following Oshana, this woman has to be seen as autonomous, even if 
the type of life she lives is not coherent with her preferences and even if she feels alienated and resents her own 
life (2006, 64-8). 
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 Hence, she explains that ‘[a] naturalized view of personal autonomy is a view according to which autonomy is a 
natural property of persons, possession of which can be established a posteriory on the basis of natural facts’. By 
contrast, ‘[n]on-naturalized theories all require something to be true of autonomous persons that cannot be known 
empirically’ (2006, 4-5). 
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 She provides a list of seven necessary and jointly sufficient conditions (2006, 76-87) for personal autonomy. 
Here is the list of internal conditions she offers: the epistemic competence condition (i.e. being self-reflective and 
self-aware) (1) and the rationality condition (2) are both internal psychological conditions. Others are partly 
psychological and partly socio-relational. The condition of procedural independence (3) (reframed as the lack of 
influences that would undermine the legitimacy of the person’s motivations, regardless of the person’s own take on 
those influences) and the condition of self-respect (4) (which includes being regarded by others as worthy of 
respect) are both examples of this.  
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against other people or institutions that might attempt to wield coercive control over her’ (2006, 
84); 2. access to a range of relevant options; 3. substantive independence, which includes 
freedom from the fear of reprisals, freedom from domination and self-sufficiency and other 
freedoms (2006, 87). Thus, even people like Rosa Parks (2006, 175) and Judith Miller, a 
journalist for the New York Times who was imprisoned for eighty days (2006, 126-8), cannot 
be said to be autonomous following Oshana.76 Given the kind of socio-relational constraints 
these people faced, and the way these restrictions were aggravated as a result of their actions, 
Oshana (2006, 175) states that ‘we can hardly call the person who takes [these actions] 
autonomous even if we can call her act an expression of autonomy, a defiance of subjugation’. 
 It should be specified here that what interests Oshana is ‘global’ personal autonomy in 
opposition to local (or episodic) autonomy. For Oshana, a slave with a benevolent master who 
enables him to make choices for himself is not globally autonomous. However, he can still be 
locally autonomous regarding the ‘local’ choices he makes. Oshana also warns against 
conflating global autonomy with political autonomy. While both global autonomy and political 
autonomy ‘draw on suppositions about personal autonomy’, these concepts are nonetheless 
less substantial than the global idea of personal autonomy (2006, 20). She writes (Oshana 2006, 
173): 
A theory of personal autonomy needs not address the special concerns of 
political autonomy. A person who counts as politically autonomous might 
lack personal autonomy and persons can live in a manner consonant with 
having a high degree of personal autonomy even though subject to law, and 
to other non-arbitrary directives of the state.  
 Similarly, she detaches the notion of global autonomy from that of moral autonomy. 
She states that global autonomy cannot serve as the basis to attribute moral responsibility to an 
agent. People who would count as globally autonomous in her framework, she argues, could be 
‘beyond the pale’ when it comes to moral autonomy and consequently cannot be held morally 
responsible for their actions. Psychopaths, for instance, lack the competency to be responsive 
to the expectation of a moral community (2006, 169). Thus, they may be globally autonomous 
but cannot be considered responsible for their actions. Inversely, people who are not globally 
autonomous, such as Rosa Parks, can certainly be considered responsible, and morally 
accountable for their actions.    
 The structural view of autonomy that Oshana proposes has many strengths. Its most 
striking and intellectually compelling aspect is the thoroughly social understanding of autonomy 
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 Judith Miller was imprisoned for refusing, under subpoena, to provide the name of a confidential source. 
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it proposes. In contrast to both procedural and strong substantive approaches, a structural 
understanding does not regard autonomy solely as a set of mental or emotional competencies 
that are internal to the agent. It stipulates that the effective possibility the agent has to exercise 
her self-government is as much a part of autonomy as being adequately reflexive and/or not 
being duped by oppressive norms. In other words, it acknowledges that autonomy is an 
‘exercise concept’ and that being adequately competent to make one’s own decision does not 
have much value if one has no real possibility to exercise this competency and/or enact one’s 
decisions.77 As Noggles (2011, 234) notes, ‘[t]his makes her view more robustly social than the 
views of philosophers who claim merely that social context can indirectly influence whether a 
person is autonomous by affecting the psychological states which directly determine whether 
the person is autonomous’.78 In this sense, a structural account of autonomy, such as Oshana’s, 
seems more coherent with the intuition at the core of the idea of relational autonomy than the 
procedural or strong substantive accounts. For proceduralists, the socio-relational context is 
seen as important for autonomy only insofar as it enables the acquirement of the competency 
deemed necessary for self-governing. Likewise, for strong substantive proponents, it seems that 
attention to the socio-relational context is instrumental for identifying which desire should be 
considered as not properly autonomous. A structural understanding, by contrast, is thoroughly 
relational. It stipulates that autonomy is a product of the social context and that we ought to 
direct our attention towards this socio-relational context when we seek to evaluate people’s 
autonomy.  
 This direct focus on the socio-relational context, in turn, allows Oshana a better and 
more comprehensive take on the problem of oppression. A structural framework stipulates that 
oppressive constraints are not solely a problem for autonomy insofar as they negatively affect 
the agent’s mental competency or create warped desires. They are also a problem for 
autonomy when they create constraints that limit or burden the exercise of self-government. 
This, in turn, allows for the acknowledgement that oppressive structures exist and are a 
problem independently of agent’s subjective take on them. In this respect, Oshana’s structural 
account integrates the main strength of substantive accounts while avoiding its main problem. 
Like strong substantive accounts, a structural understanding of autonomy cannot result in 
                                                 
77
 The term ‘exercise concept’ comes from Joseph Raz, another proponent of a structural understanding of 
autonomy. He notes that while being autonomous necessitates certain mental abilities, ‘[i]t is hard to conceive of 
an argument that possession of a capacity is valuable even though its exercise is devoid of value’ (Raz 1986, 372). 
Autonomy, as a competency, thus has value primarily in view of its exercise. 
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 See also Holroyd (2009, 324) who states that Oshana’s account of relational autonomy provides the most well -
developed constitutively relational account.  
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making the identification of oppression a matter of individual perception. It enables us to 
acknowledge that, regardless of whether an agent authentically and reflexively endorses the 
choice to become a homemaker, it is still a problem if this preference was coercively enforced 
on the agent, and if endorsing such preference leaves the agent incapable of being in control of 
her own life. This provides the justificatory ground to recognise oppressive social-scripts, even 
when agents thoroughly endorse them, and provides the necessary grounds to justify 
interventions within the social order. Moreover, in contrast to strong substantive theorists, 
Oshana’s account does not have the effect of linking autonomy to a particular conception of 
the good, nor does it stipulate prima facie restrictions on the content of the preferences that can 
be considered cogent with autonomy. In short, it seems convincingly to address the problem of 
oppression without implying the problematic and exclusionary assumptions of the strong 
substantive accounts.  
 The first problem of Oshana’s account is, however, caused by its stringency. First, if it is 
true that her account is neutral concerning the content per se of choices, it nonetheless denies, 
in practice, autonomy to roles traditionally associated with women. In her view, economic 
independence and self-sufficiency are deemed necessary for autonomy, and it seems that 
embracing the roles of caregiver and homemaker is then incompatible with autonomy (2006, 7-
60).79 Oshana’s conception can thus be subjected to the same criticism as the mainstream 
conceptions of autonomy that have been deemed hostile to women because they reproduce a 
problematic gender hierarchy of value by making autonomy difficultly compatible with 
dependency or care for others.  
 Second, and more importantly, the stringency of her account makes it difficult to see 
how one can be considered autonomous at all. To be considered autonomous, an agent has to 
have control of a ‘fairly robust variety’ in her life. She must not have been influenced in a way 
that undermines the legitimacy of her motivation or have been deprived of information about 
what she is able to do. In sum, in order to be considered self-governed, one must be 
independent psychologically as well as materially. Yet, as Nedelsky (2011) states, our autonomy 
is always shaped and influenced by others, and since dependency constitutes an unavoidable 
aspect of human life, it seems difficult to see how all these conditions can be truly attainable by 
any human being.80  
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 As Benson (2014, 94) noted, autonomy, when articulated in this manner, thus seems more like a demanding 
ideal than a truly attainable reality, possible only in idealised social and political circumstances. This is rather odd 
given Oshana’s claim that her account is a naturalised one. Hence, it seems that for a conception of autonomy to 
be naturalised, it must be possible to meet its conditions in the natural world (2006, 4-6).  
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 The stringent conditions for autonomy that Oshana provides also lead to deeply 
counter-intuitive results. It seems rather strange, to say the least, to claim that political activists 
such as Rosa Parks, Shirin Ebadi and Judith Miller are not truly autonomous. There is 
something deeply problematic in this conclusion. What else, if not autonomy, can explain the 
courageous acts of resistance we so admire in these political figures? If the conception of 
autonomy we adopt leads us to deny autonomy to such political heroes simply because they 
were living in an oppressive society, it seems to me that we lose a fundamental dimension of 
what the concept of autonomy is meant to capture. There is a sense in which someone like 
Parks can be seen as possessing a much higher degree of autonomy than many socially and 
economically privileged persons who uncritically and unreflectively abide by dominant norms 
and institutions. Autonomy is often conceived as a tool for emancipation: it thus seems 
inconsistent to hold people who actively try to fight their oppression as non-autonomous.81 
Because Oshana equates oppression with the lack of autonomy, something fundamental that 
the concept of autonomy normally serves to designate is lost.  
 This latter problem seems to stem from another one —that is, the failure, in practice, to 
distinguish between the competency needed to live an autonomous life and the socio-relational 
conditions necessary to be able to exercise one’s autonomy in meaningful ways. Oshana does 
not deny that autonomy necessitates certain emotional and mental skills and that these are 
different from the socio-relational conditions she puts forward. However, in practice, there 
seems to be a conflation between 1. being competent enough to be called autonomous and 2. 
existing in social conditions that enable one to exercise one's autonomy. Given that her goal is 
to articulate an account of autonomy that would enable us to assess autonomy in an ‘objective 
way’ (and from an external perspective), the criteria she formulates have the effect of reducing 
autonomy to the degree of self-government agents are de facto able of exercising given the 
social structure in which they are embedded. Articulated in this manner, autonomy becomes a 
measure of the options that are truly accessible to an agent without coercion or interference. 
This, in turn, leads to the concern about discriminatory exclusion given that agents who are 
otherwise competent to make their own choices, are nonetheless denied the status of 
autonomous agent because of the restrictive socio-relational context they are in.82  
 Oshana attempts to alleviate this problem by making a distinction between different 
types of autonomy. However, as she refuses the association of her conception of autonomy 
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 It is, of course, possible to criticise autonomy precisely because of its ties to the teleology of emancipation. As 
noted in the introduction, this is what has prompted theorists such as Mahmood (2005), to abandon the concept 
of autonomy altogether.   
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 I will not expose this problem in length here, as I have already done that in the first chapter.    
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with the notion of political autonomy (which, I take it, links autonomy to the status of full-
blooded agent), moral agency, responsibility and local autonomy, much of the normative role 
autonomy plays on the political level is lost in her account. The notion of global autonomy she 
proposes thus seems to serve exclusively as a tool to ground policies aimed at alleviating 
oppression. This makes her account unlikely to serve as a replacement to the current ideal that 
underlies our laws and policies, as it is explicitly not meant to play the same role. 
 Moreover, explicitly restricting the purpose of her account to addressing the problem of 
oppression does not enable Oshana to avoid the problem of exclusion, nor that of paternalism. 
If autonomy is only compatible with certain choices by virtue of their effects on the de facto 
autonomy that agents exercise, it becomes a value that can paradoxically serve to override 
choices that have been autonomously made. This worry is further reinforced by the example 
Oshana gives of the ‘would-be surrender woman’ who would rather be subservient but is 
‘propelled […] to a life as a self-supporting successful professional woman’. Oshana states that 
this woman has to be seen as autonomous, even if the type of life she lives is not coherent with 
her preferences and even if she feels alienated and resents her own life (2006, 64-8). Conscious 
of this pitfall, Oshana claims that she ‘cannot declare with certainty when the value of 
autonomy should be overridden despite the cost to the individual’(2006, 120). However, her 
account certainly opens the door to such an outcome. In her view, autonomy is not to be 
equated with what a person cares for, or needs to flourish. Hence, if we are to take autonomy 
seriously, as Oshana advocates, we ought to override several individual choices that have been 
autonomously made —especially the choices of women. In sum, while her account convincingly 
addresses the problem of oppression as it allows for adequate consideration of the socio-
relational context, its stringency renders it unfit to avoid the problem of exclusion.  
 
III. Legal Accounts 
Twenty-five years after publishing ‘Reconceiving Autonomy’, Jennifer Nedelsky returned to her 
proposal to detail a relational understanding of the ideal of autonomy in Law’s Relations. 
Nedelsky begins this book by stating that her goal is to disrupt mainstream understandings of 
autonomy in academia but also, and maybe above all, in popular culture in order to replace it 
with a new way of conceiving autonomy that would be closer to our reality as relationally 
embedded, embodied, emotional and dependent selves (2011, 3-4). In shifting the ‘[p]revailing 
Anglo-American’ understanding of autonomy, in which ‘human beings are conceived separate 
 65 
from each other’, she states that it becomes possible to reconstruct a constellation of practices 
and institutions so that ‘relationship becomes central to each part of it’ (Nedelsky 2011, 3).  
 The kind of understanding she proposes, along with other law theorists, differs from 
procedural, substantive and structural accounts in one important respect. 83 Instead of aiming at 
assessing individual autonomy, legal accounts focus on how to reframe laws and rights so as to 
foster valuable relationships that promote autonomy.  In this respect, it bears a certain 
resemblance with the kind structural understanding of autonomy Oshana offers. Indeed, like 
structural substantive accounts, legal accounts emphasise the idea that relationships are 
constitutive of autonomy and that the socio-relational context is an integral part of autonomy. 
However, the way Nedelsky interprets what it means for autonomy to be ‘constitutively 
relational’ seems quite different from Oshana’s interpretation.  
First, for Nedelsky, understanding autonomy as constitutively relational entails 
acknowledging that we cannot become autonomous outside of a socio-relational context. 
Relationships and institutions create autonomy and are not necessarily forces that threaten our 
autonomy. This entails that, in contrast to Oshana, Nedelsky does not concentrate solely on 
instances where relationships or institutions are autonomy-undermining. She also seeks to show 
what makes them autonomy-enhancing. This interpretation of ‘constitutively relational’ has 
consequences for the way we understand the state and in terms of what constitutes autonomy-
promoting policies. When we come to see individuals as constructed and created by 
relationships, Nedelsky argues, we come to see that our vision of the self as a bounded entity is 
an illusion. As a consequence, our vision of rights and entitlement has to change. If our 
autonomy is the product of relational interactions and influences, then autonomous self-
determination can no longer be viewed as necessitating a barrier to protect us against others’ 
influences. Such an understanding of autonomy, she claims, should alter the way we 
understand the role of the state and its institutions (2011, ch.2).84 Acknowledging that we are 
already shaped by the social context enables us to see that state interference, as well as the 
absence of interference, already structures our autonomy. In this respect, Nedelsky argues, we 
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 The proponents of a legal account of relational autonomy are Jonathan Herring (2009, 2013a, 2013b, 2014), 
Jennifer Nedelsky (1989, 2011) and, to a certain extent, Robert Leckey (2008).  
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 Among other things, she argues that rights and laws are viewed as forms of ‘collective choices’ (2011, 233) rather 
than as ‘trumps’ that restrain what we can collectively do (232-4).  ‘It will probably have already become apparent 
to readers familiar with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that it is much better suited to 
implementing such dialogue than is the American system of judicial review, for which, at least formally, rights as 
trumps is an accurate metaphor’, writes Nedelsky (2011, 247), as Section 1 of the Charter ‘invites a dialogue 
internal to the courts, or to anybody considering the constitutionality of a law, by opening the Charter with an 
assertion that rights are not to be seen as absolute’. Indeed, the idea that rights are subjected to ‘reasonable limits 
prescribed by the law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’ constitutes the first article 
of the Canadian Charter (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, Section 1).  
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should refrain from seeing the state’s interventions in our lives as infringing on our autonomy. 
Rather, we ought to think about how it can intervene so as to ensure that the socio-relational 
context we are in promotes autonomy rather than undermining it (2011, ch.3).  
Second, seeing ourselves as fundamentally linked to each other has consequences for 
our vision of dependency (2011, 27). Thus, in contrast to Oshana who maintains the traditional 
affiliation of autonomy with independence, Nedelsky states that viewing self-government as 
possible only in the absence of dependency is not only illusory but also highly problematic. In 
addition to encouraging social fragmentation, it has at least two deleterious consequences. The 
first one is that it makes caring work invisible or frames it in terms of an option people can 
choose to take (2011, 27-9 & 190). By bringing to light the fact that dependency is a lifelong 
and inevitable condition of human life, Nedelsky argues that a relational understanding of 
autonomy should foster a much more coherent and constructive stance towards it. The second 
consequence is that when autonomy is seen as radically opposed to dependency, people who 
depend on state help and support are often de facto labelled as non-autonomous and treated as 
such. Welfare recipients, victims of domestic violence, as well as refugees, are often treated in a 
demeaning and disrespectful fashion by the state (2011, 152-6). This kind of treatment, in turn, 
negatively affects their autonomy by reducing the way they can plausibly exercise their 
autonomy and by submitting them to the authority of others.85 Instead of seeing dependency as 
antithetical to autonomy and consequently as enabling all kinds of intrusive and paternalistic 
unilateral interventions in people’s lives, we should treat dependency as a necessary feature of 
autonomous human life. This position, in turn, encourages us to develop ways to further the 
autonomy of people who are dependent on the state. Among other things, this implies taking 
their views into account and including them in the deliberation on the decisions that concern 
them (2011, 157).  
In order to assess rights, laws, institutions, policy frameworks or even individual 
decisions, a legal relational approach demands that we evaluate them in terms of their impact 
on relationships.86 Nedelsky’s approach is thus consequentialist: the best laws and policies are 
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 Nedelsky would probably also agree with the self-regarding attitude theorists have expressed— for her, autonomy 
necessitates seeing oneself as autonomous (2011, ch.3). In this respect, demeaning attitudes would also be 
detrimental for vulnerable people’s autonomy, as they fail to recognise them as agents in their own right.  
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 Thus, in Chapter 6, Nedelsky proposes a four-step approach when a right’s conflict arises. The first step consists 
of examining the conflict in order to determine what types of relationships have generated the conflict in the first 
place and how our current laws participate in structuring these relationships. The second step consists of finding 
the core values, such as autonomy or equality, at stake within this given conflict.
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 The third step is to determine 
the kind of relationship that would likely foster such core values, and the final step is to determine how competing 
versions of laws or rights are the most likely to structure relationships in order to foster the best kinds of 
relationships.  
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those that allow us to better structure relations of equality ‘not only between citizen and state 
but also among citizens’ (2011, 17). In this respect, Nedelsky states that one of the core 
commitments of the relational approach she develops is the commitment to equality (2011, 9 & 
82). Her understanding of autonomy, she claims, is better suited to further the egalitarian 
project of liberalism than the current individualistic understanding of autonomy that underlies 
our legal system. However, she also believes that her framework can be used in a ‘neutral’ 
fashion as a methodological tool that would illuminate points of dispute and enable a better 
understanding of our legal and political systems. Thus, Nedelsky claims, even if her own 
project is tied to her own feminist and egalitarian commitments, the relational framework she 
proposes can be used as a normatively neutral methodology to reframe and clarify debates and 
issues (2011, 77-86).  
The work that legal theorists working in a relational perspective, such as Nedelsky, have 
completed thus far is compelling in many respects. Like the structural approach, Nedelsky’s 
framework has the advantage of refocusing our attention towards the relational context. 
Moreover, it does so without leading to the problem of exclusionary discrimination. First, in 
contrast to Oshana’s approach, it avoids denying the status of autonomous agent to individuals 
who are not substantively independent. Second, it explicitly frames autonomy as a human ideal, 
compatible with the vulnerability and deep interdependency that pervade human lives. This 
effectively breaks down the association of autonomy with traits and characteristics traditionally 
coded as masculine. The kind of understanding of autonomy Nedelsky proposes cannot be co-
opted to justify excluding women, minorities or vulnerable individuals as insufficiently 
autonomous to be considered agents that are worthy of respect and consideration. Finally, 
given her positive emphasis on ensuring that our institutions are indeed autonomy-promoting 
instead of autonomy-undermining, it seems that Nedelsky’s account cannot inadvertently lead 
reinforcing existing exclusionary dynamics. In her account, it is the problematic relationship 
that needs to be reframed and not the vulnerable individual who needs to be ‘forced’ to 
become autonomous.  
In spite of its many strength, however, the framework Nedelsky proposes does not 
seem to offer the necessary normative guidance to engage with cases and policies other than 
those she examines. This problem is due, in part, to the fact that she does not engage with the 
general literature on autonomy as it has developed since her initial intervention in 1989. This, 
in turn, makes her own account difficult to locate and interpret at times. More importantly, 
however, Nedelsky does not explain how to interpret the requirement of equality that makes 
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certain relationships autonomy-enhancing and others autonomy-undermining. This clearly 
makes it difficult to understand how to use her account as a normative guide to assess policies 
or ground political actions aimed at enhancing people’s autonomy.  
This latter concern is further reinforced by her claim that employing a relational 
approach has ‘often not served women’s interests well’ (2011, 184). She gives two examples of 
such an instance. The first is the historical denial of women’s claims to property once they were 
married as their relationship with their husband was seen as nullifying their legal autonomy in 
many areas (2011, 184). The second concerns cases where the non-guilty verdict was granted to 
cuckold husbands who killed their wives and/or their lovers (2011, 184). In Nedelsky’s view, 
this type of judgement can be seen as relational because the autonomy of the individual 
implicated in these cases was assessed by taking into account both the circumstances of the 
relationship between the spouses and the broader social circumstances, such as those requiring 
‘legal immunity for revenge on a “seducer”’ (2011, 184).  
These examples are troubling as it is not clear why judgements denying married 
women’s or homicidal cuckolds’ autonomy are to be viewed as relational. If it is because of the 
way stereotypes and particular values play out in these judgements, it seems that non-relational 
cases would constitute the exception rather than the norm. Even in the best of cases, legal 
judgements can hardly be seen as purely neutral. They always enact particular values (or, 
unfortunately, stereotypes) and contribute to structuring relationships in certain ways, as 
Nedelsky herself states (2011, 69-73).  In this respect, it becomes difficult to see why 
Nedelsky’s employment of the relational account would alleviate feminist dissatisfaction with 
the current individualistic understanding of this ideal. It also makes the framework she 
proposes unconvincing as a means to address the problem of oppression. If using her relational 
framework can mean, in effect, sanctioning sexist laws that reproduce gender inequalities, then 
it becomes difficult to understand how it can help further feminism’s emancipatory goals. 
Further explaining the criterion of equality, and showing how it enables the differentiation 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ relational outcomes, would have provided us with much-needed 
guidance. As noted by Robert Leckey, ‘the relational inquiry, without revealing, explicating, and 
defending its normative underpinnings, does not move us forward through a contentious 
thicket’ (421/7831). In this regard, because Nedelsky does not sufficiently explain what 
normative guidance her framework has to offer, her understanding of autonomy fails to 
convince as a suitable replacement for the individualistic ideal that currently underlies our laws 
and policies.  
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Moreover, Nedelsky’s claim that relationships are constitutive of individual autonomy 
as well as her consistent rejection of individualism seem to lead her to disregard the problem of 
oppression. As Marilyn Friedman noted, it seems to make her relational approach at odds with 
the idea that persons are sometimes threats to one another. This, in turn, causes her to devote 
insufficient attention to the problems that can ensue from detrimental relationships. While she 
does address the problem of violence against women (2011, ch.5) she nonetheless does not 
offer criteria to identify problematic relationships apart from evidently abusive ones. Her will to 
move away from an interpretation of laws and policies as barriers against others’ interference 
seems to ignore the usefulness of legal and political frameworks’ protective function. Indeed, to 
detach relational autonomy from independence, as Nedelsky does, makes the version of the 
ideal she proposes unconvincing as a basis to ground vulnerable individuals’ emancipation. As 
Friedman (2013) explains, it is necessary to acknowledge that the ideal of independence, 
especially for women, can often be a valuable asset. It remains important, in this regard, ‘not to 
make formerly subordinated persons feel guilty for their fledgling and modest attempts to avoid 
the dependence on others that makes them vulnerable to, say, domestic abuse’ (Friedman 
2013, 339).  
 
 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have presented a critical exploration of the main families of relational 
accounts. These accounts vary, both in the way they understand the relational dimension of 
autonomy and in the criteria they put in place to assess this capacity. They possess different 
strengths and weaknesses with regard to their ability to provide a means to address the problem 
of oppression and to avoid the problem of exclusion. Because they are content neutral and do 
not restrict the range of preferences that individuals can autonomously endorse, procedural 
accounts of autonomy avoid the problem of exclusion.87 However, even in their most stringent 
form, procedural criteria seem ill-equipped to address the problem of oppression. Strong 
substantive accounts of autonomy, by contrast, offer a more straightforward way to detect 
preferences caused by the internalisation of oppressive norms. Yet, this kind of account leads 
to the problematic —and factually untrue— assumption that preferences that seem coherent with 
an oppressive norm are necessarily non-autonomous. Consequently, such an account unduly 
excludes choices that might seem odd from a liberal feminist standpoint from the range of 
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preferences that can legitimately and autonomously be endorsed by individuals. In other words, 
it leads back to the issue of exclusion.  
Structural substantive accounts are interesting as they integrate the main strengths of 
procedural and substantive accounts. They do not constrain the kind of preference that an 
agent can autonomously endorse and offer ‘external’ criteria to assess autonomy. Using such an 
account of autonomy thus enables us to identify problematic socio-relational contexts and 
provides us with a means to tackle the problem of oppression. However, since Oshana’s 
structural account leads her to conflate the competency for autonomy and the exercise of this 
capacity, it leads her to oppose autonomy to oppression. More problematically, choices that 
reduce the agent’s capacity to exercise her autonomy are framed as non-autonomous, even if 
they reflect her profound convictions and relational engagements. These problems, in turn, 
lead Oshana’s account to reproduce the problem of exclusion. By contrast, the framework 
developed by Nedelsky stipulates that even when agents are victims of serious forms of 
oppression, they can never be seen as devoid of autonomy or interfered with on this basis. Her 
framework stipulates that it is the relationships that surround them that need to be restructured 
so as to better promote their autonomy. Doing so, it explicitly reclaims the compatibility of 
autonomy with both dependency and relational engagements. In this regard, it seems to 
successfully avoid the problem of exclusion. Nevertheless, because it fails to devote sufficient 
attention to the problem of oppression, such framework does not seem to offer a satisfying 
guidance to reform our laws and policies.  
 Reviewing the relational literature, it thus seems that adopting a relational account of 
autonomy means adopting an inclusive conceptualisation of this capacity—one that is respectful 
of the diversity of ways in which women can exercise their agency. Or, it means adopting a 
conception of autonomy focussed on identifying social obstacles that impede autonomy’s 
development and exercise and thus having the ability to justify an emancipatory feminist 
agenda. There seems to be a real and unavoidable normative tension created by the need to 
satisfy these two normative aims together. This tension, in turn, seems to leave us with the 
unappealing choice between formulating a criterion for autonomy that prevents exclusion but, 
by the same token, proves ineffective for identifying oppressive social circumstances, or 
articulating a stringent autonomy test, that denies the status of autonomous agent to certain 
categories of individuals. Faced with these alternatives, one wonders if addressing both the 
problem of oppression and the problem of exclusion simultaneously is possible. My task, in 
the next chapter, is to demonstrate that it is.  
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Chapter 3: Towards an Agnostic and Structural Account of 
Autonomy 
 
I have ended the previous chapter with a puzzle. Given the central role it plays in our political 
framework, there is a need to reconceptualise autonomy in order to account for the way 
oppression impacts self-determination. Such reconceptualization is also necessary in order to 
ensure that we avoid perpetuating exclusionary dynamics that systematically favour dominant 
social identities. In this respect, feminism requires an inclusive conception of autonomy, which 
‘begins with the assumptions that women do not share a common gender identity or set of 
experiences and that they often interpret similar experiences differently’ (Snyder-Hall 2010, 
259). However, pushing an emancipatory feminist project forward necessitates adopting a 
conception of autonomy that enables us to identify the kind of social forces that lead agents to 
reproduce their own subjection. This seems to require a conception of autonomy that excludes 
preferences warped by oppression and/or agents whose self-government is impaired by 
oppressive constraints. In sum, trying to address the problem of oppression and that of 
exclusion simultaneously seems to leave us with a difficult conundrum. That none of the 
existing relational reconceptualisations of autonomy has proven able to satisfy both problems 
simultaneously should not be regarded as a failure on their part. Rather, it attests to the 
inherent difficulty of doing so, given that these two objectives push in opposite normative 
directions.   
 My goal in this chapter is to provide a framework that resolves this tension and could 
serve as a convincing replacement for the individualistic ideal that underlies our laws and 
policies. The solution, I argue, resides in adopting a twofold conception of autonomy. On the 
first level is autonomy as it is traditionally understood —that is, as a set of mental and emotional 
competencies. In order to avoid the problem of exclusion, I argue that we should remain 
agnostic about autonomy, understood in that sense. On the second level is autonomy in terms 
of its exercise. Self-government, in this sense, is made possible and structured by the socio-
relational context. I suggest that it is at this level that we can properly address the problem of 
oppression. In order for an autonomy framework to adequately resolve the twin problems of 
exclusion and oppression, both levels are necessary and must be considered together.   
  I see the resulting agnostic and structural framework as owing to the insights and ideas 
of the different autonomy accounts presented in Chapter 2. However, its most evident 
influences are the relational theories Nedelsky and Oshana offer. Like that of Nedelsky, the 
 72 
conception of autonomy I propose does not offer grounds to deny autonomy to vulnerable –
nor indeed any– agents. It is, in this respect, explicitly agnostic with regard to autonomy on the 
‘first level’.  
 The first part of this chapter is devoted to defending this view. I then explain why this 
agnosticism should result, on the political level, in a systematic presumption of autonomy that 
applies to the agents as well as to their declared preferences. In the second part of this chapter, 
I explain the working of the structural aspect of my framework, which serves to assess 
autonomy on the ‘second level’. Inspired by Oshana’s view of autonomy, I argue the 
competencies necessary to be perceived as autonomous do not have much value if individuals 
are not able to exercise them. The exercise of autonomy, in turn, is primarily social. It is 
structured and enabled by the set of relationships, norms and institutions that form one’s socio-
relational context. It is at this level, I argue, that autonomy can be assessed and that we can use 
this ideal as the ground to vindicate emancipatory policies. 
 
1. An Agnostic Framework 
By virtue of its focus and of the way it understands autonomy, the framework Nedelsky offers 
precludes any judgements on whether or not a given agent is autonomous. She warns against 
the temptation to postulate that agents, even when they are in highly oppressive contexts, have 
lost their competency for autonomy.88 Likewise, Marilyn Friedman proposes a minimal 
conception of autonomy, which, in practice, precludes framing any agents as having lost their 
competency for self-government. In this section, I expand on this intuition, implicit in the work 
of these theorists. In other words, I focus on the idea that we should refrain from attempting to 
assess the degree of autonomy that agents possess. I give four arguments to support this claim. 
First, there is the argument that autonomy should be understood as causally rather than 
constitutively relational. Acknowledging that social forces causally shape our competency for 
autonomy (rather than constituting it), closes off the possibility of assessing it externally, by 
looking at the agent’s socio-relational context. Second, there is the thick disagreement 
argument: the fact is that there is no agreement on the normatively relevant competencies 
necessary to be self-governed, nor is there likely to be one. Third, there is the epistemic 
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uncertainty argument, which entails that even if this thick disagreement were resolved, we 
would still have no convincing way to determine whether or not a given agent does possess the 
relevant competency at a sufficient level to be considered autonomous. Finally, the multiple 
competencies argument seeks to show that autonomy is not a scalar competency, which could 
be measured in agents and placed along a continuum. Taken together, these arguments should 
lead us to be explicitly agnostic on the question of whether or not agents possess a sufficient 
level of competency for autonomy. As I argue in the last part of this section this conclusion 
should not merely lead us to suspend our judgement on the political level. Rather, it should 
lead us to adopt a systematic presumption of autonomy towards individuals as well as their 
declared preferences.  
 These arguments might seem only to support agnosticism towards autonomy conceived 
as a global attribute of the agents. However, they should also lead us to adopt an agnostic 
posture locally, with regard to the declared preferences of agents. Typically, the reason we view 
a preference as autonomous is because we see it as stemming from the exercise of the right 
competency. This is more evident for proceduralists, who claim that a preference is 
autonomous when it is endorsed while making good use of the adequate competency (e.g. 
critical thinking abilities). Yet, strong substantive theorists assume the same thing. What they 
postulate, however, is that the adoption of a preference congruent with an oppressive norm 
demonstrates that the agent’s competency for autonomy is skewed.  
 
 
A) Autonomy as Causally Relational   
As we have seen in Chapter 1, Christman (2004) understands the relational accounts as 
circumscribed to only those views that treat social relationships as constitutive of autonomy. 
However, the meaning of ‘constitutively relational’ remains unclear. For Christman, it seems 
primarily to designate a view similar to Oshana’s, which entails that social factors entirely 
constitute autonomy. The socio-relational context (or the relevant aspect of it) therefore 
determines the level of autonomy we regard individuals as possessing. While this view might 
make sense if we consider autonomy, as Oshana did, mainly in terms of its potential to be 
exercised, it becomes much less plausible when it comes to autonomy as a competency.89 Our 
competencies, in general, do not seem to be determined or constituted by the socio-relational 
context. For instance, even if I am in a socio-relational context conducive to learning English, I 
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 As discussed in the previous chapter, Oshana does not deny that autonomy requires mental or emotional 
competencies. However, it soon becomes evident that what is truly relevant for global autonomy is the possibilities 
left for the agent to exercise these competencies.  
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can still fail to master it properly. The same applies to people who are in socio-relational 
environments that are non-conducive or even hostile to learning a language. It will certainly be 
more difficult to learn English if one comes from a radical separatist family of French-Canadian 
descent that perceives speaking this language as a form of treachery. Yet, even in these 
circumstances, it can nevertheless be done. There seems to be no convincing reason to 
suppose that the competency for self-determination should be any different.90 Autonomy, like 
any other skill or competency, is influenced by the socio-relational context. However, it seems 
implausible to consider it as entirely constituted by it. 
 Nedelsky offers another interpretation of ‘constitutively relational’.91 For her (2011, 55), 
an ‘individual’s capacity for autonomy is made possible, is constituted by, her relations […] 
[r]elations, including those with collectives of all sorts, [are] not just potential threats to 
autonomy but its source’. That autonomy is constituted by the socio-relational context, 
however, does not mean that it is entirely determined by it. She writes that ‘autonomy, on this 
view, makes people more than the sum of conditioning. Autonomy is what enables people to 
sort, choose, reject, embrace and transform the many factors that might otherwise merely 
condition us’ (Nedelsky 2011, 54). In this regard, saying that autonomy is constitutively 
relational only implies that there is a causal link between the socio-relational context and 
autonomy. However, this causality is uncertain and cannot be seen as directly determining the 
level of autonomy, as a competency, agents possess. Following such a view, it is certainly better 
to be in a socio-relational context that is conducive to the acquisition of the repertory of skills 
needed for being considered autonomous. However, the socio-relational context cannot be 
assumed to be a predictor of the level on which people can be called autonomous.  
 Given these two radically different views of what ‘constitutively relational’ implies, I will 
use the term ‘causally relational’ to characterise accounts that ‘hold that certain relationships 
and social environments play a causal role [albeit uncertain and unpredictable] in the 
development and ongoing exercise of autonomy’ (Baumann 2008, 445).92 Following this 
characterisation, my own interpretation of autonomy, like that of Nedelsky’s, is only ‘causally 
relational’. Understanding autonomy as causally relational, in turn, seems much more in line 
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 Apart from if we postulate autonomy as residing in some sort of transcendental competency (such as the Kantian 
ideal of rationality) that remains unaffected by the contingencies of one’s life. However, this view also seems 
factually untrue and would probably be rejected by relational theorists.  
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 Which, interestingly, Christman (2004, 148-9) dismisses as only ‘causally relational’. For Christman, this would 
imply that her account is not properly relational.  
92
 The precision of the ‘uncertainty and unpredictability’ of the causal role is my addition. It serves to emphasise 
the difference between causally and constitutively relational. 
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with our concrete reality and the way we develop skills than understanding it as constitutively 
relational.93  
This might seem like a trivial remark. However, acknowledging that our competencies 
(in general) as well as our competency for self-government are causally relational has two 
interesting consequences. First, it justifies considering the socio-relational context as relevant for 
the acquisition and development of the competency for self-government. Postulating a certain 
causal link between autonomy and the socio-relational context, in turn, gives us reasons to 
ensure that this context helps to foster, as much as possible, the competency needed for self-
government in individuals. It also gives us reasons not to assume that substantive independence 
is a necessary condition for autonomy like Oshana does. Just like any other skill, autonomy 
needs to be fostered by the socio-relational context, as well as by meaningful relationships. This 
means that we are, to some extent, dependent on others to acquire and develop the skills 
needed for self-government. Given that developing autonomy benefits from the help of others, 
such independence cannot be required as a condition for self-government. In this regard, 
excluding the modes of agency primarily guided by caring concerns seems incoherent. In order 
to be consistent, a conception of autonomy cannot exclude the very modes of agency that 
enable the development of autonomy in the first place. 
 Second, it implies that it is impossible to assess the level of competency for autonomy 
that individuals possess by looking at their socio-relational context. To my knowledge, no 
relational theorist would explicitly adopt such a deterministic view of autonomy.  However, 
people who understand oppression as incompatible with autonomous agency sometimes seem 
to adopt a mild version of this view. Indeed, the assumption underlying claims such as 
‘subordinated individuals, once they are subordinated, cannot be autonomous’ (Warriner 
2015, 39) or that ‘preferences influenced by oppressive norms of femininity cannot be 
autonomous’ seems to be that oppressive scripts or social forces extinguish or, at the very least, 
substantially diminish individuals’ competency for autonomy. In contrast, adopting a causally 
relational view of autonomy entails admitting that we cannot postulate the way oppressive 
factors will affect individuals’ competency for self-determination. While being in a socio-
relational context that fosters the development of autonomy might indeed give the agent a 
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 Even if one thinks that determinism is true and that free-will is a mere fiction, it would seem bizarre to postulate 
that the competencies needed for autonomy are constitutively relational. There would be many other factors 
(biological, emotional, psychological) that would serve as determinants for our autonomy apart from relational 
ones. Here, I do not mean to take a position in the debate concerning determinism, as it is largely irrelevant for 
my current purpose.  What I want to point out, however, is that even if determinism is true, the complex interplay 
of the different factors that determine us would make assessing the competencies for autonomy impossible in 
practice. And, in any case, it would still make little sense to view it as ‘constitutively relational’. 
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greater opportunity to develop the skills needed for self-governing, it cannot guarantee that she 
will develop them. Likewise, being in a highly restrictive socio-relational context might affect 
our self-governing competency. Yet, it is impossible to predict how and to what extent. There 
exist many examples of individuals who, faced with the most grievous constraints and the most 
hostile environments, seem to manifest what many would see as a high degree of competency 
for autonomy. 
All of this goes to show that if we admit that autonomy is only causally relational, as I 
think we should, we also have to admit that assessing the socio-relational context cannot enable 
us to assess the level of competency for autonomy that individuals possess. Moreover, it cannot 
allow us to postulate that agents within oppressive socio-relational context have a diminished 
competency for autonomy.   
 
B) The Problem of Thick Disagreement  
There is a thick disagreement concerning what autonomy is and how it should be assessed. I 
use the term ‘thick’ here, following Laura Valentini (2013). She differentiates between thick 
and thin disagreement in the following manner. A ‘thin disagreement’ is when people 
reasonably disagree about X but agree about what the truth conditions of X would be. A ‘thick 
disagreement’, in contrast, implies that people reasonably disagree about both X and what its 
truth condition would be. A thick disagreement, in turn, has normative consequences because 
it implies that it is unlikely to disappear. We therefore have to acknowledge that ‘X’ is an 
essentially contested concept. Valentini employs this distinction to show that ‘justice’ is an 
essentially contested concept that is subject to a thick reasonable disagreement.94 However, 
most of the concepts that interest us, as political philosophers, are subject to the same thick 
disagreement. Individual autonomy is no exception.  
 First, as Chapter 2 revealed, even relational theorists, who form a specialised minority 
of autonomy theorists, disagree on what competency makes an agent properly self-governed. Is 
it being able to critically reflect on your preferences, having the self-awareness necessary to 
retrace the origin of your preferences or possessing the self-worth to authorise them? Are the 
ability to judge certain norms as oppressive or the capacity to know right from wrong necessary 
for autonomy? Or, is autonomy simply being able to form desires and volitions that one 
considers as one’s own?  
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 For Valentini (2013), this does not mean that we can never define ‘X’. It means that defining ‘X’ becomes a 
matter mutual justifiability. She uses this argument to express the view that democracy should be seen as 
intrinsically valuable insofar as it is an integral part of justice. I will return to this argument in the last part of this 
chapter.  
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 There is, of course, no way to resolve this debate by pointing to what autonomy really 
is. Autonomy does not designate a concrete reality that we can observe and analyse like an 
organ. It is a ‘woolly’ normative construction that we use in many different and sometimes 
contradictory ways in our ordinary lives, as well as on the political and legal levels. While some 
argue that our understanding of self-government should capture the ways we employ 
‘autonomy’ as well as our intuitions about self-government, it is unlikely that the debate will be 
resolved this way. We have varying intuitions about what counts as self-determination, what is 
needed for it in terms of mental and emotional skills and what ‘autonomy’ means.  
 Another strategy involves adopting the conception of competency that is best able to 
fulfil the normative roles autonomy serves. As Joel Anderson (2014, 355) remarks, ‘[d]ebates 
about criteria for autonomy (and what autonomy entitles one to) are best understood, not as 
debates about what autonomy, at core, really is, but rather as debates about the relative merits 
of various possible packages of thresholds, entitlements, regulations, values, and institutions’. 
As I have argued, for relational theorists, this would mean an account of the competency for 
autonomy that would address the issue of oppression without leading us back to the issue of 
exclusion. However, as Chapter 2 revealed, these two roles are difficult to combine. Addressing 
the problem of oppression seems to require adopting an understanding of autonomy that 
enables the identification of agents whose competency for self-government has been distorted 
by their oppressive context. In other words, it seems to require us to adopt an exclusionary 
account of autonomy. Inversely, avoiding the issue of exclusion seems to require us to adopt a 
highly inclusive conception of what it means to be competent enough to count as autonomous. 
Yet, such an account of autonomy cannot, in and of itself, serve to identify or address the 
problem of oppression. Given that the tension between these two normative aims is not 
solvable at the level of autonomy conceived as a competency, theorists are forced to choose 
which one should take normative precedence.95 Some claim that their conception is the best, as 
it precludes excluding agents and promotes an inclusive sense of self-worth. Others claim that a 
conception of autonomy should enable us to identify preferences skewed by oppression and to 
establish a feminist emancipatory agenda. Thus, because the roles autonomy plays are not 
compatible with one another, there is also a reasonable disagreement concerning what makes 
identifying a given competency as grounding self-government better than identifying another 
one.  
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 As I argue in this chapter, this tension can only be resolved through a twofold conception of autonomy that 
considers the capacity for self-government to reside not solely in a given competency (or rather set of 
competencies) but also in the effective possibilities individuals have to exercise it (which can be assessed by 
looking at the socio-relational context).  
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C) The Problem of Epistemic Uncertainty 96 
Even if agreement existed regarding which competency should be considered normatively 
relevant for autonomy, the problem of how to assess it in practice would remain.  
 Many autonomy theorists have devised criteria for autonomy that can function as ways 
to identify preferences or agents that should not be considered as autonomous. While these 
‘autonomy tests’ are theoretically compelling, using them for practical purpose is fraught with 
epistemological difficulties. The fact is that we do not have epistemic access to the agent’s 
interiority, which would allow us to assess the level of competency she globally possesses and 
whether she was making good use of it when endorsing a given preference. People may appear 
adequately self-reflexive, self-responsible or critical of norms and conventions. In reality, 
however, they might not possess nor exercise any of these skills while endorsing a preference or 
when living their lives. Inversely, people may appear to us as lacking in the relevant 
competency for autonomy, but they might in fact possess and exercise it in ways that are 
indiscernible to us. This clearly is an issue for procedural accounts like that of Christman’s, 
which link autonomy to the competency of reflecting on the conditions in which a given 
preference was acquired. As argued in Chapter 2, in reality, there is simply no way of knowing 
whether or not a given agent was truly able to reflect on the conditions of acquisition of her 
preference or whether she would have rejected this preference if she were to do so. Strong 
substantive accounts make the inverse mistake when they automatically link the endorsement 
of a preference coherent with an oppressive norm with a loss of critical thinking abilities. By 
doing so, they may fall prey to the mistake of psychologising the structural or confusing a 
different conception of autonomy with a lack in competency for autonomy.  
 It might seem, at first glance, that self-worth accounts avoid this problem given that they 
equate autonomy to the ability to claim ownership of one’s action. In this respect, it does not 
seem that assessing autonomy requires an epistemic access to the agent’s inner emotional or 
psychological life. To a certain extent, autonomy is performative. We can verify whether or not 
agents are autonomous based on their ability to perform autonomy and actively claim their 
preferences as their own. Yet, in practice, this route is also thwarted by the same 
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 Serene Khader (2011) best expresses this point about the epistemological difficulties of correctly interpreting 
agents’ behaviours and situations While her argument concerns adaptive preferences more specifically, her 
argument also applies to individuals’ competencies for autonomy. She rightly states that the unavoidable 
epistemological risks of ‘misunderstanding self-interested well-being trade-offs, treating deprivation caused by 
structural barriers as primarily caused by psychological problems, and mistaking unfamiliar ways of flourishing for 
instances of adaptive preference’ should be acknowledged within our theories rather than simply ignored (2011, 
42).  
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epistemological uncertainty. As Warriner (2015) remarks, if an agent is pressurised and unable 
to deviate from the script she has been given, should she still count as self-authorising? Are the 
Pyongyang citizens who glorify their country and actively claim their pride in being subjects of 
the great Kim Jong-Un self-authorising when they do so? Can we consider women from the 
Christian Patriarchy Movement as taking ownership of their actions when they claim, as their 
own, preferences that they are simply not authorised to refuse? Inversely, when an agent 
inadequately performs autonomy, or seems too uncertain or ambivalent about herself or her 
action, can we really conclude that she lacks the self-worth necessary to be considered 
autonomous? 
 What these difficulties reveal is that, in practice, there is no sure way to determine if an 
agent possesses the relevant competency to the required level by looking either at the agent 
herself or at the preferences she endorses. Whatever skill we associate autonomy to, we always 
risk being wrong about what we perceive as an evident lack of this competency.  
 
D) An Open Account of the Competencies Needed for Self-Determination 
 The arguments I have advanced so far suggest that there is only one competency, or 
cluster of related skills, that should be seen as relevant for self-government. This seems to be 
what most autonomy theorists assume when they present the competency for autonomy as a 
continuum, which has a minimal threshold, and along which it is possible to situate 
individuals.97 However, as Meyers suggests, it does not seem to make sense to view autonomy as 
such a mono-scalar competency. Self-government can involve the set of skills usually associated 
with autonomy, such as instrumental and critical reasoning, independence of thought, a certain 
kind of lucidity and transparency towards one’s own motivations and control over oneself and 
one’s emotions.98 It can also involve skills and capacities not traditionally linked to autonomy, 
such as imagination, creativity and memory.99 Additionally, as some relational theorists have 
highlighted, it can even mean exercising many skills that are typically seen as antithetical to 
most rationalistic views of autonomy. Emotional attitudes and capacities regarding others (such 
as empathy, care for others and emotional openness)100 or regarding oneself (such as self-
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 See Nedelsky (2011) and Friedman (2003), for example.  
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 See Dworkin (1988) and Frankfurt (1987).  
99
 Meyers (1987, 1989) and Mackenzie (2000). 
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 See Nedelsky (2011) and Meyers (1987, 1989) for emotional skills regarding others and the importance of care 
and empathy for self-determination.  
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consideration and self-authorisation)101 can also be sources of valuable forms of self-
government. To posit only one of these competencies as relevant or as more important than 
the other for auto-determination seems misguided. Can we truly say that being rational is more 
important in order to lead a life of one’s own choosing compared to being able to imagine 
oneself otherwise? Or, can we assess that the ability to critically reflect on one’s preference is 
crucial to be able to govern oneself while self-worth is not? Self-government, it seems, must 
imply the simultaneous exercise of a range of different competencies, and cannot be associated 
to only one skill.  
 Admitting that autonomy is not a unified competency already adds complexity to the 
mono-scalar picture of self-government. It should lead us to admit that there is no single 
competency continuum for autonomy; rather, there are many. Yet, the idea that there are 
minimal thresholds for each of the different ‘autonomy skills’ that individuals must satisfy in 
order to count as properly self-governing could nonetheless be safeguarded. This would make 
assessing the level of competencies for self-government still possible, at least in theory.102 Yet, as 
Meyers mentions, the trouble is there are many different ways one can lead a life of one’s own 
choosing as well as many different forms self-government can take. These different ways of life 
will imply different sets of skills to different degrees. Given that the range of capacities that 
could be of use in leading a life of one’s own choosing is extremely large and varied, it seems 
neither possible nor desirable to circumscribe a particular register of ‘autonomy skills’. 
Moreover, it seems impossible to simultaneously exercise all these registers of skills and 
capacities, or even to do so in the larger temporal context of one’s life. Some of them are 
scarcely compatible with one another. In this context, to identify a particular set of 
competencies as constituting autonomy will necessarily privilege certain conceptions of the 
good life over the others.  
 To give a brief example of this, let us typify (and push to extremes) two types of auto-
determination following 1. the traditional rationalistic understanding of autonomy and 2. the 
emotional and relational understanding that care feminists and some relational theorists 
promote. On the one hand, we would have someone resembling an ascetic stoic philosopher—
for whom self-government implies the exercise of reason, self-control, critical thinking and 
independence— as the ultimate ideal for self-direction. On the other hand, we would have an 
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 In practice, accepting that multiple competencies are needed for one to be considered self-governed is likely to 
make their assessment much too complex to be feasible.  
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agent like Mother Teresa, who is primarily guided by emotions such as empathy and the will to 
care for others.  
 These two archetypes of auto-determination involve two very different sets of skills and 
capacities, which are scarcely compatible with one another. Yet, they seem to constitute equally 
valuable and autonomous forms of a good life. While it is important to revalorise modes of 
agency that are typically coded as ‘feminine’, it would be problematic if such revalorisation were 
to lead us to frame those that are traditionally associated with autonomy as somewhat less 
autonomous. Likewise, understanding our ascetic stoic philosopher as somewhat more 
autonomous than Mother Teresa because he exercises skills usually associated with autonomy 
seems equally misguided.  
 What this example is meant to show is that associating autonomy with a particular 
register of skills is not innocuous. The competencies we will identify will privilege certain types 
of subjectivities and favour certain conceptions of the good life over others. Insofar as we take 
the liberal commitment to neutrality to heart, we have to assume that there is no legitimate (or 
good) way to discriminate between these different visions of the good life. Likewise, inasmuch 
as we are also committed to avoiding the issue of exclusion, drawing up a finite list of skills and 
capacities that someone should possess in order to be autonomous should be avoided. If we 
refuse to associate autonomy mainly to certain types of good life, then it makes no sense to 
view autonomy as a unified and clearly delineated competency or set of skills that could be 
subjected to evaluations and assessments. If autonomy implies an indefinite repertory of skills 
which varies in function according to the kind of good life one has chosen, then we have to 
admit that assessing the degree of competency an agent possess is simply impossible. In other 
words, we have to remain agnostic towards it.  
 This open and variable definition of what possessing the competency for autonomy 
entails can leave many sceptical. It can be thought that if autonomy cannot serve to exclude 
certain modes of agency or certain capacities from the realm of autonomous agency, then it is 
of little help in understanding what autonomy is.   
  I have two answers to this potential criticism. The first is that this open understanding of 
the competency for autonomy can still serve, to a certain extent, as a normative guide. 
Autonomy is what is necessary for self-governing and to lead a life of one’s own choosing. This 
characterisation, in itself, enables us to evaluate skills in light of this objective. Doing this 
evaluative exercise, one realises that, rather than being linked to the presence of certain 
characteristics or particular modes of self-government, the lack of autonomy is instead linked to 
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the absence of certain skills.103 For instance, consider obedience, a ‘skill’ usually seen as 
antithetical to autonomy. Obedience is certainly necessary for certain visions of the good life 
(such as the good life chosen by nuns or soldiers). It is also a valuable skill for most individuals: 
we all need to be able to follow directives and obey the orders of a superior from time to time. 
That is why we seek to cultivate this skill in children, for example. In this respect, insofar as it 
can be necessary to certain modes of self-government, obedience should not be seen as 
incompatible with autonomy. Some might even want to count it as one of the many skills that 
can be involved in self-government.104 The problem for autonomy, however, arises when 
obedience is paired with the absence of skills such as critical thinking, imagination and self-
consideration. Therefore, even if this understanding of the competency for autonomy is hazy, 
open and undefined, it can still offer certain guidance on the theoretical level.  
 The second answer is that it is not because the contours of the competencies needed 
for self-government are not clearly delineated that autonomy cannot serve its purposes on the 
normative level. As I will demonstrate in the rest of this thesis, the twofold conception of 
autonomy I propose, even if it is agnostic, can fulfil much of the normative purposes this 
concept serves on the political and legal levels. It can serve to determine the degree of 
(criminal) responsibility that should be attributed to individuals, and it can also protect 
individuals against unwanted interferences. Moreover, as I will argue in the second part of this 
chapter, it can enable us to identify oppression and be used to justify intervening in socio-
relational contexts that are destructive of the ability to self-govern.  
 I would even suggest that, for this latter task, an open conception of the competencies 
needed for autonomy is more useful than a clearly delineated account. After all, identifying 
obstacles to autonomy is associated with the understanding of autonomy we adopt. If we think 
autonomy is mainly associated with critical thinking, we will try to foster critical thinking in our 
children and will view things that can thwart this competency as threats (hence the fixation most 
mainstream autonomy theorists have on things such as manipulation, subliminal influences and 
brainwashing). The more finite and narrow our conception of the competency is, the fewer 
obstacles we are able to see and the more ‘good life’ options we exclude from our 
considerations. As Nedelsky (2011) and Herring (2014) explains, that autonomy remains 
primarily affiliated with competencies such as independence, and rationality has rendered this 
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 Saba Mahmood (2005), for instance, develops such argument in The Politics of Piety. She seeks to show that we 
may need to submit ourselves to a discipline in order to develop a skill and that submission or obedience is not 
antithetical to autonomy.  
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ideal blind to certain types of oppressive forces. If ‘Mother Teresa’ types of agency were more 
readily recognised as a valuable form of self-determination, fostering the development of skills 
such as empathy, care and attention to others would likely be of greater concern. As such, an 
open conception of the competencies needed for autonomy enables concerns for a greater 
range of ‘good life’ conceptions and therefore leads us to consider the difficulties and 
impediments individuals encounter when choosing them. 
 Admittedly, this agnostic conception of autonomy is primarily meant to be of use on 
the political and legal levels. In this respect, it has certain limitations. For instance, it cannot tell 
us why, and in what respect, children and people suffering from serious mental pathologies 
should count as less competent to make important decisions about their lives. However, I 
would argue that for most practical purposes, we do not need a conception of autonomy to do 
this. I would also suggest that we should remain wary of devising our account of the 
competencies needed for autonomy in view of the kind of cases we wish it to exclude. By doing 
so, we risk inadvertently creating an account that is too narrow and would exclude too many 
individuals and preferences we would otherwise see as autonomous. There is also a high risk of 
applying our own biases and prejudices to determine the kind of agents we think are self-
evidently not autonomous, which will then come to structure our whole understanding of 
personhood. I will return on these points later on in this chapter. 
 
E) Avoiding Exclusion: A Systematic Presumption of Autonomy 
Accepting that autonomy does not reside in only one competency but demands the exercise of 
a multitude of skills depending on individuals’ conceptions of the good life implies a de facto 
agnosticism towards the degree of competency individuals possess. It becomes, in effect, 
impossible to situate individuals somewhere along a competency scale given that there exists no 
such unified scale. Even if one refuses the view of autonomy I propose and connects autonomy 
to one particular competency, this agnosticism should still hold. As I have attempted to show, 
there are, in practice, no convincing ways to determine whether or not individuals do possess a 
given competency to the relevant degree. An examination of the socio-relational context cannot 
determine this, as it would presume an implausible and counterfactual deterministic view of 
our competencies. Moreover, there is a thick and reasonable disagreement on what 
competency should be seen as necessary for self-government.  Even if this disagreement were 
resolved, we would still have no convincing way to determine which individual should count as 
competent given that we have no epistemic access to their internal mental and/or emotional 
lives. In this context, I suggest that we ought to suspend our judgement regarding whether given 
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agents should be considered as possessing the relevant competency for autonomy and whether 
their preferences were endorsed while mobilising it. On the political level, however, there are 
reasons to translate this agnosticism into a systematic presumption of autonomy that would 
apply to the agent as well as to her declared preference.  
 First, only such a systematic prudential presumption of autonomy enables us to ensure 
that we avoid reproducing or reinforcing problematic exclusionary dynamics. Autonomy is 
most often conceived mainly as an internal competency. It is because it is conceived as such 
that it becomes intrinsically linked to the status of full-fledged moral agent, worthy of 
consideration and respect.105 The competency for autonomy is, in this respect, conceived as the 
main basis to consider individuals as equals within liberal societies (Carter 2011). We owe the 
same duties of consideration and respect to all individuals insofar as they are all equally 
competent to choose and revise their own conception of the good life and to govern their life 
with respect to it. In this regard, they are all equally worthy of being considered and of 
participating in the collective democratic decision-making process.106 Likewise, it is because 
individuals’ preferences are seen as autonomously chosen, that they are considered worthy of 
being respected and protected against undue interference.107 By contrast, not being seen as 
competent means being denied the status of full-fledged agent whose preferences and 
conception of the good life are as worthy of respect as anybody else’s.  
 The problem of exclusion mainly stems from this view of autonomy as a form of 
competency that needs to be assessed. It is partly because autonomy was associated with 
competencies and skills that were coded as masculine that autonomy was used to exclude 
women and frame them as eternal minors. However, reproducing the same kind of 
discriminatory exclusionary dynamics becomes a risk for feminist views of autonomy meant to 
identify preferences deformed by oppression. Indeed, such views simultaneously deny that the 
agents who have adopted these non-autonomous preferences are as competent as we are to 
form and revise our own conceptions of the good life. Doing so they lead to implicitly deny that 
these agents should be considered as our equals.  
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social practices’ and ‘partly fixes what others are permitted and obligated to do or refrain from doing’.  
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 As Waldron (1993) notes, democracy is understood as necessary to express equal respect because it enables us 
to ensure that the rules that govern society are acceptable to all its citizens as rational and autonomous agents.  
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 Anderson (2014, 355) remarks that ‘if you count as personally autonomous (in the sense of being competent to 
make your own decisions), you can legitimately insist on being taken seriously and not being interfered with in 
certain ways’.   
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 It might be argued that respect implies treating people as they deserve to be treated. In 
this regard, it would not be disrespectful to treat people who are incompetent to direct their 
own lives as non-autonomous. We do not disrespect children, for instance, when we make 
important decisions about their lives for them.  Yet, as I have sought to show, there are simply 
no convincing ways to 1. identify which skills are truly needed to make one’s own decisions and 
to what level and 2. to ensure that we correctly identify instances where agents do not possess a 
sufficient level of these competencies. In this context, it seems much better to adopt a 
systematic presumption of autonomy rather than to risk the arbitrary exclusion of people whose 
competency we are not able to recognise. Given that so much hinges on receiving the status of 
autonomous agent, it seems preferable to avoid denying this status to anyone.  
Adopting a systematic presumption of autonomy thus helps to avoid reproducing or 
reinforcing exclusionary dynamics because it implies systematically considering agents as our 
equals. It implies postulating that they are competent to make their own choices and to voice 
their own opinions and desires. It prompts the ethical and political duty to take their expressed 
desires and preferences into consideration and to grant them adequate respect. Even when, 
from our own perspective, an agent seems irrational and when the choices she makes seem to 
be to her own detriment, we still ought to see her as worthy of respect and as worthy of being 
listened to and taken seriously. In this regard, the agnostic conception of autonomy I propose 
cannot serve as a means to justify considering certain types of agents as less able than we are to 
direct their lives. It also cannot serve to legitimise disregarding these agents’ declared 
preferences as less worthy of respect than our own.  
This general attitude, in turn, is likely to be a better help in fostering vulnerable agents’ 
autonomy skills than treating these agents as if they were not competent to make their own 
decisions about their lives. As proponents of the self-regarding attitude model note, being self-
governed is partly dialogical for two reasons. First, developing the self-worth and self-trust that 
are often involved in self-government is relationally enabled. In order for a person to develop 
trust in herself, and to view herself as worthy of respect and consideration, it certainly helps if 
others see her and treat her as such.108 Second, not being recognised as competent to direct 
one’s own life often invites interferences and paternalism into one’s life. It can mean having 
fewer opportunities to exercise one’s autonomy in meaningful ways. This, in turn, can also 
result in effectively diminishing one’s competencies for self-government. The fewer 
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 This does not mean, however, that these others have to remain uncritical of these choices and desires. As 
Andrea Westlund (2014) argues, critically engaging with an agent’s motives and desires, if done in a respectful 
manner, can constitute an acknowledgement of his autonomy.  
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opportunities people have to exercise a given skill, the higher the chance that proficiency in this 
skill will diminish.109 In this respect, adopting a systematic presumption of autonomy has the 
added advantage of helping people develop and/or sustain the kind of skills and self-regarding 
attitudes that promote their autonomy. Inversely, refusing to take on this ethical duty can be 
seen as a form of oppression, as it endangers the self-regarding attitudes necessary for self-
government and can end up reinforcing the very dynamic of oppression we seek to alleviate. 
 
2. A Structural Framework 
One foreseeable criticism is that adopting an ‘open’ conception of autonomy that precludes any 
clear assessment of the competency an agent possesses (either as such or with regard to a given 
choice or a preference) makes the framework I propose impotent in addressing the issue of 
oppression. The main aim of this section is to demonstrate that this is not true.  
 Autonomy is often conceived solely as a competency. However, as remarked earlier, it 
does not suffice to be competent in making one’s own choices in order to lead a life of one’s 
own choosing. Agents also need to be able to enact these choices in the world. In this respect, 
we should acknowledge that what we refer to as the ‘capacity for autonomy’ includes two 
distinct (albeit connected) aspects of self-government. Leading a life of one’s own choosing 
necessitates, as we have just seen, the possession of certain (internal) mental and/or emotional 
skills. Yet, it also requires the ability to exercise these skills in the external world. Structural 
conceptions of autonomy, such as the one Oshana proposes, offer, in this regard, a great 
complement to understandings of autonomy that primarily focus on the mental and/or 
emotional competency needed for self-governing. As it refocuses on the social, institutional and 
relational conditions for autonomy, such an understanding enables us to evaluate the 
possibilities left to exercise one’s autonomy. In contrast to autonomy conceived as a 
competency, the conditions of possibility for the exercise of autonomy are indeed constitutively 
relational. Looking at the socio-relational context thus provides us with a means to assess self-
government in terms of its possibilities of exercise.  
 In this section, I explain the general working of the structural component of my 
framework and its interaction with the open and agnostic conception of the competency for 
                                                 
109
 This does not entail that we should postulate that people who have been living in highly restrictive environment 
for a long time have lost their competency for autonomy. As previously explained, there is reason to see the 
autonomy competencies as causally connected to the socio-relational context. This should give us reasons to 
ensure that people are in a socio-relational context that allows them adequate opportunities to develop and 
exercise their autonomy. However, it cannot lead us to postulate that an oppressive socio-relational context 
necessarily extinguishes people’s ability to self-govern.  
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autonomy I have so far developed. In contrast to Oshana’s conception, the twofold conception 
of autonomy I propose entails distinguishing between the internal and external dimensions of 
self-government and links the normative status of autonomous agent to autonomy as a 
competency. This, in turn, has consequences for the working of the structural part of the 
framework I propose because it implies that we cannot deny the status of autonomous agent to 
individuals who have limited possibilities to exercise their self-government. I argue that, in term 
of its exercise, autonomy should be understood as demanding an adequate range of non-trivial 
options, which should nonetheless never be viewed as determined or fixed. I then turn to the 
problem of oppression and explain how such a conception of autonomy shapes the way we 
understand and identify oppressive forces. I suggest that identifying oppression should entail 
consulting with the concerned agents, especially in view of the very ‘grey’ picture of agency that 
previous conclusions has conveyed.  
 
A) Autonomy and Adequate Options 
As Oshana points out, leading a life of one’s own choosing necessitates effectively possessing 
options from which to choose. In order to be able to govern one’s life in significant ways, 
individuals need to have access to a sufficient range of quality options. However, how do we 
define the relevant range of options that needs to be accessible to individuals? As Meyers 
(2008, 204) notes about Oshana’s theory:  
[It] is notoriously difficult to pin down [what constitutes an adequate range of 
options]. Like many other exponents of this criterion, Oshana does not 
demarcate the minimal range of autonomy-sustaining options, and she does 
not comment on how to go about demarcating it (either in the abstract or at a 
given time and place). This omission reduces her signature demand for a 
theory that ‘externalizes’ autonomy to a disappointingly vague assertion that 
unspecified, external conditions are necessary for autonomy.  
 In order for a structural conception for autonomy to be of use, it therefore needs to 
provide minimal normative guidance concerning what options are necessary for self-
government. Only such guidance, in turn, would enable us to differentiate autonomy 
promoting environments, from those that are deleterious to it. But how do we demarcate the 
range of options that would enable us to specify the external conditions needed to exercise 
one’s autonomy?   
 This is an important question. For political purposes, the easiest answer is that, at a 
minimal, the relevant range of accessible options to which individuals should have access is to 
be determined contextually within a given time and society. In this respect, the concept of a 
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range of relevant options is connected to that of equality. Insofar as liberal societies are 
centrally concerned with ensuring that everyone has the capacity to lead a life of their own 
choosing, such a society should be centrally concerned with ensuring that people possess 
roughly similar range of options from which to choose. If a part of the population does not 
have access to certain types of occupations, for instance, this would count as an important 
injustice. It is necessary to define the relevant range of options contextually, because such a 
definition does not have to rest upon a conception of the options that a fully human life 
requires. Claims of this nature inevitably face the problem of thick reasonable disagreement. 
They also face the risk of reinforcing exclusionary dynamics by framing certain (Western) 
conceptions of the good life as more fully human than others. Adopting a contextual definition 
of the relevant range of options, in contrast, implies humbler normative claims (at least within 
liberal societies), as it hinges on the notion of equal opportunities. It is compatible with 
universalistic claims about what the good life should include, but does not need to imply such 
views. It only stipulates that, in order for a society to be minimally just, everyone within it 
should have access to a similar range of options from which to choose to determine the general 
shape and direction of their lives.  
However, this general characterisation of a ‘range of relevant options’ creates further 
problems. First, what does it mean for an option to be accessible? Many feminists have 
criticised liberalism for its formal notion of equal opportunities that leads to the ignoring of the 
unequal restrictions that might effectively prevent individuals from accessing them. Clare 
Chambers (2008, 43), for instance, writes the following:  
By reducing questions of justice to questions of choice, liberals effectively 
deny the importance of culture to practice, the importance of power in 
perpetuating practices, and the role that practices play in perpetuating 
regimes of power/knowledge. Saying that an individual chooses to participate 
in a practice is to say only that she was not coerced, in a Hayekian sense. 
The difference between choice and coercion is normatively relevant: in many 
cases, an otherwise unproblematic act becomes an injustice if coerced. But 
this distinction does not begin to exhaust the normative questions concerning 
the practice, or to capture the extent to which an individual has acted 
autonomously. 
 Acknowledging opportunities as socially constituted means acknowledging that they are 
constituted by the complex network of relationships, norms, cultural understandings, ‘regimes 
of power’ and institutions that form the socio-relational context of individuals. Their 
accessibility is affected by social situation and can be restricted by the expectations of others, as 
well as by the power relationships in which we stand. Being committed to the value of 
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autonomy and to ensuring that everyone has an equal capacity to lead a life of their own 
choosing is not consistent with ignoring significant and unequal obstacles some individuals may 
encounter when accessing options. In order to be truly accessible, the range of relevant options 
cannot simply be formally open. It has to be substantively accessible to individuals: the unequal 
restrictions individuals may face with regard to certain opportunities require adequate 
compensation. This, in turn, might demand positive action on the state’s part to counterbalance 
the eventual restrictions individuals may face.110 However, given the complexity of our social 
world, how and to what extent can the state ensure that a given option is substantively open to 
individuals? 
 Another problem arises when we try to define what constitutes a relevant option. To say 
that, within a given society, every individual should have access to the same range of options 
does not entail that everybody should have access to the same range of, for instance, toothpaste 
brands. These are, evidently, not the kind of options that are important for the exercise of self-
government. The kind of opportunities that should be considered as relevant are non-trivial 
options, and they are non-trivial precisely because they are the options that are important to 
lead a life of one’s own choosing. This kind of option would include, among other things, the 
kinds of opportunities that are widely recognised as important social goods within a given 
society, such as education and social positions. The problem is, however, that not everybody 
has the same conception of the good: an option that might seem trivial to us, might in fact be 
extremely important for someone else. Moreover, what is usually seen as a non-trivial option is 
socially constructed through the existing regimes of power. This social construction of what is 
‘truly valuable’ often ends up serving the interests of the dominant social identities. For 
example, the choice of professional occupation is usually considered among the important 
opportunities that should be accessible to individuals. However, as Nedelsky (2011) notes, this 
is much less the case for those that are traditionally coded ‘feminine’, such as the opportunity 
to care for one’s child or family member. The conception of the ‘relevant range of options’ we 
adopt should not inadvertently reproduce or reinforce this kind of exclusionary dynamic. In 
this respect, if it is to be of use to feminists, we should begin by acknowledging that this range 
should include options, such as caring for one’s loved ones, as important, not just for women 
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 Hirschmann (2003, 235), for instance, notes that ‘the state often intervenes most intrusively and egregiously 
precisely when it claims to be doing the contrary, such as when, under the rubric of privacy, its failure to arrest and 
prosecute domestic abusers results in the restriction of women’s freedom’. Likewise, Mackinnon (1989, 191-2) 
notes that ‘if inequality is socially pervasive and enforced, equality will require intervention, not abdication’ on the 
state’s part.  
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but for any human being. However, merely expanding the scope of options we consider non-
trivial while still conceiving this range to be fixed is unlikely to solve the problem. If we want to 
avoid reproducing exclusionary dynamics, we can never postulate that the range of relevant 
options we have to define is fixed and unchangeable. It should be seen as open to contestation 
and evolution. But how do we define a relevant range of options without risking excluding 
options that are important for some agents? 
 
B) Listening to the Agent  
Thus far, we have seen that using the relational framework I propose entails postulating that 
our competency for autonomy is causally relational. This postulate does not have 
consequences solely for the assessment of autonomy as a competency. It should also change 
the way we understand agency. To propose that our competency for autonomy is causally 
relational entails recognising that agents are always ‘victims’ of their socio-relational context, to 
one extent or another, and that we can never be free from social influences. It also means 
acknowledging that what we refer to as the ‘competency’ for autonomy involves a plurality of 
skills that cannot all be exercised simultaneously. Therefore, it is impossible to conceive even 
privileged agents as possessing a ‘perfect’ competency for autonomy or to rank them higher 
than others on a given ‘autonomy scale’.  
 This very ‘grey’ picture of autonomy, in turn, has epistemological consequences. First, it 
has consequences for the way we conceive knowledge acquisition and for the kind of claims we 
can make about the world. Acknowledging that we are all products of a socio-relational context 
entails acknowledging that our experience within our own given socio-relational context 
structures the way we see the world. It entails recognising that our perspective on the world is 
always partial and situated.111 It implies that our socio-relational location always structures and 
limits what we can know and that our faculties – our reasoning and imagination –are themselves 
created and limited by our social background. This should make us wary of methods 
commonly applied in law and political philosophy, such as the Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’ and 
the ‘reasonable man’ standard. Such methods imply the use of reason to attain an all-
encompassing perspective that is supposed to enable us to know what is just and what is best for 
others without bothering to listen to them. It should also make us wary of defining the range of 
                                                 
111
 In this regard, the relational view proposed here is cogent with the main thesis underlying feminist social 
epistemology. As characterised by Elizabeth Anderson (2017), ‘[t]he central concept of feminist epistemology is 
that of a situated knower, and hence of situated knowledge: knowledge that reflects the particular perspectives of 
the subject’. In order to stress the fact that our knowledge is always local and limited, some feminist 
epistemologists have introduced the notions of ‘standpoint’ and ‘situatedness’ (Hartsock 1998; Harding 1991). 
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relevant non-trivial options that are important for individuals in their place without consulting 
them.  
 Second, this causally relational picture of agency has consequences for the way we 
perceive agents’ testimonies. The systematic presumption of autonomy entails that even when 
people are embedded in a highly oppressive social context and make choices that seem to 
perpetuate their own oppression, and exercise skills that do not fit the normal description of 
autonomy, we still ought to presume they possess the competency for autonomy. In this 
respect, we should consider them as epistemic agents in their own right. While our own 
vantage points and situations constrict what we can know of others, they can also provide us 
with an epistemologically privileged perspective on our own socio-relational context and on the 
ways it might restrict our autonomy. The same applies to others: their own situations within 
their socio-relational contexts grant them a privileged epistemological vantage point on these 
aspects. They are thus well positioned to gain and provide valuable knowledge about their 
socio-relational contexts through their concrete experiences of such. This realisation, in turn, 
should lead to the acknowledgement that agents’ testimonies can constitute valuable sources of 
knowledge regarding their own situations. Consequently, using the framework I propose 
implies that we ought to rely on these agents’ testimonies as a valuable source of information 
regarding at least two things. 
 First, we should consider their testimonies regarding what counts as a non-trivial option 
in their lives. Options are non-trivial when they are linked to the ability to live a life of one’s 
own choosing. In this respect, defining the minimal range of such options that should be 
available to agents within a given society should involve effectively consulting with people. 
Second, we should rely on the agents as a valuable source of knowledge regarding the obstacles 
they face in their own socio-relational contexts. While some of these socio-relational obstacles 
are certainly visible ‘from the exterior’, most of them are not so readily self-evident. We have to 
know where to look and what to look for if we are to understand the way a given socio-
relational context structures the exercise of autonomy of a given agent. Only through listening 
to agents can we orient our inquiry in meaningful ways and ensure, as much as possible, that we 
do not miss something of importance.  
 The acknowledgement that the agent’s situation grants her an epistemologically 
privileged perspective on her own socio-relational context should not, however, lead us to 
conclude that she is perfectly objective regarding her own situation. As highlighted by 
standpoint theorists, agents are not necessarily conscious or unbiased regarding their own 
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location.112 All agents interiorise social norms and dominant perspectives that may, in turn, 
render them less likely to recognise the obstacles they face.113 In this respect, the agent’s 
testimony cannot be considered as giving definitive access to the reality of her socio-relational 
situation. Yet this testimony can effectively aid in orienting research in her socio-relational 
context. Listening to the agent and considering her as an equal can also help balance prevalent 
blind points and biases, or common preconceptions about their situations.114 Listening to others 
is thus necessary to gain knowledge of their location and the kind of obstacles they face. This 
discussion, in turn, should orient research and reflexions concerning the kind of obstacles they 
face, and the kind of options that should be considered as non-trivial. In this respect, 
testimonies, factual data and empirical research (among other elements) should be used, when 
possible, to help substantiate the agent’s testimony regarding the obstacles that confront her.  
 The idea of adopting such a situated conception of objectivity thus does not deny that 
objectivity, as such, exists.115 Acknowledging that, on our own, we can with difficulty reach an 
objective stance towards our own situation should not lead us to abandon the concept of 
objectivity altogether. The acknowledgement of our own ‘situatedness’ should, instead, make us 
humbler and more prudent about our own claims and those of others. Humbler, because it 
should lead us to consider normative and factual claims as situated. What is reasonable or what 
constitutes an obstacle in a given socio-relational context is not necessarily reasonable or 
problematic in other contexts. More prudent because it should lead us to acknowledge that our 
own perspective as well as that of others is likely to be partial, biased, and incomplete.  
 
C)  Identifying Oppression 
This picture of agency leads to the recognition that the relevant range of non-trivial options to 
which individuals should have access to can never be conceived as determined or as finite. For 
political purposes, it is important to ensure that everyone has access to a roughly similar basic 
range of non-trivial options, which is to be determined contextually within a given society. 
However, this range can never be precisely circumscribed, nor should it be if we want to avoid 
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 As Hartsock (1987) emphasises, a standpoint is not simply one’s situated perspective take. Rather, it is an 
‘achieved stance’ that involves political engagement and the realisation of the shared nature of one’s experience of 
oppression. 
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 A rape victim that only blames herself for the harm she suffered constitutes a good illustration of this. 
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 As underlined by both Annette Baier (1985) and Lorraine Code (1991), we are always ‘second persons’: we 
acquire our epistemic skills in relation to others. 
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 As defined by Longino (1990, 62), ‘[o]bjectivity is a characteristic which has been applied to beliefs, individuals, 
theories, observations, and methods of inquiry. It is generally thought to involve the willingness to let our beliefs 
be determined by ‘the facts’ or by some impartial and non-arbitrary criteria rather than by our wishes as to how 
things ought to be’. 
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the risk of excluding options that are, in fact, important to certain agents. In this respect, the 
focus of the structural component of the framework I propose should be conceived as 
primarily negative. Rather than aiming at identifying the precise range of options individuals 
should have access to, inquiries into the socio-relational context should aim at identifying 
limitations and obstacles that burden individuals’ capacity to lead a life of their own choosing 
and to access the kind of options that are important to them. This means, on the political level, 
that we should turn our attention towards the identification of oppression.  
 I have provided a general characterisation of oppression in Chapter 1, following that of 
Iris Marion Young. I have suggested that oppression designates the structural disadvantage and 
injustice some people suffer as members of a social group. Oppression is a problem for 
autonomy because it burdens or constrains the exercise of self-government. It is this type of 
harm that is primarily of interest on the political level. Indeed, we are all constrained by our 
particular socio-relational context, which, in turn, constructs the meaning we attribute to our 
lives, as well as what we value and aim to achieve. In this respect, we are all limited in what we 
can do because of the expectations others have for us. Yet, this type of constrains cannot be 
conceived as unjust, insofar as it is not inserted into a more global structure of norms and 
expectations that systematically disadvantages certain types of social identity on the socio-
relational level.  
 Oppression constrains, burdens and/or reduces the possibilities for the exercise of 
autonomy, with ‘possibility’ understood as designating non-trivial options.  We should conceive 
our definition of non-trivial options as open in order to account for the diversity of good lives 
that individuals can adopt. This, however, should not lead us to believe that oppression is 
subjective. In order to count as oppressive, the constraint or burden weighing on individuals 
cannot merely be subjective. They should be brought about by social forces that are actually 
effective in a socio-relational context. These forces are easy to identify when they are of an 
institutional or political nature: depriving certain individuals of a right or imposing a 
discriminatory institutional practice that removes access to social positions by virtue of social 
identity constitutes an example of this. Yet, very often, restrictive constraints that individuals 
face are much less readily observable. Oppressive social norms or negative stereotypes 
constitute an example of that.116 However, even if they are harder to discern, these types of 
obstacle are identifiable through their effects and the observable inequalities they establish. 
When one can observe that members of a given social group have access to fewer options than 
                                                 
116See Claude M. Steele’s (2011) research on the impact of negative stereotypes on performance.  
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other members of the same society (such as certain privileged social positions), then suspicion 
should be high that there is some oppressive force at play. Likewise, if members of a given 
social group claim that they are oppressed by problematic social forces (such as norms or 
negative stereotypes and bias), this should be taken seriously and should prompt our enquiries 
concerning what constraints are effective in their given socio-relational context.  
 It should be noted here that because oppression has an objective dimension, the 
enquiry might prove group members wrong. As Amy Cudd (2006) notes, there is a difference 
between subjective and objective oppression. For example, many members of the masculinist 
movement now claim that feminism constitutes a form of oppression against men.117 While 
these men might feel subjectively oppressed by the feminist movement and the institutional 
measures brought about by feminist mobilisation (such as gender quotas, for instance), many of 
their claims remain unsubstantiated. Given that men continue predominantly to occupy 
privileged social positions, the claim that imposing quotas for women’s employment oppresses 
men cannot be substantiated. Likewise, by virtue of its objective dimension, it is possible to 
identify oppression even if the concerned individuals do not feel subjectively oppressed. For 
instance, most men and women in society might not consider themselves to be oppressed by 
gender norms. However, given the observable gender division of social roles, we might still 
claim that the norms prescribing the sexual division between caregiving and breadwinning are 
oppressive as they constrain the way individuals can plausibly exercise their autonomy. 118 
Moreover, because oppressive obstacles have an objective dimension, and because we can 
observe them through their effect on individual self-determination, we do not necessarily need 
a critical mass of individuals from a given social group to denounce the oppression they are 
victims of in order to justify political action.119 
 Such a structural conception of oppression stands in sharp contrast to the intuitive and 
substantive conception that proponents of a substantive conception of autonomy assume. In 
particular, it cannot lead to see norms or preferences as oppressive merely by virtue of their 
content. They can become oppressive insofar as they contribute in creating a structure of 
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Georgia Duerst-Lahti (2008) distinguishes between the words ‘masculism’ and ‘masculinism’. While masculism 
is associated with the early gender egalitarian days of the men’s movement, masculinism is more closely linked 
with patriarchy. According to Francis Dupuis-Deri and Mélissa Blais (2012, 25), ‘Masculinists are generally critical 
of even moderate feminists and feminists at the head of official feminist organizations’.  
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 We will return to this issue in Chapter 6. 
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 This partly addresses the ‘dupe’ concern some feminist might have regarding oppression. As Connolly (1993, 
163) notes, ‘[t]he conative dispositions people have are themselves shaped in part by the concepts, beliefs, and 
roles they internalize from the society in which they are implicated...the more successful a group is in maintaining 
ideological hegemony the less liable it is to the charge that it has limited the freedom of other groups’. This means 
that the more success an oppressive system of constrains achieves, the less easy it will be for the people it 
oppresses to recognise their oppression. 
 95 
constraints that limit the way individuals, by virtue of their social identity, can exercise their 
autonomy. As Hirschmann (2003, 94) remarks, ‘[c]hoices are discursively constructed as well; 
whether particular social formations are defined as barriers, what social arrangements seem 
“natural,” what possibilities can be imagined, are historically and culturally variable, pertaining 
more to language and differing understandings of reality’. Understanding oppression as a 
structural harm that constrains individuals’ self-government enables us to acknowledge this 
cultural variability and avoid framing certain types of norms as oppressive by virtue of what they 
prescribe. It can thus not lead us to stigmatise individual preferences that conform to this norm 
as intrinsically bad. What it allows us to see, however, is that if a norm becomes dominant and 
ends up significantly constraining the options to which certain individuals have access, there is a 
need to alleviate the obstacles it creates.  
 The definition of oppression articulated here is flexible enough to take into account the 
obstacles to autonomy that proponents of a relational account are concerned with, but it is also 
precise enough to filter out limitations to the exercise of autonomy that should not be 
considered as relevant on the political level. It is thus specifically devised to lead to the 
identification of norms that would concern proponents of a substantial account of autonomy, 
without leading to the same kind of problematic implications. Insofar as they target particular 
groups of individuals, this account of oppression can also help identify problematic forms of 
socialisation that unjustly curtail options for individuals. This conception of oppression can also 
lead to the identification of the socio-relational obstacles that mostly concern proponents of the 
self-regarding attitude model, because they negatively impact the relevant self-regarding 
attitudes necessary for self-government. Negative stereotypes, the lack of recognition and social 
marginalisation, insofar as they unfairly or unjustly burden or reduce the possibilities for the 
exercise of autonomy in an observable manner, constitute oppressive social forces. Moreover, 
insofar as something impairs or threatens the development of the competencies necessary for 
autonomy in an unjustifiable manner, it can be considered oppressive. In this respect, the lack 
of a suitable form of education and the presence of an authoritative socio-relational structure 
that was not chosen by the individual, for example, can constitute forms of oppression. Finally, 
this definition of oppression evidently incorporates the types of obstacles that concern 
proponents of a structural account, such as Oshana. 120 
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 This enumeration of the types of obstacles that can arise in a diverse socio-relational context is by no means 
exhaustive. As mentioned before, we have adopted an ‘open’ definition of autonomy in order to account for the 
diversity of the modes of determination that individuals can adopt. In this respect, the identification of oppression 
can never be seen as a finite task that can be considered dealt with once and for all.  
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D) The Temporal Dimension of Oppression 
As intuited by John Christman, identifying oppression has to take into account the way past 
social circumstances have shaped the possibilities that remain for the current exercise of self-
government. Temporality is an intrinsic dimension of relationships: without a temporal 
continuity, there can be no relationship. As a consequence, in addition to being structured by 
the social forces currently at play within a given socio-relational context, the past experiences 
agents have had within a given socio-relational context can also constrain the way they exercise 
their autonomy. Thus, there are obstacles that only become visible if one takes this temporal 
dimension into account. For instance, if members of a given community have long suffered 
from institutional racism, they might exhibit an understandable mistrust towards existing 
institutions. If calling the police was, in the past, to no effect or ended up making their situation 
worse, this might still count as an obstacle that limits their access to this option. Even if the 
institutional arrangement were changed, as long as past obstacles still observably constrain 
agents, it may still count as a form of oppression that needs to be remedied. In this respect, 
because a relational framework recognises the temporality of relationships, it entails 
acknowledging that oppression does not have to be effective within a given socio-relational 
context to constrain the way individuals can exercise their autonomy. This gives us yet another 
reason to rely on individuals’ testimony concerning the obstacles they face.  
 
E) The Question of Legitimate Means 
In summary, so long as an aspect of a given socio-relational context is 1. unfair, 2. constrains, 
burdens or reduces the possibilities available for individuals’ exercise of autonomy by virtue of 
their social identity and 3. has an objective dimension that is either directly observable or can 
be seen through its effect, this aspect should be considered oppressive. Insofar as a society is 
concerned about ensuring that everyone has an equal capacity to lead a life of their own 
choosing, I have suggested that the government should be centrally concerned about identifying 
and trying to alleviate such an oppressive force.  
 However, this goal should not lead us to ignore the problem of exclusion. In order to 
ensure that we avoid reproducing this problem, I have suggested that should always presume 
that individuals are competent to make their own choices about their lives. Adopting this 
systematic presumption of autonomy has consequences for the types of political action that can 
be pursued to alleviate sources of oppression. The framework I have proposed, for instance, 
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cannot serve to legitimise paternalistic interventions on the grounds that individuals are not 
competent to choose what is good for them. Paternalism entails restricting people’s freedom on 
the grounds of their own supposed interest (Kleinig 1984). It entails positing an inequality of 
status between the person who knows what an individual’s interest truly is and the person 
whose freedom gets curtailed. When paternalism is grounded in autonomy, it entails refusing 
to take people’s preferences into account and treating individuals as if they are unable to make 
their own choices about their lives. This stance is inconsistent with the causally relational 
picture of agency I have put forward. It is also incompatible with the presumption of autonomy. 
We cannot prevent an individual from choosing an option because we see this option as 
running against her interest. Because of the presumption of autonomy, we have to assume that 
individuals, even when they make choices that seem to perpetuate their own oppression, can be 
autonomous with regard to them.  
Rather than closing-off options, the types of intervention that should be privileged 
should aim at ensuring that agents have access to a greater range of non-trivial options. If 
oppression results in restricting people’s access to options, alleviating oppression means 
working on removing these restrictions. In certain cases, this might mean implementing policies 
and institutions that aim to remove problematic double-binds that prevent individuals from 
accessing two non-trivial options simultaneously. For instance, when current social practices 
force women to choose between having either a fulfilling career or a family, implementing a 
child-care programme or flexible work legislation might be a good start to correct the 
oppressive aspect of the socio-relational context. It might also mean compensating costs 
associated with taking an option, which might penalise those that choose it and prevent others 
from choosing it. This might mean, for instance, offering legal protection and financial 
compensations to full-time caregivers in order to ensure that choosing this option does not 
come at the cost of these individuals’ future economic stability.  
At times, alleviating obstacles can even mean working on the social construction of 
desire and attempting to diversify societal perceptions of normality. The understanding of 
oppression I have proposed entails acknowledging that norms are oppressive insofar as they 
become hegemonic and block individuals’ ability to access certain options. When this is the 
case, alleviating oppression might mean working on counterbalancing prevalent social 
understandings through means such as education, sensitisation campaigns and the promotion 
of diverse models of behaviours. For instance, in a socio-relational context in which gender 
norms that prescribe caregiving to women and breadwinning to men are prevalent, advertising 
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and publicising different models of parenting might be part of the measures that are necessary 
to alleviate the social pressure on individuals to conform. However, even when such norms are 
hegemonic, addressing oppression can never entail stigmatising the preferences people endorse 
when they conform to the hegemonic norm. The systematic presumption of autonomy I have 
proposed entails that even when people come to prefer things that are congruent with 
oppressive norms, these preferences have to be seen as autonomous and as worthy of respect. 
The structural aspect of the framework I have presented cannot justify treating people as if they 
are victims because their preferences, rather than truly being their own, are the outcome of 
their own oppression. It can, however, justify working on the transformation of a rigid social 
world to enable people to choose otherwise, should they wish to.  
This short overview of the types of measures that are coherent with the agnostic and 
structural framework I propose is by no means exhaustive. Different cases will warrant different 
types of interventions based on the kind of obstacles individuals encounter. In certain cases, 
however, measures that respect the preferences individuals adopt will not be sufficient to 
alleviate oppression. Yet, given the systematic presumption of autonomy I have adopted, 
preventing an individual from accessing an option cannot be justified on the grounds that 
individuals are not competent enough to make choices that are in their best interest.  Closing-
off the access to an option can, however, be justified when it is necessary in order to avoid 
reproducing and reinforcing oppressive dynamics that rob individuals from the possibility of 
exercising their autonomy in significant ways. For instance, when the existence of an option 
negatively impacts the autonomy of a third party without their consent, there might be reason to 
curtail the option. The option for parents to send their children to a strictly religious school 
might fall within this category. However, the justification for curtailing this option is not that 
parents are incompetent to choose what is best for their children or that the mode of good life 
they have chosen for themselves is not worthy of respect. Rather, such measure would be 
justified on the ground that it is necessary to ensure that children have the same opportunities 
as their parents to choose how to direct their own lives. 
 Likewise, when choosing an option restricts access to other non-trivial options in an 
irremediable manner, and when its existence alone pressurises individuals to take it, it might be 
justifiable to curtail the option. To give an example, Diana Tietjens Meyers (2000b) argues that 
female circumcision can be autonomously chosen. Given the presumption of autonomy I have 
adopted, we have no other choice than to assume that adults who would want to undergo such 
a procedure are autonomous regarding this desire. However, insofar as genital cutting 1. 
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irremediably removes the non-trivial option of enjoying one’s sexuality and 2. can pressurise 
individuals embedded within certain communities to agree to such surgery, curtailing this 
option might be justifiable on the grounds of autonomy. However, such political measure 
should be seen as a last resort, particularly if the members of the community who are most 
directly affected by the measure want to safeguard the option and view it as non-trivial. In this 
respect, before banning such a practice, we might try to transform it so that it does not 
irremediably entail preventing individuals from accessing another non-trivial option. For 
instance, Meyers (2000b, 481) refers to the ‘circumcision through words’ rituals and the 
‘symbolic pricking’ that has come to replace actual genital cutting in some communities. If it is 
still true that the existence alone of this option is sufficient to pressurise certain groups of 
individuals to take part in it, we would then be justified in attempting to counterbalance the 
social forces pressurising individuals’ involvement. However, it would be much more difficult 
to justify curtailing the option altogether.  
 
F)  What about Adaptive Preferences? 
Thus far, I have avoided discussing directly the issue of adaptive preferences. This can seem 
incongruous given that oppression can and is often internalised. That is why it is so powerful 
and long-lasting. As feminists have pointed out, it is precisely because oppressive norms are 
internalised that they can subsist through time as they become part of individuals’ preferences 
and lead them to reinforce and reproduce their own subservience through their seemingly free 
choices. This phenomenon has been referred to as the ‘adaptive preference problem’ within 
the literature. By virtue of its agnosticism, my framework seems to leave no way to identify 
preferences that result from the internalisation of oppressive constraints. Furthermore, the 
systematic presumption of autonomy that derives from my agnosticism means we have to 
assume that individuals are autonomous with regard to their preferences. It means we have to 
see them as worthy of respect even if their content is congruent with oppressive norms. This 
can be thought as a major flaw in my framework, preventing it from truly addressing the 
problem of oppression. The main goal of this section is to defuse this concern. I mean to show 
that identifying adaptive preferences is neither necessary nor beneficial in order to address the 
issue of oppression.  
 As Serene Khader (2011) notes, adaptive preferences are often understood as a class of 
desires antithetical to autonomy. Jon Elster (1987), for example, defines ‘adaptive preferences’ 
as those that are ‘formed behind our back’ and lead us unconsciously to downgrade desires for 
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things we cannot access. He gives the example, drawn from a Lafontaine fable, of a fox who 
adapts his preferences to his circumstances and claims that the grapes he is unable to access are 
‘sour anyway’ (1987, 117-119). These ‘deformed desires’ are considered to be a problem for 
autonomy because they are either not chosen by the agent, are out of his control or are 
unconscious and thus out of his reflexive reach. 
 Because they fail to sufficiently consider the role of socio-relational context in the 
formation and exercise of autonomy, most mainstream autonomy theories have difficulty 
addressing the issue of adaptive preferences. For example, proponents of the ‘higher-order 
desire approach’ often seem to assume the existence of uninfluenced higher order desires,121  
which does not account for the fact that higher order preferences can also be adapted from 
oppressive circumstances.122 Relational theorists have attempted to tackle this issue by avoiding 
the postulate of an authentic ‘inner citadel’ untouched by socio-relational influences. However, 
this creates further problems for the identification of adaptive preferences. This view implies 
acknowledging that all of our preferences are influenced and produced by the socio-relational 
context in which agents exist. To this extent, they can all be considered as adaptations to our 
social circumstances. Salvaging the concept of adaptive preferences thus entails finding a 
normatively relevant difference between such preferences and the others. Yet, as I seek to 
demonstrate here, there is simply no convincing way to differentiate adaptive preference from 
non-adaptive ones by assessing the preference itself. What makes certain adaptive preferences 
problematic is thus not their content or the way they were endorsed. Rather, it is the nature of 
the socio-relational context from which they are adapted. If this is true, then redirecting our 
attention towards the socio-relational context itself might be a more straightforward route to 
address the problem of adaptive preferences than devising tests to determine which preferences 
are truly adaptive and which are not. 
 This is most evident for proponents of procedural accounts of autonomy such as John 
Christman. Following the counterfactual criterion, an agent is autonomous with regard to a 
preference only if, when becoming aware of the process that led to its formation, she did not 
resist it or, counterfactually (if she were to become aware of it), would not resist it. The idea 
here is that if an agent were to become aware that her preference was the result of oppressive 
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 Popularised by theorists such as Gerald Dworkin (1988) and Harry Frankfurt (1987). 
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As explained by Robert Noggles (2005, 91), the natural response to this problem would be to claim that a second 
order must be authentic for it to determine whether the first order desire is autonomous. However, this solution 
seems to require us to posit a third order of desires that would enable us to determine the autonomy and 
authenticity of the second order desires. But then nothing prevents a third order desire form being inauthentic, 
and the problem is whole again. This is known as the ‘regress problem’ within the literature and can be 
understood as stemming from the idea of the authentic and uninfluenced core. 
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socialisation, she would readily reject it. However, what makes a preference morally 
problematic is not really whether agents endorse it after having critically thought about the way 
it was formed. Rather, it is that it was the result of a problematic form of socialisation. 
 For the sake of the argument, let us say that I have a preference for stinky cheese that 
was developed through the influence of an uncle I now despise. If, when thinking about what 
led to the formation of this preference, I discover the origin of that preference and now resent 
having it (let us say I really do hate my uncle), then my preference would count as non-
autonomous following Christman’s test. However, this is clearly not the kind of preference 
Christman wants his test to rule out as non-autonomous. The kind of preferences that his 
counterfactual criterion seeks to identify are those caused by ‘fierce conditioning’ as opposed to 
those caused by a social influence that one does not like.123 What makes a preference non-
autonomous, then, is the ‘fierce conditioning’ that has led to the formation of the non-
autonomous preference in the first place. But, if this is the case, then why not redirect our 
energy towards assessing the socio-relational context? As previously argued, given that we have 
no epistemic access to the agent’s internal life, there is simply no way to verify whether the 
agent truly satisfies Christman’s counterfactual criterion. As Christman remarks, we cannot 
postulate that an agent would necessarily reject all the preferences that were acquired through a 
dictatorial form of socialisation. Yet, insofar as such problematic conditions risk causing agents 
to form non-autonomous preferences, we might want to ensure that agents do not suffer such a 
form of socialisation in the first place.  
 As for the proponents of a strong substantive account of autonomy, they would identify 
adaptive preferences by virtue of their content. However, when looking more closely at the 
assumption that underlies their account, it seems that what makes a given preference morally 
troubling is not, in fact, its content. Rather, it is the oppressive circumstances from which 
preferences stem. Consider, for instance, Benson’s example of a college student obsessed with 
her physical appearance.124 Given the way Benson structures his example, it seems self-evident 
that the student’s preference for devoting all her time and energy to her looks is causally linked 
to the presence of oppressive femininity norms. For that reason, proponents of a substantial 
account of autonomy would consider her preference as adaptive. Stoljar states that this is 
because the substance of the norms —that is the idea that the value of women derives from their 
appearance from which the preference derives— is problematic. However, it seems that without 
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 At times, Christman seems to imply that the problem with such a preference is that it causes one to lead a ‘life of 
complete subservience’. However, for him, provided that the individual does endorse her preference for this kind 
of life and satisfies the counterfactual criterion, her preference cannot be seen as problematic. See Ch. 2. 
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See Chapter 2. 
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the presence of an oppressive structure enforcing this belief, we would simply regard this 
student’s obsession for personal grooming as an idiosyncrasy rather than as a problem for her 
autonomy.  
 This becomes clearer if we postulate that the student in question is male. If this is so, 
we would certainly consider this student’s strong desire to correspond to a certain beauty ideal 
to be a bit vain and would probably not see it as the best route to his own flourishing. However, 
we would not claim that it is non-autonomous or adaptive, even though the content of his 
preference is identical to that of Benson’s female student. This is because, in contrast to her, 
we cannot connect this male student’s preference to the prevalent norms of masculinity. If I am 
right that substantive autonomy theorists would consider the preference problematic only in the 
woman’s case, this suggests that the real object of concern is the oppressive dimension of the 
socio-relational context. It is the knowledge that our current socio-relational context does 
enforce rigid norms of feminine appearance on women and that ignoring them can have 
negative consequences for us (depending, of course, on the socio-relational context in which we 
exist).What makes Benson’s student troubling is, consequently, not so much the content it has, 
but rather the strong suspicion that the preference was coercively enforced on the female 
student, and that she might be right in her belief that her appearance is crucial to the 
opportunities she has in life. In other words, the problem is the oppressive aspect of the socio-
relational context in which her preference was formed.  
 To further illustrate the point, imagine a situation where coercion and brainwashing are 
used to force the agent to adopt a preference that more closely accords with the conception of 
the good life held by a strong substantive theorist. Imagine that in order to counteract the belief 
that a woman’s place is at home, the government implants programmes aimed at brainwashing 
girls from conservative backgrounds to adopt the preference of becoming a career woman. Far 
from being cogent with an oppressive gender norm concerning behaviour, this preference 
seems rather consistent with Stoljar’s feminist intuition. Looking strictly at content, it is 
impossible to judge the preference for being a career woman as adaptive or as otherwise 
normatively problematic. It is only when we consider the constraints of the socio-relational 
context that we can see that this preference is, in fact, produced by coercion and is, in this 
respect, not properly autonomous. What makes a preference problematic is, therefore, not its 
content but the nature of the socio-relational context which has led to its formation.  
 Serene Khader (2011) offers a third route to identify adaptive preferences. She takes 
the relational premise seriously and states that ‘to describe adaptive preferences as more 
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‘imposed’ than other types of preferences is to ignore the fact that all of us have preferences 
that are shaped by our social conditions’ (2011, 14). Because adopting the relational premise 
leads her to consider most preferences as adapted to the socio-relational context, Khader 
proposes to replace the term ‘adaptive preferences’ with ‘inappropriately adaptive preferences’. 
She defines such preferences as ‘preferences inconsistent with basic flourishing that a person 
developed under conditions nonconductive to basic flourishing and that we expect her to 
change under conditions conducive to basic-flourishing’ (2011, 17). However, it soon becomes 
clear that the defining feature of an inappropriately adaptive preference is not truly that it 
‘sustain[s] a form of life that is bad for a person’ (2011, 18).  Rather, it is that it is formed in 
conditions nonconductive to basic flourishing. 
 For instance, we can imagine agents (let say they are hard-core ascetic stoic 
philosophers) who adopt preferences that do not seem conducive to their basic flourishing.125 
They live in isolation, deprive themselves of food for days and live in the most abject poverty. 
Khader would likely agree that these philosophers’ preferences are not inappropriately 
adaptive, even though they run against their basic flourishing. This is because such preferences 
were not ‘developed under conditions nonconductive to basic flourishing and that we expect 
[them] to change under conditions conducive to basic flourishing’ (2011, 17). Yet, this is 
precisely the point I seek to make here.126 If the main problem with inappropriately adaptive 
preferences is that they are caused by a socio-relational context that is not conducive to basic 
flourishing, then there seems to be no real need to identify preferences not conducive to basic 
flourishing in order to justify interventions to eradicate inappropriately adaptive preferences. 
All we need is to address the oppressive conditions in themselves, which have caused the IAPs 
to appear in the first place. This is especially true if inappropriately adaptive preferences are a 
shallow sort of preference that agents are likely to revise when put under conditions conducive 
to basic flourishing, as Khader (2011, 147) claims they are.  
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 Khader does not stipulate what basic flourishing might look like or require as it is to be defined through an 
actual cross-cultural deliberation rather than through a hypothetical one. “My own reflection is not a cross-cultural 
deliberative process, and I do not expect it to stand in for one,” she explains. It is, therefore, not possible to affirm 
that the preferences adopted by the ascetic philosopher truly run against their basic flourishing. The reason I use 
this exemple is because it roughly ressemble the situation of the El-Pital women Khader uses, at the beginning of 
her book, to introduce the notion of IAPs. 
126
 As for her, Khader (2011, 48 & 102) gives the example of a woman who decides ‘to spend the rest of her life 
engaging repeatedly in a sport that is likely to kill her—say bullfighting’. Insofar as she experiences no ‘limits on her 
opportunities’, and that her preference is not caused by a socio-relational context unconducive to her flourishing, 
then her preference cannot be seen as an IAP. 
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Conclusion 
I have started the chapter with a conundrum. On the one hand, there is a need for feminists to 
reconceptualise autonomy in a way that cannot serve to reproduce discriminatory exclusionary 
dynamics. Given that autonomy is linked to respect and equality, it is important to avoid 
denying this status to individuals because they manifest forms of self-government we do not 
recognise. On the other hand, however, autonomy remains an important normative ideal for 
feminists. For it to ground emancipatory feminist policies, it is important for the conception of 
autonomy we employ to remain adequately mindful of the problem of oppression.  However, 
as Chapter 2 revealed, it seems almost impossible to combine these two goals. It seems that 
adopting a relational account means either adopting an inclusive conceptualization of 
autonomy—one that is respectful of the diversity of ways in which women exercise their 
agency— or adopting a conception that is focused on identifying social obstacles impeding 
autonomy’s development and exercise and, as a result, allows for the justification of an 
emancipatory feminist agenda. 
 In this chapter, I have offered a way to resolve this divide. I have suggested that instead 
of thinking of autonomy as a united capacity that mainly consist either in the possession of a 
competency or in the ability to enact one’s decisions in the world, we think of autonomy as 
requiring both. I have argued that autonomy does require certain competencies. Given that 
being considered competent is crucially linked to equality and respect, I have suggested that we 
adopt a systematic presumption of autonomy in order to ensure we avoid the problem of 
discriminatory exclusion. Yet, if we cannot and should not assess the competency for autonomy 
that individuals possess, refocusing our attention on the socio-relational context agents are in 
can enable us to assess the opportunities they have to exercise their autonomy. It is at this level 
that we can address the problem of oppression and use autonomy as means to legitimise 
emancipatory feminist policies. In the following chapters, I will attempt to demonstrate the 
interest and value of employing this twofold understanding of autonomy to replace the 
individualistic ideal that currently underlies our legal and political systems. These case studies 
focus on areas where political liberalism has proven deeply unsatisfactory for feminists because 
they concern the family or vulnerable individuals. 
 
 
 
 
 105 
Chapter 4: Disrupting Gendered Preferences127 
 
‘The family is the linchpin of gender, 
reproducing it from one generation to the next’.  
Susan Moller Okin 1989, 170 
 
‘One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman’, Simon de Beauvoir famously stated. The idea 
that womanhood ought to be understood as a social process rather than as a biological reality 
has marked generations of feminists. They have sought to demonstrate that gender, as a social 
construct, is one of the greatest vectors of injustice and inequality. Yet, if gendered preferences 
are part of individuals’ considered conceptions of the good, then it seems that liberals cannot 
do much about them. This has led some to argue that liberalism is unable to truly remedy 
inequalities between the sexes. Ann Levey (2005), for instance, argues that if we refuse to 
consider gendered preferences as autonomous, then it becomes difficult to see how anyone’s 
preferences might count as autonomous. It is true that the current social order might teach 
women to value and prefer different things than men, Levey explains. Yet, we are always 
influenced, in one way or another, by what we have been taught by the society in which we live. 
Gendered preferences are, in this respect, no different. To the extent that women have 
genuinely endorsed them, such preferences have to be considered autonomous. Therefore, 
Levey (2005, 128) concludes that ‘[t]aking feminism seriously enough means giving up 
liberalism in the following respect: it requires us to take seriously that justified political action 
may fail to respect the considered choices of some women’.  
 This criticism seems also to apply to my framework. Given its systematic presumption 
of autonomy, adopting an agnostic and structural framework implies that gendered preferences 
have to be considered autonomous and respected as such, even when they cause women to 
reinforce the gendered division of labour. In this regard, it seems that the understanding of 
autonomy I propose is not of much use to devise and legitimise policies that would truly 
address entrenched gender inequalities.  
 In this chapter, I attempt to respond to this worry. I argue that given its focus on the 
conditions necessary to exercise self-government, the conception of autonomy I propose is 
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 A version of this chapter was published under the title ‘Égalité entre les sexes et libéralisme: le cas des congés de 
paternité’ (‘Sex Equality and Liberalism: the case of paternity leave‘), in the peer reviewed journal Politique et 
Sociétés, vol. 35, n.2-3, 2016, p. 39-64. An earlier version of this paper was submitted as an essay in the class 
GV4G3. It was entitled ‘”One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman.” Can (and should) political theorizing 
attempt to disrupt the social process of “becoming” a woman?’. 
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demanding enough to promote equality between women and men. I seek to show that the 
structural side of my framework makes it an effective tool for identifying and legitimising 
measures that can disrupt a social order that reproduces injustices through generations. Based 
on an examination of the policies that seem to have made the difference in countries that most 
closely approximate parity between the sexes, I suggest that imposing an equal division of 
parental leave constitutes one of the most promising measures to address gender inequalities. I 
argue that implementing such a measure, even in one of its most stringent forms, is not only 
justified on the grounds of the understanding of autonomy I propose but should also be viewed 
as one of its requirements. This demonstrates that a structural and agnostic framework can 
offer much better grounds then a liberal understanding of autonomy to further gender equality.  
 This argumentation, however, opens the door to another line of criticism. One could 
argue that the framework I propose is too perfectionist and/or paternalistic to be considered in 
line with political liberalism. Many feminists have chosen to bite this bullet and have defended 
an explicitly perfectionistic stance against liberalism. I want to suggest an alternative way to go 
about this criticism. In the second part of this chapter, I thus examine the form the accusation 
of perfectionism can take with regard to a measure such as mandatory paternity leave. I 
contend that given the kind of justification for political action it offers, my framework can avoid 
this objection and cannot be dismissed on the basis that it is incompatible with liberalism.  
 
I. Champions of the Global Gender Gap Index 
The Global Gender Gap Index is a framework developed to capture the scope of gender-based 
inequalities in countries, rank them and track their progress. In 2013, the uncontested 
champions of the Global Gender Gap Report (GGGR) were four Nordic countries: Iceland, 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden. These countries have succeeded in nearly erasing all gender-
based disparities on the economic, political, educational and health levels (GGGR 2013, 16). 
Each of these four countries has a powerful set of institutional measures in place to promote 
gender equality, including policies such as political quotas and positive discrimination (GGGR 
2013, 20). But what seems truly unique to these leaders in gender equality is something far 
more innovative and contentious from a liberal viewpoint. Indeed, policies surrounding 
parental leave are a standout feature of these countries. Whether we talk about Iceland or 
Norway with their 16 to 28 weeks of parental leave that has to be divided equally between the 
two partners (respectively adopted in 2000 and 1995), Finland with its mandatory ‘Daddy’s 
month’ (adopted in 2003 and recently extended) or Sweden with its 60 days reserved 
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exclusively for the father (adopted in 2002), these countries have all adopted a non-transferable 
paternity leave policy (GGGR 2013, 20). This type of policy, which reserves part of the leave to 
fathers, contrasts with what has been implemented by most other countries which either offer 
leave exclusively to mothers or grant a parental leave that can be divided freely between the 
parents.  
 The idea that an equal distribution of caregiving between parents of both sexes is a 
necessary component of achieving gender equality is not new. Many feminists have defended 
the idea that the gendered division of work within the family is the keystone of enduring 
inequalities between the genders. They have sought to show that the gendered division in the 
household constitutes a determining factor causing gendered disparities of investment in the 
workforce as well as in the public and political spheres, resulting in phenomena such as the 
earning power discrepancy between men and women observed in virtually every society around 
the world. Hence, as Nancy Fraser (1994, 612) concludes, ‘[t]he construction of breadwinning 
and caregiving as separate roles, coded masculine and feminine respectively, is a principal 
undergirding of the current gender order […]. Achieving gender equity in a post-industrial 
welfare state, then, requires deconstructing gender’. More than a decade of evening up the 
parental leave in Iceland, Finland, Norway and Sweden seems to prove these assumptions 
right. Indeed, the explicit goal of mandatory paternity leave was to equalise caregiving and 
breadwinning between the sexes. As Christina Boll, Julian Leppin and Nora Reich note (Boll 
and al. 2014, 133):  
In Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland and Norway), […] the introduction of 
parental leave was driven by labour market and gender equality 
considerations. It was intended to give mothers the opportunity to continue 
participating in the labour market in the long term, ensure their income 
during the leave period, and reduce  gender differences in paid labour and 
childcare work. 
 In forcing the disruption of traditional gender models, the ‘daddy quota’ policy seems 
to have produced impressive results. In addition to the causal effect on evening up parental 
participation as well as the household division of labour (Kotsadam & Finseraas 2011), non-
transferable paternity leave seems to increase women’s participation in the workforce 
(Sundström & Stafford 1992). For this reason, it is also likely to reduce poverty among elderly 
women in the long run (Baroni 2011). Moreover, the augmentation of the father’s involvement 
in the child’s upbringing as well as in domestic labour enabled by paternity leave seems to exert 
a certain influence on the child’s internalisation of gender roles (Kotsadam & Finseraas 2013). 
In short, it seems likely that if a liberal society like Canada, for instance, were to implement 
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such a measure, it would greatly help close the gender wage gap (Selmi 2000). In evening up 
gendered expectations regarding familial responsibilities, non-transferable paternity leave is 
likely to reshape the ways in which individuals make their life and career choices.  
 
II. The Structural Forces at Play 
If the mandatory division of parental leave seems to be a powerful means to promote gender 
equality, it nonetheless constitutes an aggressive strategy to do so: this is where it becomes 
troublesome for societies attached to liberal principles. Though imposing a ‘daddy quota’ does 
not equate to coercing fathers into taking on caregiving, the measure can nonetheless be 
perceived as an illegitimate form of interference in people’s preferences. Indeed, if the father 
refuses to take the share of leave reserved for his use, the family loses it, along with the financial 
compensation associated with it. As this adds costs to the non-trivial option of following 
traditional gender models, it could be thought that such a measure is incompatible with the 
understanding of autonomy I propose. I have insisted on a systematic presumption of 
autonomy, and, respecting people’s declared preferences, how then can I defend such 
interference in people’s choices?  
 In order to see why a measure such as the daddy quota is not only coherent but should 
also be seen as a requirement of the structural and agnostic understanding of autonomy I 
propose, it is useful to look at the effect of gender neutral parental leaves. From a liberal 
perspective, it seems only fair to provide both parents with the opportunity to take the share 
they want of the parental leave. Parents should, after all, be free to decide for themselves how 
they want to raise their child and in what way they want to divide their leave. On this view, the 
measure that, in theory, comes across as the best able to express adequate respect for people’s 
autonomy is parental leave that can be divided as people want. It is thus this type of leave that is 
most often in place in liberal societies. 
 As studies show, however, a gender-neutral leave policy seems paradoxically to 
reinforce the traditional division of labour between breadwinning and caregiving rather than 
alleviating it (Brandth & Kvande 2009, 180).128 Given that, presumably, more parents would 
want to divide the leave equally, there must be other obstacles preventing them from doing so. 
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For instance, in Canada where such a policy is currently in effect, only 8% of fathers take a share of the parental 
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Insurance Plan (QPIP), which grants fathers five weeks of non-transferable paternity leave, was implemented. As 
noted by Marshall (2008, 8), this has produced a significant rise in the rates of fathers claiming parental leave at the 
national level, which ‘is mainly attributable to the introduction of the QPIP and the subsequent increase in the 
participation of Quebec fathers’. 
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Based on research pertaining to this the phenomena, these obstacles seem to be mainly of 
three types.  
 First, at the individuals’ level, there are the preferences of the parents themselves. The 
idea that women are best equipped to care for children and household chores, as well as the 
norms that make masculinity incompatible with care, would explain, in part, the fact that 
neutral parental leave seems to change nothing in the gendered division of labour (Brandth & 
Kvande 2009). Although these ideas tend to change over time, it is clear that they are still 
relatively widespread in the population today.129  
However, and as a structural analysis clarifies, even if parents do not share beliefs or 
preferences about the traditional gendered division of labour, it is still extremely difficult to 
derogate from it. At the social level, the job market as well as the beliefs and expectations of 
employers can make it very difficult for men to take their fair share of the parental leave. 
Norms are social phenomena; as such, it is difficult to contravene on the basis of a unilateral 
decision. When widely accepted at the level of the society, they produce expectations and 
pressures on individuals that render costly the option of not abiding by what they prescribe. 
While most employers recognise the need to grant leave and flexibility in employment to their 
female employees so that they can look after their children, the same is not true for their male 
staff members (Bielby & Baron 1986; Kugelberg 2006; Townsend 2002; Feldman et al. 2004). 
Employers tend to be less supportive of this demand when it comes from their male 
employees, and this is especially the case if the job is typically coded as ‘male’ (Bygren & 
Duvander 2006). Thus, when an employer learns that one of his employees is expecting a 
child, as Magnus Bygren and Michael Gähler (2012, 811) note, he tends to adopt a radically 
different approach according to the sex of the employee. While female employees are given 
less responsibility in order to leave them more room for their future responsibilities as 
mothers, knowing that one of their employees is about to become a father often leads the 
employer to entrust him with even more work.  
In addition to the job market, the family and peers of individuals can also become an 
important source of normative pressure. Given the prevalence of the idea that caring for 
children is the primary responsibility of the mother, women taking a smaller share of maternity 
leave than their partners may be judged negatively by their peers and families. By contrast, 
fathers who choose to take a substantial part of the leave are likely to encounter negative 
judgements from those around them (Bygren & Duvander 2006, 370). In this regard, Bygren 
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and Gähler (2012, 811) note that ‘[c]ultural images of being a parent are normative in the sense 
that shared beliefs and norms of what could be expected of men and women in this life stage 
constrain their own options as well as what society – including employers – expects of them’.  
Finally, at the institutional level, two main obstacles seem to exist. The first has to do 
with the legal provision reserved for parents who take leave (Estes 2011). Parents from both 
sexes will receive financial compensation when they take a share of their parental leave. 
However, this financial compensation is typically calculated as a percentage of their normal 
individual earnings. This, in turn, incentivises the lesser-earning partner to take on the greatest 
share of the leave, as the family unit will lose less money this way (Cudd 1994). As women 
typically earn less than their male partners, having her taking the lion’s share of the parental 
leave is often the rational economic choice (Moss & O’Brien 2006). The second obstacle has 
to do with the legal duration of paid parental leave. Six months, which is the duration of paid 
parental leave in the US, is far too short for men to realistically be able to assume a substantial 
part of it (Ray, Gornick & Schmitt 2010). This is, first, because giving birth can be physically 
taxing and can expose women to a whole host of physical ailments. These usually require a 
period of recovery, which can easily cover the majority of the leave. Second, feeding periods 
are frequent during the first six months of an infant’s life, and this makes the option of going 
back to work impracticable for a mother who wishes to breastfeed (Gornick & Meyers 2008, 
324–25).  
An agnostic and structural framework implies that the preferences individuals adopt 
concerning their preferred share of parental leave or, more generally, their preferred division 
of caregiving and breadwinning, should be seen as worthy of respect. Yet, this is not the end of 
the story. As Anna Amilon remarks, ‘Findings indicate that men and women alike might feel 
forced to follow the traditional gender pattern in parental leave sharing […] without actually 
intending to’ (Amilon 2009, 638). It is these other obstacles, operating at the social and 
institutional levels and possibly preventing people from choosing otherwise that a structural 
approach would seek to alleviate.  We need to find ways to mitigate the social pressures and 
institutional obstacles that make it socially costly to contravene a traditional gendered division 
of labour. We also need to change the institutional framing of parental leave in order to make 
it economically viable, and temporally feasible, for fathers to take on their share of parental 
leave. 
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III. The Daddy Quota  
While considering the challenges of promoting gender equality between the sexes within the 
family, Anca Gheaus and Ingrid Robeyn (2011) argue in favour of granting the mother and the 
father six non-transferable months of parental leave each. They propose to give four weeks of 
birth leave to mothers, which would be followed by five months of parental leave. Fathers 
would then automatically get their six months of parental leave at the end of the mother’s 
overall leave. This arrangement would allow both parents some common leave time; however, 
it would prevent them from taking more than four weeks at the same time. That fathers should 
get a significant portion of the leave on their own, Gheaus and Robeyn explain, is important to 
prevent gender specialisation, as it will help ensure that men develop the same level of 
competency as mothers in caring for their child.  
As with the policies implemented in Nordic countries, this measure is likely to 
significantly contribute to alleviating the obstacles that prevent fathers from taking on their fair 
share of parental leave. Making equal sharing of parental leave the ‘by default’ option would 
most likely constitute a decisive incentive in the effective taking up of the leave.130 The first 
advantage of such a default rule, Robeyns and Gheaus (2011, 186) explain, ‘is the shift of costs 
from fathers who want to take the leave to fathers who do not want to’. With gender-neutral 
parental leave, fathers have actively to claim their share of the leave. This burden can 
discourage many from doing so, as they might fear that it will jeopardise their career. By 
contrast, the default model makes the leave-taking automatic which, in turn, makes it much 
more difficult for employers to pressurise men into refusing it. A father who wants to waive his 
right to his share of parental leave would then need to go through the process of deregistering 
from the system.  
 As an increasing number of fathers take their share of leave, the social expectations and 
pressures weighing on both men and women are likely to lessen. As the model Robeyn and 
Gheaus propose leaves a full six months for the mother to recover and breastfeed (should she 
desire to), it also partly alleviates the institutional obstacles that pressurise women into taking 
the majority of the leave. As for the funding problem, an issue Robeyn and Gheaus do not 
consider, this could be remedied so as to remove the economic penalty associated with the 
higher earner taking a share of the leave. For instance, the economic compensation could be 
calculated as a function of the total family earnings, and additional funds could be added where 
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 Research on the underwriting of organ donations, for example, shows that making this option automatic, if no 
action is taken, substantially increases the number of participants (Thaler & Sunstein 2008, 184-192). 
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the amount is insufficient to guarantee financial stability and welfare for the family. As this 
seems to remedy and alleviate the most substantial obstacles preventing parents from sharing 
breadwinning and caregiving equally, the idea of a default model that divides parental leave 
equally between both parents seems promising. The results of the experience of more than a 
decade of the ‘daddy quota’ in Norway, Finland, Iceland and Sweden attest that such a policy 
can have impressive results.  
 Insofar as it contributes to removing the obstacles that prevent men from accessing the 
option of caring for their children and women from adopting similar career plans to men, 
promoting an equal division of parental leave between the sexes is justified on the grounds of 
autonomy. While it does incentivise the option of equally dividing caregiving and 
breadwinning, it does not cut off the option of following traditional gender roles. Fathers who 
do not want to take on their share of the leave can always waive their share. Alternatively, they 
can choose to take their share but defer caregiving to the mother when the leave is over. Such a 
measure is also mindful of the effect it can have on the larger socio-relational context. It does 
not reproduce or strengthen existing norms and stereotypes. On the contrary, it aims to 
alleviate the pervasive idea that care work is somewhat less valuable than breadwinning. 
Likewise, while it indeed makes the equal sharing of the leave the ‘by default’ option, it 
nonetheless does not frame the option of derogating from this option as somewhat bad or less 
autonomous. 
 Yet, if this non-negotiable sharing of parental leave between the mother and the father 
satisfies the criteria of my framework, the question of the legitimacy of such a policy, from a 
liberal perspective, nevertheless remains. In this regard, one could argue that adopting such an 
incentive is still far too perfectionist to be considered liberal. This, in turn, might lead to the 
questioning of the compatibility of my framework with liberalism. In contrast to Nedelsky, I 
have, after all, explicitly claimed that a structural and agnostic framework is not normatively 
neutral and has a strong feminist tethering. If this leads the relational autonomy model I 
propose to legitimise perfectionist measures, then it could be argued that such a framework 
does not constitute a coherent replacement for the current mainstream understanding of 
autonomy. My aim, in what follows, is to demonstrate that the daddy quota should not be 
considered perfectionist and that the framework I advance is indeed coherent with liberalism’s 
aims as it vindicates emancipatory policies on political grounds. First, though, I will explain and 
review the nature and content of the perfectionism objection. 
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IV. The Anti-Perfectionism Objection  
As Deneulin (2002, 499) underlines, ‘[o]ften opposed to perfectionism, liberalism is 
characterized by a respect of the freedom of people to pursue their own conception of the 
good, arguing that a policy that gives incentives for people to live in a certain way, the way that 
most perfects human life, threatens the freedom of each human being to pursue the good she 
desires to pursue’. While some liberals are explicitly perfectionists, for others, the liberal 
commitment to respect individual autonomy should be seen as incompatible with 
perfectionism. For instance, Christman (2004, 147) writes:  
Not only does the idea of autonomy set the boundaries of anti-perfectionism 
and anti-paternalism in principles of justice, it also (and relatedly) specifies 
the characteristics of the adult citizen whose interests and perspective mold 
those principles of justice and democracy. Such a conception must express 
sensitivity to the multiple differences among citizens involving patterns of 
thought, modes of identity, religious and other value commitments, and the 
like. 
 For Christman (2004, 146), this constitutes grounds to reject certain relational 
conceptions of autonomy, as they ‘problematically import a perfectionist view of human values 
into the account of autonomy and thereby threaten to undermine the usefulness of the concept 
in certain theoretical and practical contexts in which it is often seen to function’. A perfectionist 
view, he explains, is characterised by the idea that there exist human perfections that can only 
be actualised in certain versions of the good life. These perfections constitute intrinsic goods, 
and their values are independent from individuals’ judgement of them. One of the important 
reasons Christman has for rejecting certain relational views as too perfectionist is that they 
stipulate certain social conditions as necessary to label someone as autonomous. This, in turn, 
implies a perfectionist view of autonomy, which links this ideal to certain values and goods, 
independent of whether or not agents endorse these values. Christman (2004, 157) is 
concerned that this leads to the problem of discriminatory exclusion, as it implies that certain 
agents will be denied ‘the status marker of an independent citizen whose perspective and value 
orientation get a hearing in the democratic processes that constitute legitimate social policy’.  
 As we have seen, this criticism seems to apply to a structural conception of autonomy 
like that of Oshana’s. It also applies to substantive views in general. My agnostic understanding 
of autonomy, however, defuses this worry. As it implies a systematic presumption of autonomy 
that applies both to agents and to their declared preferences, it can never lead us to unduly 
exclude any agents or to perceive their preferences as less worthy of respect. However, even if 
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it cannot be accused of being too perfectionist in itself, the concern nonetheless remains that it 
leads to perfectionist outcomes on the political level.  
 As noted by Steven Wall, political perfectionism aims at creating institutions and 
initiatives that would allow for the actualisation of such perfections in all of its citizens (Wall 
1998, 8). This, in turn, ‘implies that certain values —egalitarian ones of this sort— are valid for 
individuals even if they (ex hypothesi) authentically and freely reject them’ (Christman 2004, 
152). From a perfectionist perspective, it would thus be coherent to attempt to impose the 
value of gender equality through policies like the daddy quota, even if no one was committed to 
it. This, in turn, would be incoherent with the goals of a liberal society. First, the raison d'être of 
liberal society is to allow everyone to freely choose their own version of the good life and to live 
according to their own beliefs and inclinations. To that extent, trying to impose a value (such as 
gender equality) that contradicts certain versions of the good life autonomously chosen by 
citizens would constitute a fundamental inconsistency. The objection is reinforced by the fact 
that choosing how to raise children is an integral part of people's good lives, and liberals tend to 
consider the family as being outside of the legitimate sphere of state action.131 The gendered 
models they choose to enact while raising their child should be viewed as expressing profound 
values and commitments. From this perspective, imposing an egalitarian model of child 
education, as in a policy like the daddy quota, penalises this particular of vision of the good life. 
Putting in place a daddy quota would then constitute a fundamental lack of respect for 
individuals and an illegitimate interference in their right to live according to their own 
(gendered) conception of the good.  
 Another potential worry is that a policy that aims at disrupting the gender division of 
labour would fail to respect social diversity. In a liberal society, pluralism is often seen as 
necessary for two reasons. One reason is because in order to be consistent with the 
commitment to respecting individuals’ conceptions of the good, the liberal state must ensure 
that it adequately respects and promotes the pluralism that results from the free exercise of 
autonomy of its citizens. The second reason is that society constitutes the primary context of 
individuals’ choices. The autonomous quest for the good life, which the liberal state must make 
possible for all, thus presupposes a semiotic material that allows individuals to form and revise 
their conceptions of the good. To lead a good life, therefore, implies not only the possibility of 
having the freedom to determine one's own conception of the good but also to live in a 
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pluralistic society (Kymlicka 1999, 125). The liberal state would therefore have an interest in 
protecting and respecting social diversity in order to allow individuals the widest possible range 
of choices. The diversity and plurality of family forms and of the visions of the good life that 
tint them are, in this respect, what allows the emergence of social diversity.132 In this sense, 
respecting and protecting the rights of parents to freely determine how they wish to raise their 
children and the values and the modes of good life they wish to convey can be seen as 
paramount in maintaining the context of social diversity. 
 Against these objections, I want to suggest that a relational understanding of autonomy 
can indeed advance emancipatory policies that disrupt entrenched inequalities, and it does so 
on justificatory grounds that make it impervious to the anti-perfectionist objection. This, I 
argue, is one of the strengths of my framework:  the measures it justifies cannot be dismissed 
on the grounds that they are incompatible with liberalism.   
 First, the question of how we should delimit the legitimate sphere of state action is a 
complicated normative query that cannot be answered by resorting to a crude distinction 
between the public and the private. While it is true that liberals tend to be reluctant to 
intervene within the family, this does not mean that it should be considered outside the 
legitimate exercise of state activity. Incidentally, as Nussbaum (2000, 61) states, the liberal state 
already intervenes in the family: 
The state constitutes the family structure through its laws, defining which 
group of people can count as families, defining the privileges and rights 
family members, defining what marriage and divorce are, what legitimacy and 
parental responsibility are, and so forth. This differ makes a difference: the 
state is present in the family from the start, […] the political sphere cannot 
avoid directly shaping the family structure, by recognizing some and not 
other groupings as families.  
In this respect, the simplistic claim that a policy such as the daddy quota is impermissible 
because it infringes on its citizens’ private self-determination cannot be taken very seriously. 
However, to the extent that the family is indeed the privileged sphere of individual self-
determination, political actions that target the family have to be legitimate.  
 As Schouten (2013) argues, for an intervention to be considered legitimate, it must 
satisfy two criteria. First, it must be demonstrated that the reasons for the intervention do not 
rest on a substantial value or on a comprehensive conception of the good life. As the 
proponents of the anti-perfectionist argument point out, insofar as the liberal state must allow 
the peaceful coexistence of different modes of the good life, it cannot afford to favour certain 
                                                 
132
 As Véronique Munoz-Dardé (1998, 49) states, ‘[t]he diversity of families makes it possible for the pluralism’. 
 116 
conceptions of the good over others. This is because a justification that rests on substantive 
values would fail to retain the reasoned allegiance of people who do not subscribe to these 
values (Schouten 2013, 369). To illustrate her point, Schouten uses the example of equality. As 
a substantive value, equality implies subscribing to a comprehensive conception of the good 
that demands, for instance, that we equalise work across genders. However, equality is also an 
important political value, which implies that individuals are equally treated on the political level 
and granted an equal amount of political liberties. Contrary to substantive values, political value 
can thus serve as legitimate grounds to justify political interventions. Indeed, Schouten explains, 
it is these political values that justify the exercises of the political power in the first place 
(Schouten 2013, 373). In this respect, if a policy like the daddy quota is to be justified from a 
liberal perspective, it must be justified by strictly political values—that is values that ‘reflect the 
principles of justice intended for the basic structure’ (Rawls, 1993, 132). Second, to be 
legitimate, the measure put in place by the liberal state must infringe as little as possible on 
individual freedom (Schouten 2013, 379). If there are several means through which the liberal 
state can accomplish the same goals, it has the duty to choose the measure that interferes least 
with the lifestyles individuals have chosen. This can be referred to as the requirement of 
minimal infringement.  
 This suggests that the introduction of the policy of the daddy quota can be justified by 
means other than relying on substantive values. The framework I advance provides us with 
political grounds to justify such a measure. If the raison d'être of liberalism is to allow everyone 
to lead a freely chosen life, then this means ensuring that both men and women have access to 
the same range of non-trivial options. In this respect, what the structural focus of my framework 
allows is the realisation that in our current socio-relational context, both men and women are 
prevented from accessing important non-trivial options. Therefore, it is in view of the obstacles 
that might prevent both sexes from accessing options that depart from what gender norms 
prescribe, implementing a policy like the daddy quota is justified. While a perfectionist 
approach might indeed promote and justify a measure like the daddy quota on the basis of an 
egalitarian conception of the good life, a structural approach like mine rather focuses on 
removing obstacles to a roughly equal range of options. It is, in this respect, not because the 
equal sharing of caregiving and breadwinning is considered to be an intrinsic good that 
equalising parental leaves between men and women would be implemented. Given its 
agnosticism, the framework I propose gives us no grounds to vindicate the idea that egalitarian 
conceptions of the good life are to be seen as worthier of respect than others. Such framework 
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can only vindicate measures that aims at removing obstacles that limit individual access to non-
trivial options. This, in turn, constitutes a political basis to legitimise the daddy’s quota. The 
framework I offer cannot, in this respect, be dismissed as too perfectionist to be considered 
consistent with liberalism. Because it provides us with political grounds (rather than substantive 
ones) to vindicate emancipatory policies such as the daddy quota, such a framework can 
therefore be of use to feminists who do not want to reject liberal principles.  
 Attention to the way social context structures how individuals can plausibly exercise 
their autonomy allows us to see that it is the current political status quo that threatens the 
pluralism and social diversity that liberals vindicate. It is the failure to address the structural 
forces that corner individuals into adopting the traditional gender division of labour that seems 
inconsistent with liberalism, because this failure imposes de facto a homogeneous vision of the 
good life. In contrast, as it increases the options available to individuals, a policy like the daddy 
quota promotes the pluralism and social diversity that many liberals cherish. By making the 
option of staying at home if one is a man or keeping a demanding career after becoming a 
mother socially acceptable and truly practicable, this measure leads to greater social diversity. 
This, in turn, would also grant a wider range of choices to the children who have benefited 
from this measure. As studies on the impact of the paternity leave quota tend to demonstrate, 
having less traditionally gendered parenting models allows children to design more options 
outside those associated with gender (Kotsadam & Finseraas 2013; Cools, Fiva & Kirkebøen 
2011). Even if parents still choose to follow traditional gender models, this measure allows for 
an expansion of the horizon of choices of children raised in a more traditional family, because 
it diversifies family models at the societal level. 
 Finally, my framework also satisfies the requirement of minimal infringement. Given 
its commitment to respecting people’s avowed preferences, my framework is committed to 
opening up more options for individuals without curtailing existing options (even when they are 
seen as coherent with oppressive norms). This means that the policies that it will justify cannot 
be seen as seriously infringing on individual autonomy. It is important, that is, that a policy like 
the daddy quota does not curtail the option of following the traditional division of labour. 
Fathers who do not wish to take on their share of the leave can always waive this privilege. It 
might be true that the policy constitutes a strong incentive for them to take their share of the 
leave. However, as I have argued, such an incentive is justified insofar as it is necessary to 
alleviate the current obstacles that prevent men from accessing the option of taking on 
caregiving. To date, it seems that the mandatory sharing of parental leave is the most promising 
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measure to achieve an equality of opportunity between men and women.133 If this is indeed the 
most effective measure for this purpose, then it seems that adopting this policy is not only 
legitimate but also necessary in order to counterbalance the social barriers that force the 
reproduction of the gender division of labour and prevent people from living a life of their own 
choosing. 
 
 Conclusion 
The policy vindicated here is not particularly novel. Many feminists have stressed the need to 
implement policies that encourage a more equal division between caregiving and breadwinning. 
However, my aim was not so much to demonstrate that an agnostic and structural framework 
enables us to devise radically original solutions to the perennial problems we face. Rather, I 
sought to demonstrate that the proposed framework would help support and justify 
emancipatory feminist policies on grounds that can difficultly be dismissed by liberals. I have 
attempted to show that paying adequate attention to the way the socio-relational context 
structures the opportunities left for individual to exercise their autonomy provides us with a 
basis to vindicate substantial political and social change. Yet, it does so without framing 
gendered preferences as somewhat less autonomous or worthy of respect and without 
promoting an exclusionary conception of the good life. In this respect, it defuses the anti-
perfectionist objection and can serve to justify state action on a basis that cannot be seen as 
incoherent with the aims of liberalism. This, in turn, makes it well suited as a normative tool to 
further feminist policies within liberal societies. It could thus be of use in replacing the 
inadequate individualistic understandings of autonomy that often serve as a basis to repel 
emancipatory policies, such as the daddy quota, which promote equality between the sexes.  
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Chapter 5: When the Family Is No Longer: Separations and 
the Vulnerable Caregiver 
 
 
‘And yet . . . the figure of the economically vulnerable female cohabitant 
returns to haunt us. No family law text can now avoid addressing her position, 
and how easy it is to slip into contrasting her vulnerability with the seemingly 
more protected position of her married sister’ (Bottomley & Wong 2006, 39). 
 
In the preceding chapter, I argued that addressing the structural obstacles that reproduce the 
gender division of work is not only legitimate but also necessary to ensure people’s capacity to 
lead a self-governed life. I have suggested that a policy such as the daddy quota is justified 
because the option of caring for one’s family and children constitutes a non-trivial option that 
needs to be truly open to everyone —males and females. However, even if we were to 
implement a policy like mandatory paternity leave, there would still be non-negligible obstacles 
that both limit access to this option and put those who take it at a disadvantage. In our current 
socio-relational context, that caregiving remains unpaid, and unrecognised, leaves many women 
economically dependent on their partners, especially when they have children. This is a 
problem, as it adds costs to the option of caregiving, which creates the problematic double bind 
of either securing one’s economic well-being and independence or having a family. As this 
reduces the possibility left to exercise one’s autonomy in a non-trivial manner, we should aim at 
alleviating this oppressive double bind. 
 In this chapter, I explore this issue in relation to the legal treatment of cohabitants. 
Given the kind of gender norms that are currently in place, many women are left in a state of 
economic vulnerability following separation (Stanton 2014; Gadalla 2008). Research reveals 
that while a separation leads to a slight decrease in men’s income within the years following the 
separation, for women this economic drop tends to be much more dramatic, suggesting a major 
deterioration in their economic well-being (Gadalla 2008). These results are starker still if 
women are cohabitants who had been living in de facto unions with their partners (Avellar & 
Smock 2005). In many countries, de facto unions do not come under the matrimonial regime 
that protects the lesser-earning partner in the event of the dissolution of separation (Leckey & 
Favier 2016).  
 In what follows, I explore a much-discussed recent case from Quebec (Family Law -
091768) and the appeals that ensued as an illustration and exploration of this issue. I refer to 
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this case as Lola v. Eric, as this was the name employed in the media.134 This legal saga revolved 
around the question of whether cohabitants are victims of discrimination (following article 15 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) and should be included under the same legal 
regime as married couples.135 It is an important case in Quebec, as it reinstated the legal schism 
between marriage and cohabitation and reaffirmed Quebec’s legal exceptionalism within 
Canada. It is also an interesting case to examine for our purposes for three key reasons. First, it 
revolves around the question of what legal framework is best able to protect the autonomy of 
cohabitants. Second, it illustrates the type of contextual legal dilemma that changing social 
norms and shifts of practice within modern societies pose. As noted by Statistic Canada, 
Quebec is the place in the world where cohabitation is most frequent.136 In 2006, almost one 
couple in three was living in a de facto union (34,6%) in Quebec, compared to only 13,4% for 
the rest of Canada. The growing popularity of de facto unions over marriage in Quebec 
constitutes a trend that mirrors what is happening, albeit more slowly, around the globe.137 The 
third reason why the case is so interesting is because the contrast between Quebec and the rest 
of Canada in the legal treatment of cohabitants is illustrative of a normative divide between two 
views concerning individual autonomy that are reproduced in liberal societies around the 
world. While Quebec’s legal treatment of cohabitants is fairly similar to that of other 
jurisdictions, such as France, England and Wales, most Canadian provinces now adopt a legal 
scheme that tends to subsume de facto unions under the regime of formalised unions (Leckey 
& Favier 2016, 526). The debates initiated by the Lola v. Eric trials are, in this regard, 
illustrative of the broader normative divide surrounding what legal protections and obligations 
should be attributed to cohabitants (Bottomley & Wong 2006). In most jurisdictions, this 
question is closely linked to the issue of the legal rights of same-sex couples (Brake 2016; 
Bottomley & Wong 2006). Addressing this question in the context of Quebec has the added 
advantage of detaching these two issues, given that same-sex couples have the right to marry in 
this Canadian province (Boyd & Young 2003). 
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I. The Case 
Lola meets Eric in 1992. She is a 17-year-old high school student who still lives with her parents 
in her country of origin. At 32 years of age, Eric is the prosperous manager of a successful 
international business. From 1992 to 1994, Eric brings Lola on his many trips around the 
world. He also helps fund Lola’s studies. When Lola becomes pregnant with the couple’s first 
child in 1996, the pair move together to Quebec where Eric lives. They have two more 
children (one in 1999 and the other in 2001). Lola does not work (albeit she makes some 
attempts to become a model), and Eric provides for the needs of the whole family. Lola wants 
to marry; Eric does not. He tells Lola that he does not believe in marriage but says that he 
might reconsider his position after 25 years of de facto union. However, shortly after their third 
child is born, the couple separate. They were together for ten years and cohabited for seven.138  
In February 2002, shortly after the dissolution of their union, Lola files a motion in the 
Superior Court of Quebec. In addition to her claims for child support, she contests the 
constitutionality of the articles of the Civil Code of Quebec that distinguish the rights of 
married spouses from those of de facto ones. She argues that it is discriminatory to refuse 
cohabitants the same legal protection as married spouses (such as spousal support, the division 
of the family patrimony and the right to claim a compensatory allowance).  
Justice Hallée dismisses the constitutional arguments in July 2009. Following this 
decision, Lola appeals. The appeal is partly allowed, and the article concerning spousal support 
(art. 585 C.C.Q) is declared unconstitutional. For the most part, however, the Court of Appeal 
confirms Justice Hallée’s decision concerning the family residence and patrimony and the right 
to compensatory allowance.139 Following the result of this first appeal, Eric and the Attorney 
General of Quebec appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, while Lola appeals the ruling 
concerning the division of property for cohabitants under Quebec’s Civil Code. The Supreme 
Court judgement, rendered in 2013, concludes that far from being discriminatory toward 
cohabitants, the Civil Code rather respects their autonomy and freedom of choice.140 As 
Caroline Harnois and Julie Brisson (2013, 4) note, ‘[i]n the end, the result of this lengthy 
judicial saga is to the effect that the status quo is maintained for de facto spouses in Quebec. 
The situation is clear: in the event of separation, there exists no right to spousal support or to 
the division of property of which one de facto spouse is not the owner’.  
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II. The Grounds for the Decisions: The Strong Autonomy View  
What underlined these different judgements and led to the reaffirmation of the status quo for 
cohabitants in Quebec is what Robert Leckey (2009) refers to as the ‘strong autonomy view’. 
This view can be summarised in the following terms: preserving the legal difference between 
marriage and cohabitation is necessary in order to respect people’s freedom and autonomy. 
This is the view that underlines Justice Hallée’s argument when she states that the similarities 
between married and de facto spouses should not lead us to forget the fundamental difference 
between these two types of union. Namely, that in contrast to married couples, cohabitants 
have chosen not to formalise their union.141 For her, it is clear that there is no discrimination in 
excluding de facto unions from the legal regime of formalised unions. Rather, this exclusion 
expresses an adequate respect for the autonomy and freedom of choice of cohabitants.  
 There are mainly three ways in which the strong autonomy view has been expressed. 
The first one can be understood as the ‘consent argument’. As argued by Justice Bastarache in 
the similar case Nouvelle Écosse c. Walsh, which was used as a precedent for Lola v. Eric, 
given that de facto cohabitants have chosen not to marry, they cannot be viewed as having 
consented to incur legal obligations vis-à-vis their spouses. In this regard, attributing to them 
such obligations is illegitimate and violates their autonomy. Following this line of argument, not 
marrying or otherwise institutionalising one’s relationship through a civil union is taken to 
reflect the cohabitants’ will to ‘subsist in a realm of liberty, outside the law’.142 This, however, 
does not entail that the law recognises no responsibilities or protections whatsoever to 
cohabitants. As stressed by Justice Hallée, the Civil Code does include articles that protect 
vulnerable cohabitants from being unfairly disadvantaged as a result of ending of their 
relationships. If the cohabitants have children together, both parents retain their obligation of 
support towards their children: alimony will be granted to cover for the children’s needs.143 
Moreover, if a correlation is found between the impoverishment of one party and the 
enrichment of the other, the doctrine of unjust enrichment can apply. In this regard, 
proponents of the strong autonomy view stress that even if a de facto union is exempt from 
most of the legal obligations that marriage entails, it still grants sufficient protections to 
vulnerable former partners.  
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 The second form of the strong autonomy view has been expressed through the 
‘meaningful choices argument’. Shahar Lifshitz (2009), for instance, claims that a liberal society 
has the responsibility to provide institutions that reflect and enable social pluralism. Given that 
there exist a great variety of intimate relationships, characterised by different levels of 
commitment, expectations and intentions, a liberal society should keep cohabitation as distinct 
from marriage in order to enable individuals to choose the level of commitment they wish to 
undertake. Similarly, Milton Reagan (2001) contends that a liberal society that is committed to 
autonomy has to offer the largest possible range of legal options to individuals so they can 
choose which option best expresses the level of commitment they deem acceptable. As 
proponents of the strong autonomy view emphasise, the choice is not just between the weighty 
legal obligations of marriage and informal cohabitation. In her judgement, Justice Hallée 
reminded the audience that de facto spouses are encouraged to ratify a cohabitation convention 
that organises their matrimonial regime following their specific needs and aspirations. In this 
respect, proponents of the strong autonomy view argue that maintaining the status quo for 
cohabitants should be viewed as a means to leave them free to come to a contractual agreement 
between themselves, specifying what legal obligations they want to share (Roy 2001, 447-8; 
Dubé 1987, 709). Subsuming cohabitation under the legal regime of marriage would, in this 
respect, not only violate individuals’ will not to take on the substantial commitments that come 
with marriage. It would also deprive them of the possibility to choose for themselves how they 
want to structure their relationship (Lifshitz 2009).  
 The strong autonomy view finds an echo in certain feminist discourses in the form of 
the ‘women’s equal agency argument’. Imposing such duties on de facto spouses, it is argued, 
contributes to two problematic views about women. First, it undermines equality between men 
and women as it implies that women are too weak to support themselves following a separation. 
This, in turn, reinforces prevalent inequalities and stereotypes. Quebec’s Conseil du Statut de 
la Femme, for instance, contended that women were now in an economic position to support 
themselves following a separation (1991, 15). In this regard, rather than helping women access 
a real equality of opportunity, the imposition of duties of support to an unmarried partner 
would be an obstacle to their full acceptance into the world of work. It perpetuates the hurtful 
and detrimental view that women are unable to provide for themselves following a separation. 
Ruth Deech (1980, 486) offers the following explanation:  
Maintenance and property awards to former cohabiting partners are not 
simply payment for the freedom to leave one woman for another, but would 
also reinforce the outmoded view, upheld by the law, of the man as the head 
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of the household and the woman under obligation to provide domestic 
services and child care, a view which is too unsatisfactory in its application to 
married persons to permit of its extension to the unmarried. 
 Second, it is argued that imposing duties on the de facto spouse fails to acknowledge 
the will of female cohabitants. It seems to imply that not marrying can never be considered as 
the autonomous wish of a woman (Bottomley 2006). This ignores the fact that many women 
knowingly and autonomously reject the institution of marriage (Lifshitz 2009, 1588). Many 
feminists, for instance, argue against marriage as a sexist institution that reproduces pernicious 
forms of inequality and symbolic violence (Okin 1989; Kingston 2004; Chambers 2013).  If 
imposing legal duties on cohabitants implies forcing them into a marriage-like institution, then 
it seems indeed that doing so would violate the autonomy of women who reject this institution.  
 
III. The Grounds for Contestation: The Functionalist Argument 
As remarked by Louise Langevin (2009), it is unfortunate that the important legal debate on 
cohabitants was initiated as a result of a case like that of Lola v. Eric. If the case attracted such a 
massive media attention and spurred a massive controversy in Quebec, it was precisely because 
it was so disconnected from the economic reality of the large majority of families. Lola 
demanded alimony of 56,000 dollars per month for herself, in addition to half of the family 
assets, and a flat sum of 50,000 dollars. In 2006, she had already obtained alimony of 34,260 
per month for the three children, as well as Eric’s reimbursement of the children’s 
expenditures (such as the salaries of one cook, two full-time nannies, one preceptor and one 
psychotherapist). Given the kind of sums involved, it is difficult to feel sorry for Lola. Even if 
her standard of living did in fact drop following her separation with Eric, the monthly alimony 
she received still puts her in the top 5% of the wealthiest people in Quebec. Yet, it is on the 
basis of this exceptional case, which cannot be taken to reflect the situation of the vast majority 
of cohabitants, that a decision that bears major consequences on the hundreds of thousands of 
de facto spouses was made.  
The exceptional nature of the case, Langevin argues, has led judges to err and to arrive 
at a decision that is unfair to the large majority of cohabitants. During the first trial, Justice 
Hallée used Lola’s lawyer’s failure to submit sufficient proof that cohabitants were victims of 
discrimination. As Langevin contends, were Justice Hallée to consider the actual statistics we 
possess on the economic situation of most women with children following a separation, she 
would have had evidence that the legal void surrounding de facto unions is indeed 
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discriminatory against female cohabitants.144 Divorce augments the economic vulnerability of 
women, and this effect is far worse for cohabitants, as they cannot claim alimony or their fair 
share of the family assets. Yet, as Langevin stresses, the affliction women encounter after a 
separation is not due to their own failure to find decent employment. Given the current gender 
division of labour, women still assume the large majority of households’ unpaid and 
unrecognised care work. They often take on flexible or part-time jobs to be able to devote 
themselves to caregiving, while their partner continues to climb the economic ladder 
(Gunderson 2006). In this regard, concludes Langevin, the decision to maintain the status quo 
for cohabitants reproduces a systemic discrimination against women: it fails to acknowledge the 
caregiving work they undertake and leaves them vulnerable and unprotected in the event of a 
separation.  
Langevin’s claim, as well as that employed in Lola’s defence, is underpinned by what 
Leckey (2016) refers to as the functionalist argument. It is, incidentally, this kind of argument 
that justifies similar legal treatment granted to both cohabitants and married partners in other 
Canadian provinces as well as in the most progressive jurisdictions. This view emphasises the 
functional equivalence between de facto and married spouses and argues that provided a de 
facto union functions in the same way as that of a married couple, it should be granted the 
same bundle of rights and protections (Gaucher 2015). As argued by the dissenting judge 
L’Heureux-Dubé in Walsh, like married spouses, cohabitants become interdependent as they 
divide the balance of caregiving and bread-winning work.145 While one partner might indeed 
become economically dependent on the other, the latter may need his partner to care for the 
children, and the household. Just as in a marriage, the role the main caregiver takes on is likely 
to make her economically vulnerable (Douglas, Pearce & Woodward 2009). This disadvantage, 
and the necessity to compensate for the invisible care work women so often take on, is 
acknowledged for married partners. Why not acknowledge it for cohabitants who are similarly 
committed and interdependent? According to the proponents of the functionalist view, not 
doing so fails to recognise the extent of women’s non-monetary contribution to the 
maintenance of the family and reproduces the exploitation of women in this role (Diduck & 
Orton 1994, Langevin 2009).  
In addition to calling attention to the similarities between married and de facto spouses, 
proponents of the functionalist view contest the assumptions that underlie the strong autonomy 
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view. Not marrying, they stress, is seldom the free and autonomous joint decision strong 
autonomy proponents assume it to be (Wax 1998; Wong 2009; Leckey 2009). In this regard, it 
cannot be taken as expressive of the partners’ common will to avoid the legal obligations that 
come with marriage. First, there are many other reasons that can lead a couple not to formalise 
their union. As Bottomley and Wong (2006, 40) note, ‘[t]he reasons for not taking steps to 
protect themselves need further investigation, but seem to range from believing in the myth of 
‘common-law marriage’ and lack of basic legal information and advice through to believing in 
their men’. Second, and more importantly, the decision to marry or to not marry cannot be 
taken unilaterally. It has to be a joint decision. As illustrated by Lola v. Eric, one partner cannot 
force the other to marry her, nor can she oblige him to grant her legal protections in the event 
of a separation. Especially if she is the economically worst-off in the couple, she seldom has the 
tools or the bargaining power to convince her partner to consider marriage or to ratify a 
contract that protects her in the event of a separation. As Shahar Lifshitz (2009, 1581) remarks, 
‘[i]n the real world, big differences exist between men and women in their economic capacity, 
business experience, patterns of negotiation management
 
and status in the marriage market. 
Consequently, the choice not to marry reflects, in many cases, a unilateral decision of the most 
powerful partner, rather than a joint decision of both parties’. Whose freedom and autonomy 
is being protected by the decision not to grant economic protection to the most economically 
vulnerable cohabitant? 
Moreover, as proponents of the functionalist argument stress, while it is true that some 
legal protections are available to economically vulnerable cohabitants, this recourse tends to be 
interpreted in a very narrow fashion by courts and constitutes a poor substitute for equality and 
justice (Douglas, Pearce & Woodward 2009). Hence, concludes Langevin (2009), the state has 
no problem intervening in the life of married spouses on the grounds of equality and the 
recognition of the invisible work done primarily by women. Why invoke the primacy of 
autonomy and freedom only when it comes to cohabitants? It might be true that the strong 
autonomy view protects autonomy; however, it is primarily that of the stronger partner.  
 
IV. Respecting Autonomy While Protecting Caregivers 
Both the Strong Autonomy View and the Functionalist View are unsatisfactory. A simplistic 
and individualistic view of autonomy, which regards cohabitants as akin to homo economicus, 
seems to underline the strong autonomy view. Individuals are presumed to be in possession of 
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complete information concerning the legal consequences of not marrying.146 They are also 
assumed to have decided to forego formalising their union on the basis of a narrow, rational 
calculation where the legal costs of marrying are duly weighed against the benefits of not doing 
so. This is opposed to the romantic imagery of marriage and the kinds of social norms that 
underlie this institution. As Clare Chambers (2016, 58) argues, even if people were cognitively 
able to put themselves in the self-interested mind-set necessary to make this kind of calculus, 
the prevalent social norms would frame such reasons to marry as antithetical to good husbandly 
and wifely behaviour.147 In this respect, focusing on the formal means of marriage as expressive 
of consent to a bundle of rights and obligations seems disconnected from the reality of 
coupledom. It also erases ‘the potentially stronger partner’s tacit choice to stay in the 
relationship, fostering reliance and encouraging relationship-specific investments on the other’s 
part’ (Leckey & Favier 2016, 536-7). As functionalists have noted, consent is not always 
expressed explicitly. Obligations and responsibilities can also be tacitly accepted.  
 Because of its individualistic focus, the strong autonomy view also overlooks the power 
differential that can exist within a couple as well as the fact that marrying has to be a joint 
decision. As Lola v. Eric demonstrates, the decision not to marry is often unilateral, and one of 
the spouses can easily refuse to institutionalise the union. In this respect, reliance on contracts 
as a means to guarantee a free agreement seems no less naïve, as the same power relationship 
can play out in such an agreement as well (Leckey & Favier 2016, 537).  As Chambers remarks 
(2016, 57), ‘[t]he contract model relies on equality between the contracting partners, but if the 
parties are unequal then individuals can face pressure to agree to unfair contracts —just as 
women have always faced considerable pressure to agree to the profound inequality of 
traditional marriage’, 
   Refraining from imposing legal obligations outside of contracts or marriage does not 
then guarantee the free exercise of autonomy. In practice, it is more likely to serve to hide the 
reproduction of privilege and power differentials. As it fails to consider the dynamics of 
domination that can exist within a couple, the individualistic understanding of autonomy that 
underlies the strong autonomy view thus leads to the reproduction of a power dynamic that 
systematically robs women of the ability to exercise their autonomy. 
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 The functionalist argument, however, does not prove any more satisfactory in 
presenting women cohabitants as eternal victims. It seems to assume that, in both cohabitation 
and marriage, a classic gender division of labour necessarily develops through time. In theory, 
this serves to acknowledge the fact that gender norms often pressure women into taking the 
bulk of caregiving. In practice, however, it can have the effect of reinforcing and legitimising 
conservative norms of heterosexual relationships. When adjudicating which cohabitants should 
be treated ‘as if’ they were legally married, judges typically draw on functional characteristics 
thought to be part of marriage. This, in turn, often serves to enforce a certain ideal of 
conjugality, which represents ‘how judges imagine marriage ought to be’ (Cossman & Ryder 
2001, 290). This is problematic for same-sex couples (which often do not correspond to this 
ideal) (Gaucher 2015).148 However, it is also an issue for heterosexual couples, as it presents an 
exploitative gender division of labour as a normal dimension of conjugality (Lifshitz 2009). 
 The functionalist view also seems to reproduce problematic views about women’s 
autonomy, as it assumes that not marrying can never be an autonomous desire on their part. It 
forgets that the desire not to formalise one’s union can indeed be expressive of a joint and 
egalitarian decision from both partners. In this respect, as the strong autonomy proponents 
argue, imposing a unique legal regime on all problematically infringes on individuals’ 
autonomy. Moreover, if feminists are right that the institution is symbolically oppressive and 
can reinforce the gender division of labour, then including all de facto cohabitants in a 
marriage-like legal scheme, independently of their will, seems problematic (Okin 1989; 
Kingston 2004; Chambers 2013).  It seems to simultaneously curtail the option of not 
subscribing to the institution of marriage and to reinforce oppressive views of conjugality.149 
 Is the structural framework exposed in Chapter 3 of any use in addressing this agent or 
victim binary? It may seem, at first glance, that adopting the framework I propose leads us to 
the same conclusion as the strong autonomy view (albeit for different reasons). I have argued 
that if we want to avoid the problem of exclusion, then we should adopt a systematic 
presumption of autonomy. This presumption, in turn, means we cannot assume that women 
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are any less autonomous than men. We should, in this respect, avoid questioning their 
declared desires and refrain from assuming that the desire not to marry (or not to be protected 
by a marriage-like institution) cannot correspond to the autonomous wish of at least some 
female cohabitants. My approach also seems to suggest that very strict conditions must be 
satisfied if we are to remove an option (such as the option to avoid the legal responsibilities of 
marriage), as doing so infringes on the autonomy of individuals. It commits us to the view that 
the more non-trivial options one possesses, then the better it is for autonomy. 
  However, the agnostic and structural framework I propose is equally committed to 
avoiding the problem of oppression. This means that it can never lead us to ignore or 
understate the power differentials that can exist within a relationship and which may leave those 
taking on caregiving responsibilities unprotected and economically vulnerable, thereby robbing 
them of non-trivial options. As Langevin (2009) comments, the problem at stake here is not so 
much that of a wealthy woman like Lola. There certainly was a power differential in Lola’s 
case. It was, after all, her partner’s will that prevented her from accessing the legal protection of 
marriage. However, not being granted the protections of marriage did not leave her in a 
situation of economic vulnerability that substantially reduced her ability to exercise her 
autonomy. Certainly, falling from the top 1% down to the 5% of the wealthiest persons might 
have reduced her access to certain options. Yet, these options cannot be considered as non-
trivial. As seen in Chapter 3, a non-trivial option is one that is necessary to live a life of one’s 
own choosing: it cannot be the kind of exclusive and outrageously expensive option that is only 
accessible to the elite of society. Moreover, it is difficult to sustain the functionalist argument 
that refusing to grant her $50,000 per month constitutes a failure to acknowledge her non-
monetary contribution to the family. Given the number of staff working for her, it seems 
doubtful that Lola took on much of the care work.  
 What Lola’s case enables us to see is that the fact that marriage necessitates the consent 
of both partners is not oppressive in itself.150 It takes two to form a couple, and it should indeed 
take two to institutionalise this union. Where the need to have the consent of both parties 
becomes a problem is when it exposes the weaker partner to the potential domination of the 
other and unfairly reduces her set of options in a non-trivial manner. In other words, the 
problem is that the status of ‘married couple’ is seen as the relevant basis to attribute rights and 
protections to individuals. It is this link between marriage and the different legal protection 
afforded by it that is questionable. As remarked by Chambers (2013, 133), ‘[t]hese rights are 
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given to the couple because they are married, not because they have chosen each right in turn 
(for they have not), and not because there is some other feature of their relationship that merits 
them (for non-married couples living in identical circumstances will lack some or all of these 
rights)’. This is a problem. There does not seem to be a valid justification for denying legal 
protections to individuals who take on the bulk of the caregiving work on the grounds that they 
were unable or unwilling to subscribe to the institution of marriage. As functionalists noted, in 
the current state of affairs, taking on the bulk of the caregiving work exposes women to 
economic vulnerability and exploitation. What is oppressive is that the recognition of women’s 
contribution to their families depends on their partners’ will to marry. This too often leaves 
women in a situation of economical vulnerability, which substantially reduces their capacity to 
lead a self-governed life. In short, the problem is that partners can rob caregivers of the non-
trivial option to receive legal protection, recognition and economical compensation in exchange 
for their work.  
Given that an agnostic and structural framework compels us to leave both the option of 
marriage and that of de facto cohabitation open, we have to find a way to compensate for the 
power dynamic that deprives caregivers of the possibility legally to protect themselves against 
the detrimental effect of a separation. This means detaching the issue of compensating for care 
work from that of marriage. As rightly argued by functionalists, women who take on caregiving 
work should be able to claim economic compensation for their non-monetary contribution to 
the family. This recognition, in turn, should not depend on their will, or that of their partners, 
to marry, for marriage can be separated from the recognition of care work. There is a 
precedent here:  following Bottomley and Wong (2006), Tasmania is the first jurisdiction to 
operate such a divide between marriage and the recognition of care work. The Domestic 
Relationships Act, adopted in 2003, omits any reference to the nature of the care relationship 
and avoids sexualising it. It adopts a general definition of ‘domestic relationship’ as a 
relationship between two adults where ‘one provides personal or financial commitment and 
support of a domestic nature to the material benefit of the other’.151 For this reason, Bottomley 
and Wong (2016) view such a legal framework as promising, as it effectively opens up the 
option of claiming compensation and economic protection for the non-monetary contribution. 
They stress that one does not even have to be in a sexual or amorous relationship to benefit 
from the legal protections provided by the Act: family members and unrelated friends could 
also benefit from the protections (Bottomley & Wong 2016, 48). This, they claim, effectively 
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opens up the option of claiming legal protection and compensation for all and not just de facto 
partners.152 
This kind of solution provides an effective response to strong autonomy proponents, as 
it avoids subsuming all cohabitants under marriage-like regulations. Moreover, it participates in 
reshaping problematic gender norms by effectively making caregiving a viable option for all. It 
also sends the message that caregiving is worthy of respect and constitutes a social contribution 
that is valuable and should receive compensation. As it enables primary caregivers to receive 
adequate legal protection for their work independently of the type of relationship they are in, it 
also seems to answer some of the functionalist criticisms. However, in some respects, it does 
not go far enough. 
First, the Domestic Relationships Act remains similar to marriage, in that it is a holistic 
regulation that creates a single status on which hinges the attribution of a bundle of rights and 
responsibilities covering multiple areas of life. While caregiving might be a better basis to 
attribute such a bundle than marriage given that it is essential to human existence (Brake 2012, 
87), it remains unclear why this status should be the single basis on which to attribute rights 
such as tax status, inheritance, property ownership, next-of-kinship and immigration. This 
seems to assume that among the many relationships that may be important for individuals, only 
one constitutes the relevant basis for receiving all these diverse protections and obligations. The 
Tasmanian Act, for instance, emphasises the need for the relationship to be exclusive, as the 
parties (Relationships Act, s 11) ‘must not be married or a party to a deed of relationship’.  Yet, 
as Chambers (2013, 136) notes, ‘[i]ndividuals’ arrangements are more wide-ranging. Separated 
couples with children may continue to co-parent but share no other relationship. Others 
maintain a nuclear family unit but also share property or care with an elderly parent or sibling’. 
In this respect, creating an exclusionary alternative status to marriage as the basis on which to 
grant marriage-like rights and privileges seems to reproduce some of the flaws of the 
functionalist view: it assumes that caring relationships are, like marital ones, exclusionary. This 
could leave many primary caregivers unprotected, given the impossibility for either partner to 
cumulate more than one status simultaneously.153  
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Second, and more importantly, a policy like the Domestic Relationships Act operates 
on an opt-in basis and necessitates both parties’ agreement to lodge a certificate making the 
caring relationship official.154 Either party may also unilaterally withdraw the application within 
28 days of lodging it (Relationships Act 2003, S12). Under the Act, the risk of reproducing the 
problem of domination is mitigated by the fact that if a caring relationship is not registered, 
such a status can still be invoked, provided that it is determined that the two persons entertain a 
caring relationship.155 However, such a policy still potentially leaves individuals who take on the 
role of primary caregivers unprotected if the Court does not find the relationship significant 
enough to be attributed a status.  
In view of these problems, the idea of piecemeal regulation like that proposed by 
Chambers (2013 & 2016) might prove more satisfactory. Instead of bundling all the different 
rights and protections together and linking them to one status that cannot be combined with 
another one, Chambers proposes to regulate each part of the relationships separately. She 
writes (2013, 137), ‘[t]here would be no assumption that, in any particular case, all the functions 
coincided in one relationship. Thus, there would be separate regulations for property, child 
custody, immigration, and so on. Each of these regulations would stand separately, and 
individuals could form relationships with different people for different functions’. In this 
respect, receiving protection for one’s non-monetary work would not be reliant on the 
individual capacity to secure the exclusivity of a status with another individual. Under 
Chambers’ proposal, nothing precludes individuals from incurring and being attributed rights 
and obligations from different sources. Anyone who is the primary caregiver of a child, for 
instance, independently of whether the other parent is otherwise married or engaged, can 
receive protection. Moreover, within a piecemeal regulation regime, receiving a given right or 
incurring a given obligation is automatic. The contracting parties may be able to opt-out of such 
obligations, but they cannot do so unilaterally. 
As noted by Bottomley and Wong (2006, 48), ‘[t]he recent Australian reforms not only 
extend to non-sexual care relationships; they also reveal an emerging trend, following the lead 
taken in the Domestic Relationships Act, of shifting the focus from the status of marriage and 
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 See the Relationships Act 2003, s11, which states that ‘[e]ach party to a caring relationship must lodge a 
certificate, in a form approved by the Registrar, from a legal practitioner which states that the legal practitioner 
provided legal advice to that party, independently of the other party to the relationship’. 
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 The criteria the court uses are ‘(a) the duration of the relationship; (b) the nature and extent of common 
residence; (c) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, 
between the parties; (d) the ownership, use and acquisition of property; (e) the degree of mutual commitment to a 
shared life; (f) the performance of household duties; (g) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship; (h) 
the level of personal care and domestic support provided by one or each of the partners to the other’ (The 
Relationships Act S5). 
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marriage-like relationships to one based instead on emotional and financial interdependence as 
indicators of a legally recognized relationship’. There is, indeed, no distinction made in the Act 
between sexual relationships and other ones. This helps avoid the problem of exclusion as it 
does not enforce a traditional and heteronormative ideal on the legal level. Chambers’ 
proposal, in turn, pushes this idea further. It opens up the option of claiming legal protection 
and compensation for all rather than solely for people in a privileged exclusive relationship. It 
participates in reshaping problematic gender norms, effectively making caring a viable option 
for everyone. It also sends the message that caregiving is worthy of respect and constitutes a 
social contribution that is valuable and should receive compensation. Finally, such a solution 
also addresses the issue of oppression as it counterbalances the power relationships that can 
develop within the family. By giving people who take on caregiver roles the option to claim 
legal protection and compensation, it alleviates the risks of exploitation and the potential for 
domination. In short, such a solution seems effectively to address functionalist concerns 
without leading to the same problems.   
The idea of adopting piecemeal regulation should also satisfy the strong autonomy view 
proponents, as it does not infringe upon the autonomy of those who do not want to marry or 
otherwise formalise their unions. Contrary to the solution functionalists prefer, this proposal 
does not impose a unique legal framework for all. It acknowledges that the relevant 
relationships in our lives are multiple and marked by different levels and sorts of commitment, 
which, in turn, should give rise to different types of obligations and protections. It does not 
presume that cohabitation is necessarily marked by a traditional heteronormative division of 
labour and acknowledges that some cohabitants would not satisfy the criteria necessary to claim 
compensation. It is likely that someone like Lola, for instance, would not. The idea of 
piecemeal regulation also does not reinforce problematic assumptions concerning women’s 
autonomy. It does not revolve around whether or not women are more fragile than men and 
necessitate more protection from the law. Rather, it reframes the debate as opening up an 
important option for all: that of one’s contribution to society being duly recognised, 
compensated for and legally protected. It leads to solutions that are autonomy promoting and 
incorporates respect for the freedom of choice without returning to the problem of oppression.  
It could, of course, be argued that this solution violates the autonomy of the person 
who benefits from the non-monetary work that his partner performs. This person has not 
chosen, after all, to incur legal and economic responsibility toward his partner. Yet, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, autonomy is also the normative basis to attribute responsibility. Being 
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autonomous does not solely consist of making free choices: it also entails accepting the 
responsibilities that come with these choices. When one tacitly consents to benefit from 
another’s work, one also has to accept paying the fair costs of this work. Refusing to 
compensate for the work another has done for us can hardly be understood as an act of 
autonomy. It is an act of irresponsibility that, if supported by legal arrangements, amounts to 
legitimising exploitation.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried to demonstrate that the structural and agnostic framework I defend 
enables us to avoid a simplistic agent or victim dichotomy, as it assumes that people who take 
on caregiving work are autonomous agents who may nonetheless need to be protected against 
oppressive dynamics. Contrary to the strong autonomy view, a structural framework cannot 
ignore the issue of oppression. It leads us to consider the autonomy of all parties within a 
relationship rather than only the dominant one. However, in contrast to the functionalist 
argument, such an agnostic framework cannot lead us to forget the issue of autonomy 
altogether or to deny that not marrying might be an autonomous choice that needs to be 
respected. It commits us to ensuring that the option to claim compensation and protection for 
one’s work is truly open to everyone. In doing so, it avoids enforcing conservative 
heteronormative norms by invoking problematic assumptions about what constitutes a couple 
and what roles are normally taken on by men and women. It protects carers independently of 
their gender and the type of relationship they have with the persons who benefit from their 
work. In doing so, it contributes to institutionalising the recognition of caregiving work for all. 
As Bottomley and Wong (2006, 53) write, legal arrangements should reflect social change and 
‘keep open the possibilities of thinking other futures, rather than being caught by the past’. This 
is precisely what something like the idea of piecemeal regulation has the potential to do. Of 
course, if it had been effective in Quebec, such a legal framework would not have helped Lola 
much in obtaining half of Eric’s financial assets. It might, however, have enabled Lola to obtain 
other rights, such as Canadian citizenship. More importantly, however, such a regulation would 
have been highly beneficial in promoting the autonomy of the hundreds of thousands of 
cohabitants in Quebec. It would also have been highly effective in protecting all those who take 
on caregiving work. 
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Chapter 6: Hounded Women and the IPV Protocol156 
It was the women’s movement of the late 1960s that brought attention to intimate partner 
violence (IPV) as an issue for criminal justice (Sack 2004). Yet, the pervasive gendered culture 
as well as the discretion granted to both law enforcement agents and to abuse victims have 
contributed to the penal system’s on-going ineffectiveness in regard to stopping and punishing 
IPV. Though this failure has many aspects, one part of it has been women’s frequent 
unwillingness to press charges against their abusers—an unwillingness judges and police officers 
tended to perceive either as a form of masochism or as proof that the alleged abuse could not 
have been too bad (Showden 2011, 659). Feminist mobilisation in the second part of the 20th 
century led to the acknowledgment of the destructive effect abuse has on its victims’ autonomy. 
IPV was recognised as a dynamic of systemic control that deprives its victim of the possibility to 
lead a self-governed life (Schneider 2000, 21-22). Legal activists increasingly used psychological 
work on learned helplessness and the battered woman syndrome to explain women’s incapacity 
to end their abusive relationships and their unwillingness to press charges against their abusers 
(Miccio 2005, 303-7). As a result, many jurisdictions adopted a special mandatory no-drop 
protocol for IPV cases in the early 1990s (Sack 2004, 1675).157 A paradigmatic example of such 
a protocol can be found in the procedure New York County implemented to replace the 
previously ineffective policing of IPV (Suk 2009, 35). This policy was designed to avoid giving 
discretionary decision-making power to law enforcement agents and to avoid a reliance on 
victim cooperation. Whether women want it or not, the suspicion that abuse has taken place 
triggers an automatic procedure: the suspect is arrested, prosecuted and issued a temporary 
order of protection (TOP) to prevent him from entertaining further contact with his victim.  
The New York County protocol is a source of deep disagreement among feminists. In 
this chapter, I explore this debate in order to show: 1. that the controversy about the no-drop 
protocol revolves around the question of how to assess the autonomy of oppressed individuals; 
and 2. that a structural and agnostic understanding of autonomy can be of great use in resolving 
this disagreement. In order to show this, I first explain the functioning of the New York County 
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 A version of this chapter has been published in a special issue of the peer-reviewed Journal Moral Philosophy 
and Politics on the philosophy of Joseph Raz under the title ‘Hounded Women: The IPV Protocol and the 
Autonomy of Abuse Victims,’ Gauthier-Chung, Maud Faïle. Moral Philosophy and Politics; Berlin 4.1  (2017): 67-
85. 
157
 See Hanna (1998) and Chiu (2001) for a list of specific jurisdictions where the IPV protocol has been adopted. 
The protocol takes different forms in each one of these jurisdictions: some force the victim to testify against her 
abuser, while others do not mandate the issuance of a restraining order.  
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no-drop protocol before reviewing the position of those who support the protocols and of 
those who view them as an illegitimate intervention. I suggest that both stances are unable to 
account for the situation of women in abusive relationships, as they reproduce the problematic 
agent or victim dichotomy. In the second part of the chapter, I relate the situation of victims of 
abuse to that of Raz’s fictive case of the ‘hounded woman’. I suggest that Raz’s unorthodox 
focus on the social conditions needed to lead an autonomous life makes his framework 
particularly useful to feminists, as it enables us to go beyond the agent versus victim dichotomy. 
In contrast to Raz, however, I contend that such a structural understanding of autonomy should 
refrain from making judgements on the competency for autonomy ‘hounded women’ can 
retain. Using an agnostic and structural understanding of autonomy, I argue, enables us to 
acknowledge the agency of ‘hounded women’ while legitimising state actions aimed at 
eradicating the coercion of which they are victims. Hopefully, this leads to a more nuanced 
assessment of the situation of oppressed individuals, such as those who are victims of abuse, 
while accounting for important intuitions of both the pro- and anti-protocol proponents.  
 
I. The No-Drop Protocol and the Debate Surrounding It 
Within the NY protocol, the occurrence of a probable case of IPV automatically triggers the 
following steps. The first is the arrest of the presumed abuser upon reasonable doubt. Once an 
arrest has been made, a prosecution procedure is automatically started, regardless of the 
victim's willingness to testify or cooperate. Prosecutors routinely pursue cases in the face of the 
victim's explicit opposition to the prosecution and inform her that the choice to prosecute the 
abuser belongs to the state (Suk 2009, 37). To ensure the success of the prosecution, police 
officers are trained to accumulate hard evidence against the defendant, regardless of victim 
cooperation: this includes photographs of her injuries, her ‘excited utterance’ at the scene, the 
state of the house, etc. (Suk 2009, 37). The third step of the process consists of issuing a 
temporary order of protection (TOP) as a condition for releasing the defendant.158 The TOP 
prohibits him from contacting the victim and from returning to her home, even if it is the 
defendant’s normal place of residence.  
 It is important to note that as soon as the protocol is triggered, the presumed victim has 
no control over its automatic proceeding. The protocol cannot be dropped, and the defendant 
will automatically be prosecuted and issued a TOP. The presumed victim might not even have 
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 The TOP, commonly referred to as a ‘restraining order’, requires the abuser to stay away from both the plaintiff 
and the plaintiff’s home and to have no contact of any kind with her or her children (Davis 2001, 117).  
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been the one to call the police in the first place. In this respect, critics of the no-drop protocol 
argue that far from protecting the victim’s interests, this policy is rather ‘re-victimizing’ her by 
substituting the will of her abuser with the will of the state (Mills 2003; Fedders 1997; Showden 
2011). Critics point to the fact that this policy is typically advocated by middle-class white 
women but affects predominantly poor black, Hispanic and migrant women, and they claim 
that this underlines its failure to understand the agency exercised by women of colour (Suk 
2009, Fedders 1997, Showden 2011). By analysing the strategies of resistance of abuse victims, 
critics of the protocol deconstruct the assumption that these agents are devoid of autonomy. 
They contend that while ‘behaviours and subjective senses of oneself and what one needs to do 
might look maladaptive or masochistic to outsiders who cannot see patterns of behaviours, […] 
they can be read as highly agentic, engaging the structures of autonomy and freedom available 
in a given situation’ (Showden 2011, 725). The perpetrators of abuse are, indeed, often the 
main source of income of the household, which partly explains their victims’ reluctance to 
separate (Meyer 2012). Critics of the protocol point to the fact that this policy can have a 
devastating effect on victims’ long-term outcomes in terms of financial and housing stability, 
especially if the victim has children (Chiu 2001). As a result, they argue that a state solution to 
IPV should entail respecting women’s autonomy and should present them with an array of 
resources and options instead of forcing a coercive and potentially detrimental procedure on 
them (Showden 2011; Mills 1999). 
 ‘Isn’t this where we were over twenty-five years ago?’ asks Emily J. Sack (2004, 1688) 
while reviewing the solutions proposed by critics of the protocol. According to supporters of 
this policy, letting women choose what to do in the face of abuse completely undermines the 
fact that IPV is characterised by a dynamic of systemic control. Placing the burden of choice on 
the victim problematically overlooks the psychological harm the abuse inflicts as well as the 
coercion and manipulation abusers exert on their victims. Ruth Jones (2000, 609), for instance, 
argues the following: 
[S]tate-sanctioned intervention of guardianship is necessary because an 
abuser has brutally and systematically deprived a woman of her ability to 
exercise independent judgement. Existing resources available to a battered 
woman such as restraining orders, shelters, and support groups presuppose 
an ability to avail herself of assistance. But when a battered woman is so 
controlled that she has lost her autonomy, these resources are not genuine 
options. A battered woman incapacitated by mental and physical abuse must 
be empowered by forcible removal from the control of an abuser.  
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 In addition, those in favour of the protocol stress that letting women choose whether or 
not to prosecute transforms IPV into a matter of individual preference. It disregards the 
systemic dimension of IPV and the compelling interest the state has in stopping and actively 
punishing endemic violence against women. In this argument, there is a necessary trade-off to 
be made between respecting the preferences of individual victims and the need to ensure global 
social security and an individual’s autonomy (Sack 2004; Hanna 1998; Jones 2000). 
 We do not yet possess any conclusive information about the impact these policies have 
on the offenders’ recidivism, victims’ safety or the global prevalence of IPV. While these 
policies have indeed been evaluated, the results are conflicting.159 Given that the evidence we 
possess is both limited and mixed, the best way to understand the debate is not as a matter of 
pragmatic efficiency but rather as a conflict between two opposing views on abused women’s 
autonomy.  
 For those in favour of mandatory prosecutions, the no-drop protocol is required, 
‘because battered women are incapable of making a “rational” choice while being traumatized 
by the violence’ (Miccio 2005, 241). The oppression they have suffered is presumed to have 
impaired their capacity for autonomy to such an extent that they are rendered incapable of 
critically assessing their own situation. This is the reason why most of them choose to stay with 
their abusers and fail to prosecute them (Jones 2000). Following this view, mandatory practices 
then serve as a shield not just from the violence of individual males but also from what is 
perceived as the victim’s lack of autonomy. Since the victims of abuse cannot be seen as 
autonomous agents, the state has to intervene in their private lives, in order to prosecute their 
abusers, and put an end to the violent relationship. 
 What seems to underlie the arguments in favour of mandatory prosecution is a 
substantive vision of autonomy that is principally concerned with the problem of oppression. 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, this understanding of autonomy constrains the content of desires 
and preferences that can be viewed as autonomous (Stoljar & Mackenzie 2000, 19). These 
substantive constraints typically draw on liberal notions of autonomy, such as independence 
from social and private power and control over one’s environment (Lépinard 2011, 207.). 
They also make autonomy incoherent with preferences tainted by oppression (Stoljar 2000). 
Autonomy, following proponents of such an account, should not be seen as cogent with 
constrained life situations, no matter how the person came to choose such a situation 
(Christman 2015). Even if agents grappling with oppressive constraints are able to rationalise 
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  See Sack (2004, 1676), who offers a review of the main studies concerning the effect of the IPV protocol. 
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their preferences, these reflective judgements should not be understood as an expression of 
autonomy (Stoljar 2000). Rather, they should be seen as symptoms of the way the coercive 
aspect of the agent’s environment has affected her autonomy. Therefore, women who stay in 
abusive relationships cannot be regarded as autonomous 1. because autonomy is incompatible 
with the presence of oppressive external constraints (Lépinard 2011, 208) and 2. because the 
choice to remain in an abusive relationship demonstrates a lack of autonomy competencies on 
these women’s part. Moreover, the decision to stay with a violent partner seems to be 
underlined by problematic oppressive gender norms that normalise male aggression and 
prescribe that women should stay with their partners at whatever cost.160 
 By contrast, the critics of the protocol point to examples of the agency exercised by 
individuals in violent relationships and seek to prove that these women are indeed 
autonomous. In this view, victims of abuse should be viewed as agents in their own right. The 
coercion they experience should not be understated. However, the state’s imposition of an 
automatic protocol constitutes an illegitimate usurpation of their decision-making power 
(Miccio 2005, 242). As autonomous agents, they deserve our respect and their stated desires 
should be taken into consideration.  
 In this analysis, anti-protocols seem to rely on a minimal conception of autonomy.161 
This kind of account aims to remain content-neutral: the content of a person’s choices, 
preferences and beliefs is irrelevant to the issue of whether she is autonomous in regard to 
them (Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000, 13-17). It also puts minimal requirements on agents and 
preferences in order to consider them as autonomous. Such a framing of autonomy seeks to 
address the issue of discriminatory exclusion. Women do not all have the same aspirations, 
values and political goals, and they come from different racial and social backgrounds. In order 
to account for this diversity, it is important to adopt a pluralist and inclusive conception of 
agency that cannot be seen as permeated by liberal standards of substantive autonomy. This is 
why, as we have seen in Chapter 2, theorists such as Marilyn Friedman (2003) propose a 
conception of autonomy that places minimal requirements on agents to be seen as deserving 
the status of autonomous agent. Insofar as being considered autonomous is the basis of being 
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  It is to be noted, however, that theorists who adopt a substantial conception of autonomy are not necessarily in 
favour of coercive interventions that bypass agents’ desires. Natalie Stoljar (2014, 250), for instance, is resolutely 
against such interventions as they may ‘well be self-defeating if they harm or damage the agent’s autonomy further’. 
What I want to underline, however, is that people who seek to legitimise the mandatory protocol do so on the 
grounds of substantial conceptions of autonomy that allow them to frame abuse victims as non-autonomous.  
161
 As noted earlier, others have opposed the protocol on pragmatic grounds (e.g. its potentially harmful and/or 
counterproductive effects on victims). These are important concerns that need to be taken into consideration. Yet, 
given that we lack conclusive evidence regarding these, I will instead concentrate on arguments that revolve around 
autonomy in what follows. 
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seen as deserving of equal respect, such a minimal account of autonomy ‘has, independently of 
other considerations, the advantage of promoting a more inclusive sense of equal worth’ 
(Friedman 2003, 23). Given the agency they demonstrate, women who find themselves in 
abusive relationships should be seen as worthy of bearing the status of autonomous agents. 
Paternalistic intervention in their lives, such as the mandatory protocol, is both unwarranted 
and illegitimate. 
 Reviewing the position of the protocol supporters and that of its critics, it seems that we 
are confronted with an unappealing dilemma.162 We can frame women in abusive relationships 
as poor victims devoid of autonomy, which can justify adopting a paternalistic stance towards 
them that legitimises bypassing their desires altogether. The alternative, however, does not 
seem more satisfactory. To understand these women as agents in their own right is indeed 
important to avoid disrespecting them, and to understand the rationale guiding their actions 
(e.g. the need for financial stability, and the welfare of their children, for instance (Meyer 
2016)). Yet, the conception of autonomy that critics of the protocol imply when they insist on 
framing abused victims as autonomous blurs the distinction between coerced choices and 
autonomous decisions. In practice, it returns us to the ineffective policies of the 1970s where 
the prosecution of abusive behaviour relied solely on the victim. In short, both pro- and anti-
protocol positions seem equally inadequate as they entail an exclusive focus on determining the 
extent to which victims of abuse can be seen as possessing the necessary competencies to be 
granted the status of autonomous agent. This focus, in turn, leads to a framing of agents in 
abusive relationships through the unhelpful agent or victim dichotomy: these women can either 
be conceived as autonomous agents who carry the sole responsibility for their own welfare or as 
victims devoid of autonomy. 163 
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 Referred to as the ‘Agency Dilemma’ by Serene Khader (2011, 30-36). 
163
 My claim here is not that substantive or minimal conceptions of autonomy necessarily have the kind of 
normative implication concerning the legitimacy of paternalism I sketch in this chapter. There are many ways a 
proponent of substantive autonomy can prevent her account from serving to justify coercive interventions (see 
Stoljar 2014, for instance). Inversely, the proponent of a minimal account of autonomy could very well develop a 
separate line of argument in favour of interventions that bypass agents’ autonomous desires. What I want to point 
out is that legitimising coercive state action is made on the grounds of individuals’ autonomy in liberal societies 
(Conly 2013). Thus, supporters of the most paternalistic versions of the protocol have to rely on highly demanding 
autonomy standards if they want to legitimise intervening in the abuse victims’ lives, independently of their desires. 
Inversely, anti-protocols have to adopt minimal conceptions of autonomy that allow them to frame abuse victims 
as autonomous to prove that these interventions are illegitimate.  
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II. Hounded Women 
In this second part, I argue that a structural framework is better suited to account for the 
situation of female victims of abuse than substantive or minimal understandings of autonomy. I 
consider Raz’s account of autonomy here, as the structural understanding he proposes bears a 
close resemblance to my account. In this respect, exploring Raz’s framework helps unveil both 
the general strength of structural accounts as well as the pertinence of the agnostic component 
of the version that I propose.   
 Just as in my own account, Raz insists that being the author of one’s life is not just a 
matter of possessing the right mental capacities. Autonomy also has social conditions. The first 
one, Raz (1986, 155) claims, is relational: autonomy necessitates the absence of coercion and 
manipulation. The second one concerns the type and quality of options that are open to agents. 
These options are socially given (Raz 1986, 205-6). They are enabled and shaped by norms, 
conventions, as well as by social institutions. They are, in other words, dependent on the 
structure of the social context in which the agent finds herself. It is precisely because of its 
unorthodox focus on the prerequisite social conditions to lead an autonomous life that a 
structural account can be of great help in framing issues such as intimate partner abuse and 
determining what to do about them. Raz, of course, does not directly address the issue of abuse 
victims’ autonomy. Yet, he does discuss a fictive case that, in many respects, is closely related to 
the situation of women who find themselves in violent relationships (Raz 1986, 374):  
The Hounded Woman: A person finds herself in a small desert island. She 
shares the island with a fierce carnivorous animal that perpetually hunts for 
her. Her mental stamina, her intellectual ingenuity, her will power and her 
physical resources are taxed to their limits by her struggle to remain alive. 
She never has a chance to do or even to think of anything other than how to 
escape from the beast.  
 As Marilyn Friedman (2014, 223) notes, it is not too much of a stretch to compare the 
hounded woman to a victim of domestic violence. Many abuse victims are constantly hunted as 
well.164 They live their lives in fear of possible physical and psychological attacks. They share 
their living space with a ‘predator’ whose behaviour and habits they must observe and learn to 
predict in order to avoid the next strike. Like the hounded woman, they must devote their 
energy, as well as their physical and mental power to the task of ‘escaping from the beast’.165   
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 Findings concerning situational couple violence suggest that some women may suffer sporadic episodes of 
physical violence without experiencing the broader patterns of coercive control that characterise domestic violence 
(Johnson & Leone 2005). 
165
 For a thorough study of how this dynamic of systemic control works and entraps its victim, see Stark (2007). IPV 
remains, to this day, the leading cause of injuries to women of reproductive age in industrialised countries (Meyer 
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 The hounded woman, Raz states, is incapable of living an autonomous life (Raz 1986, 
374). For one, the options she possesses are inadequate. One can lead an autonomous life, Raz 
believes, only when faced with a decent range of different and valuable options. The main 
problem, in the hounded woman’s case, is not that she does not have enough options or that 
they are insufficiently varied. On the contrary, she has a considerable range of options and can 
decide what to do during every moment of her life. She can hide in a tree, try to find something 
to eat; take a walk outside or cook dinner. Just like abuse victims who might sometimes seem 
to lead normal, unimpeded lives, in the minutia of her life, the hounded woman might 
sometimes resemble minimalist camping aficionados.166 Yet, the medium and long-term options 
these ‘hounded women’ have are dominated by the need to escape being devoured by the 
beast. The ever-present fear for their lives leaves them unable to form meaningful personal 
projects and lead self-governed lives. And when the choices one possesses are dominated by 
the need to protect one’s life then, Raz explains (1986, 376), one has no true choice at all.  
 The second problem with the hounded woman’s autonomy is the coercion from which 
she suffers. To the extent that she is left unable to form and enact comprehensive goals for fear 
of the beast’s attacks, she lives a coerced life. This coercion is even more evident in the case of 
women whose physical and mental integrity is being directly threatened by their partners.167 
Having to stop friendships or relationships with one’s family, being forced to abandon one’s 
career or goals or having to ask permission to leave one’s house for fear of encountering one’s 
partner’s wrath are certainly among the most grievous real-life examples of coercion in our 
societies.168   
 At this point of the argument, however, an important question arises. Does 
acknowledging that our ‘hounded women’ are incapable of being the authors of their lives 
commit us to denying them the status of autonomous agent? If it does, then it seems that 
adopting a structural framework entails subscribing to the views of those in favour of the 
protocols. 
                                                                                                                                                        
2012, 179-180). A total of 60% of homicides involve a female victim being killed by her partner (Shackelford & 
Mouzos 2005).  
166
 That is not to say that abuse victims can decide what to do at every moment of their lives. What I want to 
underline is that while victims sometime seem to live normal, unimpeded lives, as they do make choices in their 
everyday lives, the options they possess are nonetheless always inadequate. Yet, it is important to stress that there 
are moments when these agents cannot really decide much (in the midst of an attack, for instance). 
167
 Following Raz (1986, 154), coercion consists of forcing someone to do one’s biding ‘by changing the 
circumstances surrounding that other person's choice or by credibly threatening to do so if the other does not act 
in a certain way’. 
168
 For an in-depth analysis of the coercive control abusers can exert on their victims, see Dutton & Goodman 
2005, among many others.  
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  Raz himself is not very clear about what receiving the status of autonomous agent 
necessitates. His primary concern is with the social conditions needed to be able to lead a self-
governed life. It thus remains unclear whether the implication of his conception of autonomy is 
that someone lacking effective conditions is to be denied the status of autonomous agent for 
this reason. As we have seen in Chapter 2, Marina Oshana is clearer in this respect. She 
proposes what can be seen as a feminist interpretation of Raz’s framework. In her view, being 
considered autonomous entails having the power and options for being in de facto control of 
one’s life (Oshana 2006). Insofar as abuse victims cannot be said to be in control over their 
lives, they cannot be regarded as autonomous agents. 
 There are, however, problems with denying the status of autonomous agent to people 
who, because of restrictions caused by unfortunate external circumstances, are incapable of 
leading self-governed lives. As noted by Raz (1986, 154-155), autonomy is usually assimilated to 
the set of mental abilities that are needed to form and revise life choices. As argued in Chapter 
3, it is because autonomy is conceived as a sort of competency that it becomes a status marker 
that endows individuals with privileges as well as with responsibilities. If one does possess the 
necessary competencies —i.e. is sufficiently rational, reflective, self-aware, etc.— to form and 
revise one’s preferences, then these preferences are seen as worthy of respect and 
consideration. One is, in other words, seen as able to make decisions about one’s own life and 
receive the privilege of being treated like an equal by other members of the society. By 
contrast, if one’s preferences are not autonomously formed, then there is no need to respect 
them. Non-autonomous agents, such as children or mentally disabled individuals, cannot be 
seen as equals by other members of the society: since they are not competent to make their 
own decisions, others' overseeing of important aspects of their lives for them is required for 
their welfare.  
 In this respect, equating the presence of impediments to the meaningful exercise of 
autonomy to the denial of the status of autonomous agent seems problematically to erase the 
distinction between possessing the competency for autonomy —that is the set of mental skills to 
form and revise projects— and having the possibility to exercise this competency in meaningful 
ways. There is an important distinction between not being able to live a self-governed life 
because of coercive constraints and not being able to do so because one does not possess the 
prerequisite capacities. The first situation warrants political action to alleviate the problematic 
aspect of the social context, while the second legitimises paternalistic interventions that 
disregard agents’ stated desires.  
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 In this thesis, I have suggested an alternative interpretation of the claim that coerced 
individuals do not enjoy autonomous lives. This entails carefully differentiating between 
autonomy as a set of competencies, and the external conditions for being able to live an 
autonomous life. An agent could be left unable to exercise autonomy —e.g. because she is 
paralyzed, in prison or, like our Hounded Women, lacks valuable options— but still possess 
the set of mental abilities necessary to formulate autonomous desires and thoughts. Inversely, a 
person could fail to possess the competencies necessary to be regarded as autonomous —e.g. if 
she suffers from serious mental disability— and yet be in an environment that grants her the 
possibility to lead an autonomous life. In this respect, it remains important to differentiate the 
competency for autonomy from the external conditions necessary to exercise it in meaningful 
ways. While it is true that abuse victims may be incapable of leading a self-governed life 
because of external impediments to the way they can exercise their autonomy, there are 
important reasons not to deny that they are competent enough to bear the status of 
autonomous agent and formulate decisions about their own lives that are worthy of respect and 
consideration.  
 First, as argued in Chapter 3, it seems misguided to postulate that coercion and a lack 
of options necessarily extinguish the competencies needed to make one’s own decisions.169 
Moreover, as highlighted by various studies, victims of IPV can be read as highly rational, 
reflective and imaginative, as they industriously employ the various harm-reducing strategies 
that are available to them given the highly constrictive environment in which they are trapped 
(Meyer 2016; Hamby 2014).  There are, of course, reasons to think that prolonged episodes of 
coercion or the continued lack of meaningful options might affect the mental capacities needed 
to be self-governing. However, given that we do not possess epistemic access to agents’ mental 
lives, there seems to be no way to determine how or to what extent. Moreover, not all abuse 
victims are similar: they have different backgrounds, and they experience coercion to varying 
extents and might react to it in different ways (Roberts 2007). Therefore, to formulate broad 
generalisations about the effect coercion and a lack of options have on women seems ill-
advised. As critics of the IPV protocol point out, most women do not stop being competent to 
direct their own lives because they are in an oppressive relationship (Meyer 2016; Hamby 
2014). The exercise of their autonomy clearly becomes structured by the abuse they encounter. 
Yet, there is no reason to postulate that IPV extinguishes their competency to make 
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 For an analysis pertaining to the agency and autonomy exercised by women in violent relationships, see the 
special issue of Global Public Health entitled ‘Conceptualizing the agency of highly marginalized women: Intimate 
partner violence in extreme settings’ (Campbell & Mannell 2016), as well as Meyer’s (2012) on the agency women 
exercise when the choose to stay with their abusers. 
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autonomous decisions altogether. The fact that someone is not able to enact her desire in the 
world because of the constraints she faces does not substantiate the conclusion that she is 
incapable of formulating autonomous desires altogether. 
 Second, and more importantly, given that being seen as possessing the mental abilities 
to be self-governing is necessary to be granted the status of autonomous agent, we should be 
wary of framing abuse victims as incompetent to lead autonomous lives.170 As underlined by 
critics of the no-drop protocol, presenting women as victims devoid of autonomy opens the 
door to paternalistic interventions that further deprive them of the little control they were able 
to retain over their lives. It also ignores the rationale guiding these women’s actions. This, in 
turn, makes it difficult to take into account the very real constraint victims of abuse sometimes 
encounter and the dire effects policies like the IPV protocol can have on them if they are not 
supplemented with targeted interventions aimed at alleviating these deleterious effects. 
Moreover, insofar as it contributes to reproducing the stereotype of the incapacitated and 
irrational woman, it seems that framing abuse victims as unworthy of bearing the status of 
autonomous agent feeds into problematic power relationships that are not only gendered but 
also classed and raced (Miccio 2005, 242).171 As mentioned by Showden (2011), IPV policies 
tend predominantly to affect vulnerable individuals. In this respect, such policies, especially if 
they are grounded on the view that abuse victims are somewhat less autonomous then we are, 
risk inadvertently reproducing problematic exclusionary dynamics.  
Under this interpretation, adopting a structural framework entails acknowledging that 
rather than a lack of competency, what victims of abuse suffer from is coercion as well as a lack 
of adequate options. And these issues, in a liberal society, should not be tolerated. Raz is well 
known for what he refers to as the ‘principle of autonomy’, which requires that people (and 
therefore the state) secure the conditions of autonomy for all people. Going far beyond the 
negative duty of non-interference, this principle entails a duty to actively promote autonomy 
through political action. To the extent that domestic violence denies women the opportunity to 
lead a self-governed life, its gravity cannot be minimised. Moreover, as stressed by Raz, 
autonomy is a social product. Prevalent norms and institutions determine individuals’ horizon 
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 For examples of the kind of problematic legal consequences that framing abuse victims as non-autonomous has 
had, see Schneider 2000, Ch. 5. Among other things, presenting abuse victims as non-autonomous leads to the 
credibility deficits these women face as complainants and witnesses. It also makes it very difficult for them to claim 
self-defence when they end up killing their abusers while attempting to save their own lives. In certain cases, it has 
also served to deny them guardianship of their children.  
171
 On this topic, see Crenshaw (1991) who shows how violence against women is shaped by multiple social and 
intersecting determinants. Ignoring the importance of these social determinants and of their interaction, explains 
Crenshaw, can lead to devising solutions that interact with women’s pre-existing vulnerabilities and further 
disempower them. 
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of possibilities, shape social practices and structure the relationships that are valuable in one’s 
life. Further, given the kind of norms and institutions that currently govern our societies, 
domestic violence constitutes a widespread and systemic phenomenon.172 The absence of 
serious penal consequences for abusers implicitly sanctions the dynamic of systemic control 
that deprives part of the population of the conditions to lead a self-governed life.  It sends the 
message that it is acceptable for men to do whatever they want with their spouse —that coercing 
and threatening them is acceptable. In other words, it reinforces social forms inhospitable to 
women’s autonomy. Therefore, the prosecution of abusers should not depend on the victims’ 
will; the coercion that abusers inflict on their victims should be treated as a crime. In light of 
the long status quo of the state towards IPV, this sends a clear message that such behaviour is 
intolerable and contributes in restructuring deeply problematic gender relationships. There are 
thus compelling reasons for the state to prosecute abusers on a mandatory basis and not leave 
the choice to prosecute one’s abuser open to the agent.  
 Nevertheless, it is not because an agent cannot properly exercise her autonomy that she 
should be seen as incompetent to bear the status of autonomous agent. That IPV poses as a 
real threat to its victims’ capacity to exercise their autonomy in meaningful ways cannot justify 
deafness to their voices and desires. But does that mean that we should allow them to choose 
whether they want to continue living with their partners? On the one hand, the choice of one’s 
partner seems to be an integral part of living an autonomous life. On the other hand, in the 
case of an IPV victim, her partner is also the beast that threatens her. The option of staying 
with him could therefore be conceived as a ‘bad’ or ‘morally repugnant’ option. For Raz, 
leaving open such as bad option to individuals is not a requirement of respect for autonomy. It 
would, in this respect, be justified to prevent women from remaining with their partners. 
 Contrary this idea, I want to defend the agnosticism of my framework and suggest that 
there are important reasons not to automatically issue a TOP that coercively forces the 
separation of a woman from her partner, even when this relationship has become abusive. The 
analogy drawn between the hounded woman and IPV victims might be misleading in this 
respect. While staying on an island with a predator has indeed no value for someone’s 
autonomy, intimate relationships can sometime be constitutive of one’s sense of self and 
purpose. Intimate relationships are not the same as the relationship between a woman and a 
strange beast: they are often emotionally charged, factor into one’s identity and give value and 
                                                 
172
 Data from the most recent National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey indicate that nearly 29 million 
US women (that is, more than 1 in 5 women) have experienced severe physical violence by an intimate partner at 
some point in their lives (Center for Disease Control and Prevention 2015).  
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meaning to one’s goals. In this respect, the relationship one has with a particular partner can 
have a deep positive value for one’s autonomy. Understanding this allows us to recognise that 
women might have compelling reasons to try to save their relationship from the abuse (and 
sometimes succeed) (Mahoney 1991, 1302). Yet, this desire must also be understood in its 
context. In Mahoney’s words (1991, 1301), ‘[w]omen do not love "batterers"'. Women love 
their husbands, lovers, and partners. The problem is that their loved ones have begun using 
violence’. When women claim their desire to stay with their partner, they seek to safeguard 
their relationship and the positive things this emotional commitment brings to their lives —not 
the abuse.  
This, however, should not lead us to forget that victims often ‘need’ their partner for 
other reasons, as they are often the main breadwinners of the household (Meyer 2012). Too 
often victims must choose between staying in an abusive relationship and facing dire economic 
consequences if they leave.173 When they ignore women’s voices and the reasons guiding their 
choices and actions, the flip side of well-intended policies, such as the no-drop protocol, may 
well become counterproductive at best and deleterious. As it is agnostic and compels us to 
listen to women within abusive relationships, the framework I propose should encourage us to 
take such problems into account when devising a solution.  
All this goes to show that the form taken by mandatory intervention, where the 
systematic issuance of a TOP is used as a means to disrupt relationships between abusers and 
victims, is highly problematic. A TOP lasts from one to three years, and even if the couple can 
reunite at its term, it seems unlikely that a relationship would survive for years without any form 
of communication or contact (Suk 2009, 48). However, women sometimes do want to 
safeguard their relationships, and this desire has to be understood as an expression of their 
autonomy. While it is true that the state has a compelling interest in punishing abusers 
independently of the victim’s will, it is equally true that the strategy used to do so is not 
legitimate when it fails to respect some women’s desires. Moreover, it is misleading. 
Criminalising the relationship itself punishes the woman who want to safeguard it instead of 
punishing the abuse: putting a violent man in prison, even if it burdens the relationship, does 
not equate to forcibly ending it. The couple can still see each other and communicate. For the 
many victims who want or need to maintain their relationships, the added element of forced 
separation through no-contact orders that can last for up to three years can have a deterrent 
effect on help-seeking. Such a policy can also have a devastating effect on victims’ long-term 
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 As noted by Bassuk and al.(1998), 63% of homeless women have been victims of domestic violence, and many 
women struggle to find decent and stable housing for themselves and their children after leaving abusive partners. 
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outcomes in terms of financial and housing stability. Furthermore, since the focus of the TOP 
is to end the relationship between the abuser and the victim by monitoring the latter, this 
measure is often unproductive: abusers sometimes respect the TOP but end up repeating the 
abuse with another victim (Miccio 2005, 280-1). 174  
 Thus, instead of coercively ending the relationship, the state should work on ending the 
abuse. This might mean allowing the relationship to continue through monitored contacts (if 
the victim wishes to), while ensuring that this is a real choice on the victim’s part. For this task, 
eliminating the dependency of these women on their partners is crucial. Ensuring the presence 
of adequate temporary and permanent housing, the accessibility of emergency funds and 
employment programmes, constitutes examples of measures that could help alleviating this 
problem. Monitoring the abuser instead of his victim is another measure that could be used 
instead of the TOP. The evidence we now have on the efficacy of using GPS to track sex 
offenders to reduce the risk of recidivism is very promising.175 Provided that the abuser is 
properly monitored, allowing supervised contact between a woman and her partner would not 
increase the victim’s risk of suffering further attacks. In fact, this strategy could even be safer for 
victims than no-contact orders. 176   
Conclusion 
A structural and agnostic analysis is more nuanced than that proposed by both defenders of the 
protocols, and those who oppose the protocols, and it combines important intuitions of both 
positions. It permits us to acknowledge that women can be victims of coercion while remaining 
agents in their own right, as they retain their competency to form and revise autonomous 
thoughts and desires.  In short, exiting the agent or victim dichotomy necessitates 
understanding autonomy in the broader social context of the agent. In addition to pointing 
toward potential changes to the current protocol, such a structural understanding of autonomy 
allows the realisation that a criminal approach to domestic violence is highly insufficient. 
Abusive relationships are, indeed, enabled by a larger social context that is structured by gender 
norms (Showden 2011, ch.2). This social form (to use Raz’s terminology), which prescribes 
aggressive and dominating behaviour to men and docility and submissiveness to women, is the 
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 The National Network to End Domestic Violence (NNEDV) also notes that monitoring victims raises serious 
safety and privacy risks and might be used against them by offenders’ attorneys. 
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 A recent study on the efficacy of such a device in California found that high-risk sex offenders were 91.5 per 
cent less likely to commit a new offence if they were monitored via GPS  (Gies et al. 2012). 
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 Following Diane Rosenfeld (2007), while TOPs are effective in most cases, when they do not work, it can be 
deadly. Most IPV homicides occur when the couple are separated and when many murder victims have had 
restraining orders against their killer (Davis 2001). By contrast, GPS tracking seems to drastically reduce the risk of 
homicides (Rosenfeld 2007).  
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very same social form that makes women far more likely to be victims of physical aggression 
and threats, sexual harassment and sexual abuse.177 Women are, of course, made highly 
conscious of these threats from a young age. We are told not to go out too late, not to wear 
certain types of clothes, not to drink too much and not to be alone with unknown men. This 
social form, in short, is not only a problem for the autonomy of women in abusive 
relationships: it structures the everyday life of every person who identifies as a woman in our 
society. Many feminists are, of course, highly conscious of that. However, this awareness tends 
to disappear behind an increasingly prominent and exclusively criminalised approach to IPV 
(Miccio 2005, 289). This approach is tantamount to seeing abuse as an ‘individual problem’, 
that is as a behaviour presented by some particular individual exhibiting abnormal criminal 
tendencies, and not as something that is enabled and created by a larger social context that 
affects everyone. By contrast, a structural and agnostic framework allows us to refocus on the 
social conditions necessary to lead an autonomous life and enables us to recognise that it is 
highly insufficient to punish some particular individual in order to end violence against women. 
What we need to do is to transform the underlying social form that transforms women into 
prey and men into beasts. 
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 As explained by Steve Wall (1998, 164-165), ‘[s]ocial forms refer to the ‘forms of behaviour’ which are ‘widely 
practiced’ in a society’ and thus cover a wide range of phenomena, including gender norms. 
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Chapter 7: Victims or Agents? When Battered Women Kill 
 
The legal and criminal responsibility of individuals accused of violent crimes is usually thought 
to be closely associated with the degree of autonomy, as a competency, they were thought to 
possess at the moment of the deed.178 This is especially true when the defendant is a woman 
who is a victim of intimate partner violence. With the growing awareness of the deleterious 
effects abuse can have on women’s capacity for autonomy, it is often argued that women who 
kill their abuser should be at least partly absolved of criminal liability.  That these women did 
not leave a relationship they thought to be life threatening, or that they seemingly failed to use 
legal resources for protection is often explained by the impairments the abuse had caused to 
their autonomy capacity.  
 It could be thought that the agnostic framework I propose is useless for assessing 
criminal responsibility (especially in such cases), as it precludes a clear assessment of an 
individual’s competency for autonomy. In this chapter, I attempt to disprove this idea and seek 
to show that linking criminal liability to the assessment of the competency for autonomy is not 
only unnecessary: it can be prejudicial. I claim that it is precisely because my relational 
framework is ‘agnostic’ about the question of the defendant’s degree of autonomy that it is a 
useful first step in assessing criminal liability. In order to do so, I review the way homicides 
committed by victims of abuse tend to be assessed. Using the English case R v Scamp- [2010] 
EWCA Crim 2259, I attempt to show how the current legislative framework can be viewed as 
reproducing the ‘victim or agent’ dichotomy. In the second part, I explore the difficulties of 
claiming self-defence for battered women who kill, and I review the famous case of Lavallee 
and its jurisprudence effects in the Canadian context.179 The last part is then dedicated to 
demonstrating the use of an agnostic and structural framework of autonomy in assessing these 
kinds of cases. I conclude this chapter by arguing that this approach is a good first step in 
determining criminal liability in violent crimes in many other cases, especially when these 
involve agents who belong to socially marginalised groups.  
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 See Schneider (2000, 115), for example, who notes that ‘well-intentioned lawyers, legislators, legal scholars, and 
judges have made legal arguments, developed legislation, and written articles and judicial opinions that assert 
“battered women’s” or “battered woman syndrome” defences or claims, whether as the basis for claims of self-
defence, for admissibility of expert testimony, or for a special cause of action in tort’. 
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 The Canadian Common Law is derived from the English and Welsh law. However, even though these two 
jurisdictions share great similarities, the precedents set in one jurisdiction are not legally binding for the other.  
 151 
I. The Guilty Agent or the Helpless Victim: Diminished Responsibility 
and Provocation Pleas 
 
In jurisdictions that use common law, there are four possible defences available to someone 
who stands accused of murder (Morrissey 2003, 71). The first is self-defence. It is considered a 
‘perfect’ defence as it can lead to the complete acquittal of the defendant.180 In most 
jurisdictions, a successful claim of self-defence entails the satisfaction of four criteria: 1. The 
threat was serious enough to reasonably justify a self-defence killing; 2. the threat was imminent 
and the self-defensive action was neither preventive nor vengeful; 3. the defence was 
proportional to the threat; 4. the defendant had no alternative course of action and no real 
possibility to retreat.181 Unlike self-defence, provocation is an ‘imperfect defence’ which can 
only lead to a reduction of the culpability and sentence of the defendant. It is typically used 
when the victim’s behaviour is believed to have caused a loss of control by the defendant. 
Similar to provocation, the diminished responsibility defence also reduces the crime to 
manslaughter and leads to a lesser sentence for the defendant. As noted by Belinda Morrisey 
(2003, 71), this type of defence ‘rests on the defendant’s possession of an abnormality of mind 
at the time of the killing, which was so different to that of an ordinary person that the 
reasonable man would consider abnormal’. Finally, the defence of insanity nullifies the case: 
the defendant is seen as too mentally impaired to be considered responsible for her actions. In 
such an eventuality, judges can order long-term institutionalisation or psychiatric treatments.  
 I review the three latter defences (provocation, diminished responsibility and insanity) 
in this part of the chapter. Though this presentation can suggest there is a neat distinction 
between them, in practice, these different categories often merge with each other. Using the 
fairly recent English case of Kirsty Scamp, I show how these defences are invoked in cases 
involving victims of abuse who kill their partners. I mean to demonstrate that the use of these 
defences depends on the defendant’s assumed degree of competency for autonomy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
180As noted by Schneider (2000, 116), some jurisdictions recognise ‘’imperfect’’ self-defence when a defendant is 
found honest in believing that self-defence was necessary, but this belief is found to be ‘unreasonable’. The 
imperfect self-defence results in a reduction of the sentence from murder to manslaughter.  
181
 We will return to these criteria and the way they are used and understood in the second part of this section. 
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A) The Case182 
Kirsty Scamp was eighteen when she started working in a residential care home for adults with 
learning disabilities and mental health problems where she was reported to be a valued and 
competent member of staff. She met Jason Bull in 2005, and they moved in together in 
Sheerness in December of the same year. During the period they lived together, she 
experienced a number of violent incidents; three were documented. In February 2006, after 
picking her up from work, Bull punched Scamp and destroyed some flowers he had bought for 
her. In the second incident, Bull pushed Scamp onto the bedroom floor and smashed her 
head against the wall before overdosing on painkillers. In February 2006, when Scamp 
threatened to leave him, Bull tried to strangle her and started punching her. Following the 
attack, she suffered a perforated eardrum and reported the assault to the police. Bull was 
arrested and subsequently bailed. 
 After this incident, Bull promised to get help and to abstain from alcohol. He was 
subsequently referred to a psychologist (Justice for Women 2016). However, on 13 March 
2006, Scamp accepted an invitation to go out with him to celebrate his birthday. At the bar, 
Bull had a few drinks and some cocaine. After returning home, Scamp tried to stop him from 
drinking more, and they started to argue. Bull began punching her and pulled out clumps of 
her hair. Scamp left the flat and sat on the steps outside the front door. While waiting for Bull 
to calm down, she overheard him talking about her and suspected he was calling a woman with 
whom he was previously seen flirting. As she went back to the flat to confront him, they began 
to argue. Bull became violent, and he attempted to strangle her and threw her against the wall. 
At one point, he grabbed her by the hair and punched her. Scamp stated that she was terrified 
because he would not stop. She reported that she ‘had never seen him look the way he did that 
night’ (Justice for Women, 2015). She grabbed a kitchen knife to defend herself against the 
increasing violence of Bull’s attacks. Seeing all the blood and Bull slumped against the door, 
she ran out to the street to summon help. An ambulance arrived, but the medical staff could 
not save Bull. The police arrived at the flat at 8.43.  In the police car, she is reported to have 
said, ‘I can't have killed him, the knife didn't go in all the way’ (R v Scamp). 
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 In building this case, I relied on the Judgement on Conviction, R v Scamp- [2010] EWCA Crim 2259. 
Unfortunately, the 2007 and 2010 judgements were not available. However, the 2010 judgement summarises and 
cites transcripts from these two previous trials. I also used the documentation provided by the organisation Justice 
for Women and found further information in multiple newspaper articles: Bindel, Julie. 26 June 2009, ‘Driven to 
Kill’, The Guardian; Staff writer. 30 July 2010, ‘Released woman: I still can’t go home to mum’, Kent and Sussex 
Courier; Staff writer. 26 July 2010, ‘Kent woman freed after stabbing ‘never meant to kill’’, BBC News; Staff 
writer, 30 July 2010, ‘Kirsty is released from prison’, Kent and Sussex Courier; Staff writer, 22 July 2010, ‘Woman 
who stabbed boyfriend to death is freed because trial judge failed to properly direct jurors on victim’s violent past’, 
The Daily Mail; Staff writer, 20 July 2010, ‘Kirsty released from prison’, Kent and Sussex Courier. 
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  While she was awaiting trial, the prosecution’s barrister offered her a deal: the Crown 
would drop the murder charge if she pleaded guilty to manslaughter. Scamp rejected this deal. 
She felt she had acted in self-defence. ‘I don't remember killing him but I suppose I must have 
done’, she wrote in a letter from Holloway prison. ‘I just know I was scared he would kill me’ 
(Bindel 2009). In February 2007, the jury convicted Scamp of murder by a majority of ten to 
two. In spite of the evidences regarding Bull’s abusive behaviour and the testimony of Tracy 
Dunn, Bull’s previous girlfriend, the judge sentenced Scamp to the maximum sentence: life 
imprisonment. In sentencing, the judge mentioned the strong positive references from the care 
home where Scamp worked and remarked that her ‘care skills should have made her better 
equipped to tolerate Jason’s violent and erratic behaviour’ (Justice for Women 2015; Bindel 
2009). The Judgement on Conviction mentions that, in this first trial, ‘[t]here was some 
evidence from a neighbour, Paul Chimes, and from the deceased's sister, that the appellant was 
the stronger personality. The sister said that the appellant wore the trousers’ (R v. Scamp). 
 Following her conviction, Justice for Women took up Scamp’s case. The organisation 
lodged an appeal in February 2010. This first appeal was based on the failure of the Court to 
properly consider the defence of provocation, which would have reduced her sentence from 
murder to manslaughter. However, the judge ‘failed to draw the jury’s attention to the violence 
Kirsty had been subjected to’ and focussed, instead, on Jason’s comments that Kirsty had 
overheard and implied that she ‘had acted out of jealousy rather than fear’ (Justice for Women, 
2015). Being directed in considering whether it was reasonable to kill as a result of jealousy, the 
majority concluded that Scamp had committed murder. 183  
 The second appeal happened on the 21st of July 2010. This time, following a recent 
change in the law on provocation,184 the defence was successful and Scamp’s conviction was 
reduced from murder to manslaughter. The imposed sentence was reduced to six years for 
manslaughter based on provocation. Since the defendant, who was 24 at the time, had already 
served this time in Holloway prison, she was released immediately. During the sentencing, 
Lord Justice Laws explained that the ‘appellant had been brought up in a culture of sustained 
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  The judge gave the following direction to the jury: ‘that she lost her self‑control […] as a result of what Jason 
may have said to her about her mother and father or as a result of what she heard him saying to Kelly on the 
phone.  It is a matter for you to consider’. (R v Scamp).  
184
 Here is Justice for Women (2015) comments on this change: ‘[i]ronically, since Kirsty’s conviction, the law has 
changed, partly as a result of Justice for Women’s campaign.  The old defence of provocation has been replaced 
by the defence of loss of control, which applies in cases where someone kills out of fear of serious violence. Had 
this law been in place at the time of Kirsty’s trial, the judge would have been required to bring the jury’s attention 
to the violence and the fear she had experienced’. To the extent that the loss of control defence is more readily 
usable than the old provocation one for women who suffered domestic violence, this change is certainly for the 
best. However, as we will see, in framing women who kill their abusers as having loss control over their actions, 
this new defence also reinforces common prejudices against women victim of intimate partner violence.  
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domestic violence’ (R v Scamp). Scamp’s history of abuse when she was a child and the 
violence she endured from Jason Bull were judged as having ‘provoked’ her ‘loss of control’ on 
the night of the 13th of March 2006. Commenting on the issue of this second appeal to the 
Press, the judge mentioned that he had found the case difficult and highlighted the fact that, 
despite Scamp’s difficult childhood, she had secured a good job at a home for vulnerable 
adults.185 
 Though she was free, Scamp was still exposed to travel restrictions: she could not yet 
return to her parents’ home in Sittingbourne and had to stay in Stepney for two additional 
years. Commenting on the result of this second appeal, Scamp said that the initial joy of being 
finally free, after years in prison, was rapidly replaced by worries about her future.186 Because of 
her criminal record, it is unlikely that Scamp will be able to find employment as a carer. 
 
B) The Victim or Agent Dichotomy 
Kirsty Scamp’s case illustrates, in a powerful manner, how criminal liability, in cases involving 
intimate partner abuse, is seen as intimately linked to the victim’s presumed degree of 
competency for autonomy. As Elizabeth Schneider (2000, 120) argue, ‘the phrase “battered 
woman” is interpreted by judges, legislators, and scholars in a rigid and dichotomized fashion. 
This has particularly serious ramifications for cases of battered women who kill’. Within the 
legal and popular iconography, battered women are primarily seen as incapacitated victims 
whose ‘learned helplessness’ has prevented them from leaving an abusive relationship or 
seeking help. This rigid and monolithic representation is, however, seriously contradicted when 
a battered woman disproves her helplessness by demonstrating strong agency in other spheres 
of her life. As she does not fit the mould of the helpless victim, she is then framed as an 
autonomous agent who must bear full criminal liability for her acts. This is especially true if the 
woman’s professional position does not fit the ‘victim trope’. This was true for Scamp, whom 
the judge implicitly blamed, during her first trial, for not being able to better deal with Bull’s 
abusive behaviour. Women seen as ‘too strong’ are viewed as able to cope with the abuse they 
encounter and are therefore understood as somewhat responsible for it. They are not ‘true’ 
victims anymore. Even when judges and legal actors do not insist on the strong degree of 
                                                 
185As reported in the newspaper article ‘Kirsty released from prison’, Kent and Sussex Courier (20 July 2010) and 
substantiated by Judgement on Conviction where the judge contrasts the ‘early history of this young woman's life in 
which she suffered very deleterious experiences and considerable difficulties’ with the ‘fact that she obtained eight 
GCSEs’ and that ‘upon leaving school at 16, she gained a further qualification and has been in good paid work, as 
we understand it, virtually continuously from then until the date of the death’ (R v Scamp). 
186
As reported by the Kent and Sussex Courier in the article ‘Released woman: I still can’t go home to mum’ (30 
July 2010). 
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autonomy competency manifested by the defendant in her life, the sole fact that an abused 
woman has been able to take defensive action against her abuser often plays against her in trial 
(Schneider 2000). Because these women have proven that they were not helpless by defending 
themselves, they are to be viewed as guilty for killing their abusers. Many commentators have 
noted the preponderance of the tropes of the ‘vigilante’ or ‘revenge killer’ when women kill 
and then report that they were victims of serious forms of abuse at the hands of their victims 
(Maguigan 1991; Ayyildiz 1995).187 
 The vigilante or revenge killer trope is exemplified in multiple judgements. It is 
exemplified in Kirsty Scamp’s first appeal, where the judge framed her act as being caused by 
jealousy rather than by fear of violence. It is exemplified in Sara Thornton’s case, when she was 
accused of inflicting a fatal stab wound on her husband, Malcolm Thornton, after he 
threatened to kill both her and their daughter Louisa.188 Despite the strong evidence of the 
abuse she suffered, the prosecution convicted her of murder and claimed that Thornton was a 
‘pathological liar’ who ‘had carried out the killing for financial gain’.189 This pattern is also 
exemplified in Kiranjit Ahluwalia’s first trial, during which the Court refused to consider the 
evidence of abuse and suggested that the killing of Ahluwalia’s abusive husband was instead 
motivated by jealousy due to her husband's repeated affairs.190 These are only a few examples: 
the trope of the revenge killer is a recurring one when a battered woman kills. As the agentic 
and proactive act of killing contradicts the image of the helpless victim, a woman who ends up 
killing her partner cannot be trusted when she claims she was abused. She is thus assumed to 
have killed out of spite or jealousy or to avenge herself, and her allegations of abuse are 
perceived as attempts to dodge full criminal liability.  
 In contrast, when abused women who kill are able to avoid full criminal liability for 
their actions, it is often because they were successfully placed within the mould of the helpless 
victim. We can observe this transformation in Scamp’s case. Whereas she was framed 
alternatively as responsible for the abuse and as a revenge killer in her first and second trials, in 
her final appeal, the iconography of the abuse victim successfully replaced that of the 
autonomous murderer. Suddenly, insisting on Scamp’s history of abuse when she was growing 
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 Other commentators have expressed mistrust towards the so-called ‘abuse excuse’, thus mirroring the way courts 
tend to judge abused women who kill. For example, Alan M. Dershowitz in The Abuse Excuse and Other Cop-
Outs, Sob Stories, and Evasions of Responsibility (1994) has claimed that it constitutes a ‘legal tactic by which 
criminal defendants claim a history of abuse as an excuse for violent retaliation’.’ This ‘abuse excuse’, claims 
Dershowitz, is ‘quickly becoming a license to kill and maim’, which ‘endangers our collective safety by legitimating 
[…] vigilantism’. 
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 The case R v Thornton-[1992] 1 All ER 306 is a  prominent English case.  
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 As reported in the BBC News article ‘Spotlight on domestic abuse laws’ (29 July 2008).  
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 The case R v Ahluwalia- [1992] 4 All ER 889 is also a well-known English case.  
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up as well as the violence she suffered from Bull’s part, the Court explained her act as a ‘loss of 
control’ amounting to provocation, implying that her history of abuse had affected her 
judgement and her capacity to act rationally. This is also what happened in both Thornton’s 
and Ahluwalia’s appeals: abuse and ‘mind abnormality’ evidence was admitted and seen as 
amounting to ‘diminished responsibility’ sentences.191 Finally, the same happened with Emma 
Humphrey, who stabbed her boyfriend and pimp for fear that he would either rape or stab 
her.192 Commenting on her subsequent successful appeal,193 the organisation Justice for Women 
(2015), which supplied Humphrey’s legal help, wrote that it had ‘created an important 
precedent. It concerns the aspect of the defence of provocation, where the jury are directed to 
consider the characteristics of the “reasonable man” […] Emma's so called “abnormal 
personality” and her “attention seeking traits”, should have been taken into account [in her first 
trial] when considering the relevant characteristics of the ‘reasonable man”.’194 
 What these examples indicate is that courts interpret criminal responsibility as closely 
linked to the defendant’s presumed degree of autonomy competency. On the one hand, when 
a defendant can be successfully framed as a ‘true’ victim whose autonomy is judged to be 
irremediably impaired/ diminished by the abuse she suffered, it leads to a proportional 
diminution of the sentence from murder to manslaughter. The act of killing an abuser is 
partially excused, either because a temporary loss of control (provocation) is thought to cause it 
or because the ‘abnormality of mind’ of the defendant prevented her from being fully 
conscious and responsible for what she was doing (diminished responsibility). On the other 
hand, the act of killing one’s abuser is rarely immediately understood as caused by such an 
impaired competency for autonomy. Women who kill their (alleged) abusive partners are often 
assumed to be autonomous, and the fact that they were victims of domestic violence is either 
ignored or used to frame their act as a form of revenge against their partner. In all the cases 
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 Returning to Sara Thornton, it is only when, in the second appeal, psychiatrists successfully argued that 
Thornton suffered from dissociation and mind abnormality that her sentence was reduced to manslaughter. The 
Court then finally agreed to consider evidence concerning the extent of the domestic violence Thornton had 
suffered. The same happened in Kiranjit Ahluwalia’s case: the court finally admitted expert evidence and 
psychiatric reports as relevant evidence, and the sentence was subsequently reduced to manslaughter based on 
diminished responsibility. It was argued that the fact that she was suffering from severe depression when she killed 
her husband had altered her decision-making abilities at the time. R v Thornton-[1992] 1 All ER 306 and R v 
Ahluwalia- [1992] 4 All ER 889. 
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 R v Humphrey - [1995] 4 All ER 1008. 
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 The appeal reduced her sentence from murder to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. 
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 Returning the notion of abnormal personality, Justice for Women (2015) notes that’[a]lthough Justice for 
Women does not like the term “abnormal personality”, it does prove that the courts are indirectly recognising the 
relevance of a long term history of abuse going back to childhood. Such abuse caused Emma to regularly self-
harm. The court has now recognised that the behaviour associated with self-harm can be so significant that a jury 
should take it into account when considering the relevant characteristics of the ‘reasonable man’, where the act of 
provocation is somehow connected with such characteristics’ (emphasis mine). 
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reviewed, the possibility left to these women to exercise their autonomy in any meaningful 
ways, given the abusive socio-relational context they were in, was not assessed. Therefore, these 
judgements were made solely on the grounds of the degree of autonomy, as a competency, that 
the defendant allegedly possessed.  
 It should be noted here that both diminished responsibility and provocation are seen as 
‘excuses’, contrary to self-defence, which is seen as a justification.195 An ‘excuse’ suggests that the 
act was personal to the defendant, caused by her own particular psychological issues. By 
contrast, a ‘justification’ is thought to reflect the public and common sense of rightfulness: the 
act, given the circumstances, is justified since any rational and autonomous person would have 
done the same. As we will see in the following section, victims of abuse have yet to be 
acknowledged both as victims of very serious abuses and as rational and autonomous agents. In 
this respect, the appearance of a new standard of ‘reasonableness’ in English law, following 
Emma Humphrey’s case, which would apply only to battered women in order to take into 
account their so-called ‘mind abnormality’, is unlikely to help dissipate the non-autonomous 
battered women trope.  
 
II. What About Self-Defence? Lavallee, the Battered Women Syndrome 
and Its Consequences 
 
It could be thought that a successful self-defence plea would better fit Scamp’s, Humphrey’s, 
Ahluwalia’s and Thornton’s situations, as it would mitigate the rigid agent or victim dichotomy, 
attesting both to the serious harm these women suffered (and from which they needed to 
defend themselves) and to their competency to take control of their lives. However, apart from 
Scamp, these women readily pleaded guilty to manslaughter charges, based either on 
provocation or diminished responsibility. I begin this section by reviewing the reasons why this 
is so and exploring the four criteria used to assess self-defence. I then focus on the famous 
Canadian case R. v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 R.C.S. 852 and its subsequent influence on 
jurisprudence. This case, and the consequences it has had in Canadian legal context, is 
interesting for our purpose as it granted self-defence for a victim of domestic violence. 
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 As noted by Schneider (2000, 135), ‘[s]elf-defence as justification focuses on the act of defending one’s self; it 
rests on a determination that the act was right because of its circumstances. In contrast, a finding of an excuse, like 
insanity or heat of passion, focuses on the actor; it is a finding that the act, though wrong, should be tolerated 
because of the actor’s particular characteristics or state of mind’. 
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A) The Problems with the Traditional Criteria for Self-Defence 
According to Belinda Morrissey (2003, 93), ‘The diminished responsibility/provocation 
defence is common for battered women in Britain, as a way to avoid the mandatory life 
sentence for a murder conviction’. Indeed—and this is not exclusive to Britain—self-defence is 
traditionally not seen as applying to abuse victims. Although the self-defence law is supposed to 
be universal in its application, many feminists have pointed to the fact that male experience has 
shaped its current understanding (Schneider 2000; Sheehy 2014; Wallace 2004; McColgan 
1993). More precisely, the fact that self-defence was originally thought to apply in typical male 
confrontations has shaped each of the four criteria utilised to assess rightful self-defence, thus 
making them difficult to apply to women who kill their abusers. This often prevents self-
defence from being considered in these kinds of case. The criterion of ‘imminence’, for 
example, was originally put in place in order to prevent both preventive and vengeful actions 
against an eventual aggressor. It is often used to reject the self-defence pleas of battered women 
who delayed their self-defensive actions. For instance, even though they did not plead self-
defence,196 the criterion of imminence was used to discredit both Sara Thornton’s and Kiranjit 
Ahluwalia’s pleas. Because of the minute it took Sara Thornton to find the knife after her 
husband had threatened her life and her daughter’s, the court refused her first attempt to 
appeal on the grounds of provocation. As for Ahluwalia, it seems that a key reason her plea of 
provocation was rejected was because of the few hours that elapsed between her husband’s last 
attack and her retaliation. This period was deemed to be a ‘cooling down’ period rather than a 
‘boiling over’ period, which would have supported her claims of provocation.197  
 It is sometimes thought that the self-defence plea fails for battered women primarily 
because these cases tend to fail the ‘imminence’ criterion. However, the idea that battered 
women typically kill a sleeping, unconscious and unsuspecting partner tends to be disproved by 
studies and inventories made of these kinds of cases (Maguigan 1991). Cases such as R v. 
Scamp, where the killing happens during a potentially life-threatening attack, are much more 
frequent than delayed killings. Nonetheless, even when the threat is imminent, self-defence 
pleas are often still ruled out. Given that a typical male confrontation involves opponents of 
comparable strength, skills and stamina, resorting to the use of a weapon against an unarmed 
man tends to be judged as a failure to use proportional force. In this respect, notes O’Donovan 
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 For delayed action in self-defences cases, see Shaffer (1997, 7). 
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 Justice for Women (2015) notes that ‘[a] key reason for the failure of Kiranjit's plea of provocation was the bias 
towards male behaviour in such cases.  The time that had elapsed between Deepak's last attack on Kiranjit and her 
retaliation (a few hours) was deemed to be a ‘cooling down’ period and not a ‘boiling over’ period as her defence 
suggested’.  
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(1991, 222), ‘[b]ased on the standard of ‘reasonable proportionality’ the traditional conception 
of self-defence does not permit a weapon being used in response to a fist or a boot’. This 
criterion poses obvious problems for women who are, on average, smaller, lighter and less 
likely to have experience in controlled aggression compared to their male partner. During a 
violent attack that might be life-threatening, women often have no viable self-defence means 
other than to use a knife or gun against their aggressor. 
 The criterion of the ‘absence of alternative course of action’ also tends to work against 
battered women who kill, as it is often understood as being a duty to retreat.198 However, as 
noted by McColgan (1993, 516), since intimate partner abuse typically occurs in the intimacy of 
the home, ‘to require [the battered woman] to flee from that attack is to require her to leave 
her home. […] Furthermore, where the woman has children in the home, to require her to flee 
from violent attacks would, in many cases, require her to leave those children with the 
attacker’.199 If, as exemplified by Thornton’s case, the duty to retreat is sometimes interpreted as 
being the possibility of walking out of the house or ‘going upstairs’, it is also often equated to 
leaving the relationship altogether. According to Schneider (2000, 77), ‘[t]he common view is 
that a battered woman should somehow have left the violent relationship and that if she didn’t 
leave, anything that happened was her fault’.200 
 The principal obstacle against allowing self-defence pleas for battered women who kill 
is, however, most certainly to be found in the doctrinal notion of the ‘reasonable man’ used to 
assess the general reasonableness of the self-defence plea given the threat faced by the 
defendant.201 As many commentators have remarked (e.g. Schneider 2000; O’Donovan 1991), 
this standard of ‘reasonableness’ is often interpreted as being antithetical to the notion of the 
‘abused women’. One reason it is viewed in this manner is because within popular culture, 
femininity is associated with the realm of irrationality and emotions, and this association has 
                                                 
198As exemplified in Sara Thornton’s first appeal, even if in theory, using the ‘duty to retreat’ criterion has been 
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199
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retreat from the home’. 
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We have discussed, in the first section of this chapter, both of the reasons that might justify a woman’s decision 
to stay with her abuser and the obstacles of leaving an abusive relationship. We have also seen why requiring a 
woman to leave an abusive relationship is deeply prejudicial. 
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 As noted in the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (Vol. 15), this standard ‘is set by the hypothetical reasonable 
man. The court has to decide what the average or ordinary man — often known as the man on the Clapham 
omnibus — would have done in the circumstances if he had acted with reasonable skill or care’. The idea behind 
this legal test is to test the jury’s intuitions about the general reasonableness of the defendant’s act. Would a 
reasonable man, placed under the same circumstances, have done the same? 
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consequences for the way judges understand the legal standard of reasonableness. As 
O’Donovan (1991, 222) noted, ‘[i]t is common in the literature to report not a single common-
law reference to the “reasonable women” and it has been implied that this is a contradiction in 
terms’. It is also viewed this way because ‘within legal discourse, battered women who remain in 
dangerous situations don’t and can’t fit the legal understanding of the subject as a rational, 
independent autonomous being’ (Morrissey 2003, 74). In spite of the broad advertising and 
education campaigns surrounding intimate partner violence, the stereotypes of the masochistic, 
abnormal or provocative battered woman are stubborn. The common understanding of 
‘reasonableness’ is therefore often seen as incompatible with the commonplace representations 
of battered women who kill. 
 
B) R v. Lavallee and Its Consequences  
Fitting neatly within the prevailing stereotype of the ‘good’ woman, passive and somewhat 
lessened in terms of autonomy and reasonableness compared to a man, the defence of 
‘diminished responsibility’ and ‘provocation’ helps frame battered women who kill as ‘victims’ 
instead of ‘murderers’. As they are more readily compatible with prevailing ideas about victims 
of abuse, it is these two types of defence that are most commonly used in cases involving 
domestic violence. Of course, it might be thought that the problems battered women 
experience when presenting a self-defence plea are particular to the UK and that it might be 
different within the Canadian jurisdiction. Indeed, one of the most discussed successful abused 
women’s defence can be found in the Canadian case R. v. Lavallee.  
 In 1990, Angelique Lynn Lavallee202 was charged with the second-degree murder of her 
husband Kevin Rust. Lavallee readily admitted accidentally shooting Rust in the back of the 
head as he was returning to the on-going party happening elsewhere in the house.203 While the 
evidence revealed that Rust had abused Lavallee throughout their relationship and threatened 
to kill her right after the party, Lavallee’s actions in shooting Rust while he was leaving the 
room did not fit the traditional criteria for self-defence. Having killed Rust in anticipation of an 
assault, and not during its course, her actions failed the traditional criteria of imminence. 
Likewise, the fact that there were other people in the house at the time of the killing and that 
Lavallee was in possession of sufficient time to seek the assistance of the police could easily be 
viewed as failing both the ‘reasonableness’ and the ‘alternative course of action’ criteria. 
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 She was trying to shoot above his head in an attempt to scare him. However, that Lavallee claimed to have killed 
Rust by accident does not seem to have played any decisive role in her prosecution and subsequent acquittal.  
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However, at trial, the testimony of the psychiatrist Dr Fred Shane about the battered women 
syndrome overturned the guilty verdict to which the case was likely to lead. The jury 
subsequently acquitted Lavallee on self-defence grounds.204 Though the appeal court invalidated 
this verdict, the Supreme Court nonetheless stated that the expert evidence on battered women 
syndrome was admissible in self-defence cases, thus creating an important precedent in 
Canadian jurisprudence. 
 At first, feminists celebrated the acceptance of expert evidence regarding the battered 
woman syndrome in Lavallee’s case, as they had long campaigned for the judicial recognition 
of the BWS as a way to transform societal and legal understandings of intimate partner abuse 
(Wallace 2004, 1755). As noted by Schneider (2000, 80), the admission of expert’s testimony 
on BWS was seen ‘as a way to remedy the unequal treatment of women resulting from the 
application of male norms and standards in the criminal justice system’. In addition, the appeal 
to BWS was seen as a way to overcome the current understanding of ‘reasonableness’ as 
incompatible with being a battered woman. Martha Shaffer (1997, 5), for instance, notes that 
‘expert evidence could explain how a battered woman’s perception that she faced a threat of 
death or grievous bodily harm might be reasonable, even where outside observers might not 
perceive an attack to be imminent’. While the ‘cycle of violence’ part of the BWS helped 
explain the defendant’s perception of the threat she faced, the ‘learned helplessness’ provided a 
convenient answer to the recurring question of why the defendant had not left her partner if 
she was a victim of such grievous harm, thereby dispelling the myth of the ‘irrational’, ‘liar’ or 
‘masochist’ battered woman.  
Unfortunately, Lavallee’s case does not appear to have led to a dramatic increase in self-
defence claims by women. According to Schaffer (1997, 17-8), ‘[o]f the 16 women charged with 
murder or manslaughter of an abusive partner, only three were ultimately acquitted […] The 
remaining 11 women were found guilty of manslaughter, nine of them pleading guilty to the 
offence’. While BWS has certainly contributed to raising awareness about domestic violence 
and has earned widespread recognition from both the population and the courtrooms (Schaffer 
1997; Schneider 2000), its use in the courtroom has had problematic consequences. Indeed, it 
paradoxically contributed to making self-defence claims at odds with being a victim of abuse 
(Schneider 2000, 131). The automatic association of abuse with learned helplessness leads to a 
conundrum: if a woman really was abused and really could not leave or seek help due to 
learned helplessness, how could she kill her abuser? Following a rigid interpretation of BWS, 
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 162 
acting aggressively or showing any measure of autonomy can be seen as dismissing the 
possibility of framing the defendant as a ‘true’ battered woman. As a result, the more a woman 
departs from the incapacitated victim trope, the more difficult it is to convince judges and 
jurors that she actually was a victim of abuse and could have acted in self-defence. Thus, if R v. 
Lavallee has not led to a significant increase in women’s successful self-defence claims, Schaffer 
(1997) explains, this may be partly because BWS makes it a difficult defence to use for women 
who do not fit the trope of the helpless victim. Explaining the decisions of nine women who 
pleaded guilty to the manslaughter charges during the five years after Lavallee, Schaffer (1997, 
25) writes that the stakes might be too high to risk a trial ‘when a battered woman deviates from 
the ideal of the “deserving” victim/battered woman who has “faultlessly” and passively endured 
vicious abuse’. In such cases, the defendant’s own defence counsel tends to strongly advise a 
guilty plea.205 
Alternatively, when the defence successfully frames the defendant as a victim of BWS, 
this often serves to show that she was not in possession of the necessary autonomy to commit 
murder instead of supporting self-defence claims (Schaffer 1997, 19-25). The ‘syndrome’ 
terminology is, in this respect, more readily linked with the traditional defence of diminished 
responsibility, insanity or provocation rather than with the reasonableness necessary for self-
defence. When BWS does work to support self-defence pleas, it often does so at the cost of 
the credibility and rightfulness of the claim. The BWS tends to depict battered women as 
damaged individuals whose perception of reality did not really correspond to their situations. It 
suggests that the court ought to revise its standard of reasonableness in light of the fact that the 
defendant was supposedly unable to see the options of leaving the relationship and seeking 
help. As a result, it psychologises the defendant’s situation, obscuring the actual obstacles that 
might have prevented her from doing so. The harm of the abuse is reduced to a mere 
individual problem, which masks the socio-relational factors that facilitate domestic violence. 
Hence, writes Schneider (2000, 80), ‘despite the purposes of this legal strategy, old stereotypes 
of incapacity have been replicated in a new form. Lawyers who have submitted testimony have 
primarily focused on the passive, victimized aspects of battered women’s experiences—their 
“learned helplessness”—rather than explaining homicide as a woman’s necessary choice to save 
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of Mr. Shaw, defending her life but acting in drunken revenge’. 
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her own life’. Instead of supporting the self-defence claims of a defendant as being justified and 
rational in light of the situation in which she was involved, relying on the BWS instead seems to 
contribute in replacing her in the trope of the ‘incapacitated victim’. 
 
III. An Agnostic and Structural Defence for Battered Women Who Kill  
As we have seen, self-defence is notoriously difficult to claim for battered women, and this 
difficulty does not seem to have been overcome with the precedent set by R v. Lavallee. Instead 
of leading towards a more finely grained analysis of cases wherein battered women kill their 
abusers, the use of BWS in self-defence cases seems to reinforce the victim or agent 
dichotomy, even when the self-defence plea is successful. In this section, I argue that an 
agnostic and structural conception of autonomy provides a way to assess homicidal battered 
women’s criminal liability without entering the murky water of the assessment of the 
competency for autonomy these women possess. This, I argue, makes the framework I 
propose better equipped to deal with this kind of case then the conception of autonomy that is 
currently used.    
 
A) Neither Victims nor Agents 
As Schneider (2000, 74) comments, ‘[f]eminist work has […] often been shaped by an 
incomplete and static view of women as either victims or agents; this false dichotomy between 
women’s victimization and women’s agency is a central tension within feminism’. Indeed, 
feminist mobilisation and activism on behalf of battered women who kill have often been 
shaped by the perceived need to present defendants as victims.206 While this representation is 
accurate, the problem is that the exclusive focus on women’s victimhood has led to the failure 
to perceive their agency. As Schneider (2000, 120) comments, ‘[w]omen who are battered, and 
particularly battered women who kill, are simultaneously victims and agents: they are abused 
but they also act to protect themselves’. The relational framework presented in this thesis helps 
support this idea. Using this framework, strong women of the likes of Kirsty Scamp cannot be 
penalised for remaining autonomous in spite of the abuse they encountered. Likewise, by using 
an agnostic framework, one can never conclude that a defendant is no longer autonomous due 
to the abuse she suffered. Because it leads us to postulate that an agent can safeguard her 
capacity for autonomy, even in the face of an extremely coercive socio-relational context, such a 
framework cannot be co-opted to represent abused women as helpless victims who can no 
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longer be seen as competent enough to act reasonably. It encourages us to recognise that 
women within abusive relationships are both agents in their own rights and victims of their 
oppressive socio-relational contexts.  
 
 
B) The Use of Socio-Relational Criteria 
An agnostic framework prohibits us from making invidious judgements about a defendant’s 
degree of the competency for autonomy: we have to rely on the assessment of the external 
socio-relational context in which she exercised her autonomy in order to assess her criminal 
responsibility. It is, consequently, not through the use of psychological evidence of ‘mind 
abnormality’ or ‘learned helplessness’ that the criminal responsibility of these women ought to 
be assessed. Such psychological evidence is often met with scepticism, contested or rejected as 
irrelevant in courtrooms (Wallace 2004, 1749; Beecher-Monas 2001, 83); relying on external 
evidence regarding the way the socio-relational context has constrained the autonomy exercise 
of a defendant has the added advantage of being harder to dismiss by judge and jury. Contrary 
to psychological evidences, such evidences can be verified and supported by empirical data.  
 As a means to provide an overview of the kinds of obstacles that could have prevented 
a defendant from accessing other options than self-defence, I now focus on four examples of 
the kind of evidence that can usefully be introduced in court proceedings. One of these is the 
police response to the defendant’s calls, which can be substantiated by records and depositions. 
For instance, as indicated by Bull’s arrest and subsequent bail without further consequences, 
such evidence often demonstrates that the police are ineffective in responding to IPV. The 
unresponsiveness of law enforcement agents is also demonstrated in innumerable cases of 
women struggling with abusive partners. To refer back to the cases already discussed, this 
ineffectiveness is demonstrated in Thornton’s case who ‘had called the police to her house at 
least five times because of Thornton's attacks on her’ (Justice for Women 2015) and in Kiranjit 
Ahluwalia’s case, who ‘obtained two court injunctions in an effort to stop Deepak's attacks on 
her, but to no effect’ (Justice for Women, 2015). As Martha Minow (1990) explains, the 
societal failure of law enforcement to intervene in abusive relationships should not be seen as 
separate from the violence; rather, it should be viewed as a part of it. 207 Often, when the 
defendant has failed to appeal to law enforcement agents, this can be explained in regard to the 
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restraining order against the violence in her home, they are part of the violence […] Society permits such violence 
to go unchallenged through the isolation of families and the failures of police to respond’. 
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well-known futility of such action given the community from which she derives. Moreover, as 
noted by several researchers (Crenshaw 1991, Allard 1991; Rasche 1988; Richie 1985), when a 
woman comes from a socially stigmatised community, her distrust of the law enforcement 
apparatus is potentially justified. In such cases, the defence can appeal to statistical evidence 
regarding police intervention within the given community to show the reasonableness of such 
mistrust. 208 
 In regard to the second example, it is clear that the presence of a viable alternative to 
staying in an abusive relationship should also be assessed. It is often thought that shelters for 
battered women are abundant and easily accessible. However, most shelters offer time limited 
services, and transitional housing that allows women to move safely to independent living are 
few and far between (Tutty & Rothery 2002; Becker 1995). Additionally, shelters are often 
overcrowded and are regularly forced to refuse or delay access to their services to many women 
(Roberts et al. 2007).209 According to Wallace (2004, 1754) ‘[t]he U.S. still has three times as 
many animal shelters as battered women shelters’. This number is astonishing in light of the 
statistics concerning both the frequency of IPV and the known fact that the presence of shelters 
considerably diminishes the number of homicides committed by women (as well as, of course, 
IPV homicides in general) (Wallace 2004). 
 Thirdly, the presence or absence of sustainable sources of subsistence such as jobs 
paying a ‘family wage’, day care and affordable and permanent housing should also be 
considered. As noted by several researchers, IPV is a phenomenon that affects women from all 
economic and social backgrounds. However, what best predicts the extent and length of the 
abuse is women’s socio-economic vulnerability, which renders them dependent on their 
abusers for their sustenance. The wider legislative framework can also increase this 
dependence on the abuser. The legal framework surrounding IPV, divorce and separation, 
children’s guardianship and immigration sponsorship can, in this respect, contribute to 
women’s dependence on their abusers.  
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 Such evidence could help the defence in cases such as Wanrow. During the first trial, as Schneider (2000, 30) 
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 As noted by Mary Becker (1995, 19) ‘[s]helters are notoriously short of room, particularly for mothers with 
children, and have time limitations—such as thirty days—that make them inadequate as transitional housing for an 
effective escape. Even on a short-term basis, shelters are far from ideal housing situations, and often do not permit 
boys over a certain age, making them inadequate for many mothers’. 
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  Finally, in addition to the above socio-relational factors, the way the abusive relationship 
itself has contributed to restraining the exercise of autonomy needs to be assessed. A relational 
framework has to take into account the fact that an abusive relationship cannot be ‘time-
framed’ and analysed only as a series of discrete episodes of violence that can be studied in 
isolation from one another. In reality, it is an on-going and intimate relationship that often 
forms the core of the defendant’s relational context. Like all relationships, the history of an 
abusive relationship contributes in forming both partners’ perception of what it is possible for 
them to do. The history of abuse has to be examined carefully in order to assess the way it 
restrained the defendant’s actions. If all previous attempts to flee the abuse or report it have 
failed and were met with greater violence and threats from the abuser, it might have been 
reasonable for the defendant to act in self-defence rather than call the police or leave the 
house. Contrary to some commonplace ideas, women in abusive relationships often attempts 
to leave the relationship and employ diverse strategies to diminish their partners’ violence. 
However, when judging battered women who kill, courts tend to ignore these attempts and 
strategies. This is exemplified in Kiranjit Ahluwalia’s case. Even though she actively tried to 
escape the relationship and successfully obtained two court injunctions against her husband, 
Deepak always found her and brought her back. Terrified of staying but knowing the futility of 
running away or using legal means against her abusive partner, she set fire to his clothes while 
he was sleeping to ‘make him understand what pain was’ (Justice for Women, 2015). These 
circumstances were ignored during her trial and do not seem to have played any decisive role 
in her subsequent appeal. The framework proposed here would change that: the way her 
abusive relationship has constricted Ahluwalia’s sense of what she could reasonably do would 
be given an important role in determining her criminal liability. 
 
C) Listening to Battered Women 
It might be difficult to judge the way a relationship has constrained the exercise of autonomy 
using only externally observable facts: 1. because it might be impossible to substantiate, using 
witness or police testimony: and 2. because abusive relationships, like all relationships, are 
different from one another. Despite expert efforts to typify IPV and its cycle of violence, it 
remains the case that ‘one model fits all’ constitutes a gross, and sometimes problematic, 
representation of reality. Even if it seems that, in most abusive relationships, violence tends to 
be cyclical, experts note that the form and duration of the cycle greatly vary and also differ from 
one relationship to another (Ogle & Jacobs, 2002). Some forms of violence and control can 
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also be difficult to assess from an external point of view. Women routinely report psychological 
and emotional abuse as worse than the actual battering episodes (Kelly 1988, 120; Schneider 
2000, 65). All of this is to say that in such cases, the defendant’s own knowledge of the way the 
abuse has structured her life has to be seriously considered within the courtroom.  
 As noted by Schneider (2000, 102), ‘[s]torytelling—using the “stories” of clients as the 
essential factual matrix of the case—has always been an essential part of good lawyering’. This is 
particularly true for the stories of battered women who kill. These narratives are often the sole 
access to the extent and nature of the abuse and to the way the abusive relationship has 
structured the defendant’s life. Additionally, truly listening to defendants can help us refine our 
current understandings of IPV. Specialists have now developed a general theory of IPV. 
However, battered women are not all similarly situated, and their own experience of IPV is 
shaped by the specific dynamics of their own socio-relational context. Apart from the 
difficulties linked to securing jobs and housing, IPV can present an ‘acute dilemma for the 
battered woman who identifies her experiences not only as an abused individual, but as an 
abused person who is a member of an abused community’ (Schneider 2000, 63). As noted by 
Crenshaw (1991, 1245-6), the existing stigma and stereotypes of violence weighing on African-
American communities might explain why abused women from this community may feel 
pressured to minimise or suppress information about IPV. Listening to female victims of abuse 
can thus provide us with better insight into their particular situation as well as into the factors 
enabling IPV within a given socio-relational context.   
 As Schneider (2000, 139) states, ‘[t]raditionally, courts and commentators have 
distinguished “subjective” from “objective” standards of self-defence. The objective standard—
the traditional “reasonable-man standard”—looked at reasonableness from the perspective of 
the hypothetical reasonable man, while the subjective standard regarded reasonableness from 
the individual’s own perspective’. As we have seen in Chapter 3, the use of a relational 
framework ought to make us wary of such a differentiation between what constitutes an 
‘objective’ standard and what constitutes a ‘subjective’ one. We are all situated subjects, 
embedded in our own particular socio-relational context. If, within a given society, a majority 
might share some common references, the simple fact that these cultural markers are the most 
common does not mean that they ought to be seen as the ‘good’ or ‘reasonable’ ones. This is 
not to say that everything is relative or that there is no way of differentiating what is reasonable 
from what is unreasonable. However, as I have suggested, the presupposed and unquestioned 
view that the standard of the reasonable man is truly neutral tends to lead to the adoption of 
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partial and prejudiced criteria to assess ‘reasonableness’. This is why abused women’s 
testimonies are so sorely needed. We must listen to these women not because they possess, as 
the reform following R v Humphrey implies, a ‘deformed perception of reality’ that we must 
use to lessen our standards of reasonableness. Rather, we must listen to victims of abuse 
because benefiting from their own privileged perspective on their socio-relational context can 
help us arrive at a less biased view of the reasonableness of their act.210  
 
D) Self-Defence for Battered Women 
In summary, we can see that the changes brought about by a structural and agnostic framework 
should lead courts to the presumption that abused women who kill have done so in self-
defence. Using an agnostic framework prevents presupposing, as is usually the case, that the 
homicide was due to a diminished mental state the abuse caused. Rather, the possibility that 
victims of domestic violence might have acted autonomously, in self-defence, must be 
thoroughly examined by both the courtroom and the defence counsel.  
 In this part, I seek to offer different names and understandings for self-defence criteria. 
Of course, as Holly Maguigan (1991) argue, the problem is not really the names of the criteria 
but rather the way courtrooms frame and understand them in cases where abused women kill. 
Yet, it seems helpful to suggest possible changes to these criteria, given that different words 
have different interpretative ranges and impacts. The name and description of the criteria used 
to assess self-defence can serve as a way to tighten their interpretative range and reduce their 
potential for prejudicial interpretations. 
 Following a relational framework, the first thing that needs to be reframed in self-
defence cases is the standard of reasonableness informing courtroom judgements. As I have 
previously argued, the idea that there is such thing as a purely objective point of view that can 
lead to universally valid standards of reasonableness is not only highly questionable from an 
epistemic point of view but it can also be deleterious. For it is when legal actors form opinions 
based on this supposedly neutral perspective and take it for granted that it has led them to form 
an impartial judgement that they are most at risk of letting prejudice and stereotypes cloud their 
opinions. Instead of this ‘view from nowhere’ presupposed by the perspectival take of the 
‘reasonable man’, courtrooms should admit a situated notion of reasonableness. Given a 
particular defendant’s socio-relational context and situation, was it reasonable to act as she has 
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 Of course, what they say should not be assumed to represent the truth of their situation. Like all agents, victims 
of abuse might be biased, and they might lie. What I mean to emphasise, however, is that we should be wary of 
representing their vision of the reality, or their testimony, as somewhat more distorted or as less reliable than that 
of any other agent.   
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done? This is, of course, not to suggest that the courtroom should wholly adopt the defendant’s 
subjective take on her actions. This replacement of the reasonable man standard by one of 
situated reasonableness is only there to emphasise the trivial truth that reasonableness is always 
situated: for instance, what would be a reasonable course of action in a pub fight might not be 
the same during an assault by one’s abusive partner. It is also there to remind both judge and 
jury that their perspectives have been shaped by their own life experiences and socio-relational 
contexts. Judging women from radically different relational backgrounds might demand a 
greater effort at empathy, which is not always helped by resorting to a supposedly neutral 
standard.    
 Since an abusive relationship cannot be ‘time-framed’, the criterion of ‘imminence’ 
used to assess these cases should also change. As we have seen, a threat occurring within the 
context of an abusive relationship is not the same as one occurring in a confrontation opposing 
two strangers. The self-defensive action can only be understood in the light of the way the 
history of the relationship has participated in structuring the life. A criterion such as the 
probability of a further attack, similar to that used in international conflicts, would be more 
pertinent than ‘imminence’, as it incorporates the ‘intuitive point of probability, which entails 
some assessment of risk based on past behaviour’ (Wallace 2004, 1749). Unlike ‘imminence’, 
it can encompass the historical component that so often characterises IPV.211 The criterion of 
‘imminence’ is, incidentally, already used in generous fashion when courtrooms are faced with 
a ‘standard’ male case of self-defence, as it is often seen ‘as a proxy for any number of other 
self-defence factors –for example strength of threat, retreat, proportionality, and aggression’ 
(Wallace 2004, 1761). Thus, explicitly changing the criterion from ‘imminence’ to the 
probability of a further attack would not radically alter the self-defence doctrine. It would 
simply change the way it is currently used to block battered women's use of self-defence pleas. 
 Similarly, as Wallace (2004, 1775-7) proposes, it seems more coherent to adopt the 
criterion of the magnitude of the harm that could result from the threat rather than the 
criterion of ‘reasonable force’. It seems absurd to demand that abused women renounce the 
use of knives or guns for self-defence. In addition, based on the history of violence and past 
threats, this standard seems to be more adequate to assess abused women’s self-defence claims. 
Given their history of abuse and the life-threatening magnitude of the harm they might impose 
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 As noted by Wallace (2004, 1771), ‘[i]f the threat is imminent in the sense of being permanent, the threatened 
party should be allowed to act when presented with a ‘window of opportunity,’ rather than allowing the aggressor 
to choose the exact time and manner of confrontation’. 
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on their victims, it might be reasonable to use a weapon to defend oneself against a spouse of 
the likes of Deepak Ahluwalia, Jason Bull or Malcolm Thornton.  
 Finally, a structural and agnostic framework could also suggest modifications to the 
criterion of ‘retreat’. While it is true that this criterion has been officially abandoned in most 
jurisdictions, as exemplified by Sara Thornton’s case, it is often still implicitly used to assess the 
reasonableness of a self-defensive act. This interpretation of the ‘alternative course of action’ 
ought to be eliminated within a relational framework. Replacing the criterion of alternatives 
with the constraints of the socio-relational context could help to rectify problematic 
interpretations. Instead of focusing attention on enumerating all theoretically possible courses 
of action a defendant could have taken instead of resorting to self-defence, this criterion orients 
it towards all the socio-relational obstacles the defendant faced. I have indicated some of these 
above and will not review them again here. Suffice to say here that when the police or the law-
enforcement apparatus has repeatedly failed the defendant; when, because she risks losing her 
children or immigration status or lacks the socio-economic resources, she has no other viable 
alternative than to stay with her abuser; when the dynamic of control is so bad that she has lost 
contact with her friends and family and cannot exit the house without making her partner 
suspicious—there might be more than sufficient reason to think that she had no other viable 
alternatives than to resort to self-defence. 
As both Wallace (2004) and Shaffer (1997) argue, most of the time, cases of abused 
women who kill their abusers are better framed as self-defence cases than as provocation or 
diminished responsibility. Referring back to Kirsty Scamp’s case, it seems clear that her 
stabbing of Jason Bull was an attempt to defend herself and not a loss of control provoked by 
years of abuse. Given that Bull was already attacking her and seemed in an uncontrollable fit of 
rage, the criterion of the probability of further attacks is more than satisfied with this case. As 
for the magnitude of harm that could have been caused by this attack, given Bull’s history of 
violence, it seems that Kirsty was right in feeling that she had to defend herself given that, just a 
month earlier, he had left her with a perforated eardrum. Even if Bull had not killed her, Kirsty 
would doubtlessly have suffered grievous harm if she had not tried to defend herself. As for the 
criterion of constraints of the socio-relational context, though R v. Scamp does not include 
details that would enable us to arrive at a complete analysis of her socio-relational context, we 
can still note that her call to the police did not result in any legal consequences for Bull. One 
cannot help but think that if the police had treated Bull’s violence more seriously and 
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monitored him closely, law enforcement agents could have stopped the attack.212 Finally, if the 
courtroom had taken Scamp’s point of view seriously, listened to her and attempted to judge 
her case by using a situated standard of reasonableness instead of a supposedly neutral and 
universal standard of reasonableness, it could not have concluded that Scamp was liable of the 
murder of Jason Bull. Putting oneself in Kirsty Scamp’s position, knowing that one month 
earlier he had inflicted grievous injuries on oneself, being forcefully attacked by him while 
knowing that he was intoxicated and never having seen him in such a violent state, a member of 
the jury would probably have been scared for his life, too. In this context, the act of grabbing a 
knife to attempt to defend oneself against an attack might have been not only understandable 
but also reasonable. Kirsty Scamp’s case is, unfortunately, no exception: it seems that all the 
cases previously reviewed could have been successfully framed as self-defence.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have sought to show the use of a structural and agnostic framework to reframe 
traditional criteria of self-defence. Using Kirsty Scamp’s case, I have tried to demonstrate, in 
the first part, that evaluating the criminal liability of women who kill their abusers, in light of the 
degree of autonomy capacity they are thought to possess, is both problematic and detrimental. 
Framing defendants as either helpless victims or as autonomous murderers reflects a simplistic 
and erroneous view of these individuals, which then reinforces prejudicial stereotypes about 
abuse victims. In the second part, I have reviewed the current obstacles preventing abuse 
victims from claiming self-defence. I have suggested that the traditional criteria for self-defence 
are frequently used to exclude the pleas of abused women who kill. I have also attempted to 
show that despite its promising results in Lavallee’s case, the use of BWS to assist the self-
defence claims of battered women is not truly helpful in the long run. As Shaffer’s review of the 
subsequent cases indicated, R v. Lavallee has not led to a significant increase of self-defence 
pleas for battered women who kill. In this respect, the principal obstacle preventing defendants 
claiming self-defence is that being reasonable is often viewed as antithetic to being an abuse 
victim. Because the BWS frame abuses victims as ‘abnormal’ and ‘pathological’, it reinforces 
the idea that they cannot be viewed as both reasonable and autonomous. Against this 
traditional view, I attempted to show, in the final part, how a relational framework can help 
reframe the criteria used to assess self-defence so as to accommodate abused women’s pleas 
without relying on the BWS or on assessments of one’s competency for autonomy. I have 
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sought to show that it is precisely because it is agnostic towards the degree of competency for 
autonomy agents possess that such framework can help us arrive at a less biased view of these 
women’s criminal responsibility. By contrast to the individualistic and competency based 
understanding of autonomy, which underpins the current understanding of criminal 
responsibility, it is much more difficult to co-opt such an understanding of autonomy to 
reinforce long-lasting prejudices against victims of domestic violence, and women in general.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 173 
Conclusion 
My goal, in this thesis, was to help resolve the conflicted relationship feminism has with 
autonomy. In consideration of feminist criticisms of the individualistic ideal that underlies our 
laws and policies, I have sought to arrive at an understanding of autonomy that cannot serve as 
the grounds to deny individuals their political and legal equality, as has so often been the case 
with women, and vulnerable individuals. I have argued that in order to avoid the risks of 
autonomy being used to fuel exclusionary dynamics, we ought to remain agnostic concerning 
who should be seen as sufficiently competent to be attributed the status of full-blooded agent 
who is worthy of respect. I have suggested that there is no plausible or convincing way to restrict 
the attribution of the status of autonomous agent to only certain individuals. Moreover, for 
feminist purposes, there seems to be no convincing reason to do so. I have tried to show that 
redirecting our attention towards the way the socio-relational context might restrict individuals’ 
exercise of their autonomy gives us the grounds we need to justify intervening in oppressive 
dynamics. We do not need to frame women as ‘poor victims’ with impaired competencies for 
self-government in order to legitimise challenging problematic social scripts. What we need is 
to pay sufficient attention to how the socio-relational context, with its prevalent gender bias and 
norms, reduces the way individuals can plausibly exercise their autonomy. I have tried to 
demonstrate that it is by adopting a twofold account of autonomy, which frames us all as 
equally competent to make our own choices, while paying adequate attention to the unequal 
obstacles we might face while exercising our self-government, that it becomes possible to 
address the problem of oppression without causing the problem of exclusion to resurface. In 
short, I have sought to demonstrate that in order to ease the conflicted relationship feminists 
have with the ideal of autonomy, we need to stop focusing on the question of who should be 
considered autonomous and instead address the question of what structural changes might 
promote the autonomy of all. 
In the second part of this thesis, I sought to convey that such a conception of autonomy 
could advantageously replace the individualistic ideal that underlies liberal laws and policies. As 
it enables us to legitimise emancipatory policies on grounds that are compatible with liberalism, 
such a framework could be of use to feminists. Its agnostic component makes it coherent with 
the liberal duty of respect towards people’s choices. Its structural component enables it to 
effectively address the reproduction of oppressive dynamics through people’s seemingly free 
choices. Refocusing our attention towards the socio-relational context enables us to see that, 
very often, choices cannot be conceived as ‘free’ once we take into account the costs certain 
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socio-relational elements add to the option of diverging from what is conceived as ‘normal’. It is 
these obstacles and pressures that limit the way individuals can exercise their autonomy 
(regardless of whether they are conscious of them) that the structural component of this 
framework seeks to identify and alleviate.  
That the framework I propose is committed to promoting a greater equality of 
opportunity does not mean, however, that it should be blind to the disadvantage affiliated to 
some opportunities. As I have suggested in Chapter 6, some non-trivial options, especially 
when they are coded feminine, increase individuals’ vulnerability. The option of taking on the 
bulk of the caregiving constitutes one of these. This is especially true if the person (usually 
female) who makes this choice is unwilling or unable to institutionalise her union with her 
partner. Nevertheless, I have argued that respecting individual self-determination entails leaving 
both the option of marrying and that of receiving legal protections for one’s work, open. Thus, 
the structural component of the framework I propose should encourage us to remain attentive 
to the unequal dynamic that can exist between individuals, and help us vindicate state actions 
meant to alleviate the unfair costs that choosing certain non-trivial options creates. 
In Chapters 6 and 7, I have suggested that precisely because of its agnosticism and not 
(as one might be tempted to think) in spite of it, the framework I propose can offer valuable 
normative guidance to address issues that involve individuals’ struggles with oppressive 
constraints. As it entails systematically considering people as competent and worthy of respect, 
it can never lead to treating vulnerable individuals in a demeaning or paternalistic manner. 
This, in turn, helps ensure that the kind of policies adopted to address endemic problems such 
as intimate partner abuse, and the assumptions employed to justify such policies, do not 
inadvertently reinforce other forms of oppressive (and exclusionary) dynamics against the very 
people seeking help. Adopting a systematic presumption of autonomy, I have suggested, can 
even help us establish more constructive ways to assess criminal responsibility. Linking 
responsibility exclusively to the competency for autonomy people possess, as individualistic 
understandings of autonomy tend to do, often results in overlooking the role that socio-
relational context plays in enabling criminality. By contrast, the structural framework I offer 
links responsibility to the effective possibilities agents have to do otherwise. In doing so, it 
enables us to consider the role institutions, policies and social infrastructures might have played 
in making an appalling course of action the most viable one. This, I argued, enables a better 
understanding of crimes, such as the manslaughter of one’s abusive partner. However, in view 
of the statistics revealing the close ties criminality has with poverty, race and the lack of 
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resources and opportunities, it seems that such an approach could also be beneficial in many 
other areas of our criminal system. By encouraging us to consider the collective responsibility 
all share in leaving individuals with such a scarcity of non-trivial options, a structural view of 
criminal responsibility might orient us towards more constructive ways to reduce its incidence 
as well as to a more humane way to treat perpetrators. 213  
There are evident limitations to adopting the agnostic conception of autonomy I 
propose. People do sometimes suffer from serious mental pathologies that render them unfit 
to be considered properly self-governed and responsible for their actions. The framework I 
propose is clearly not meant to address this kind of case. In this regard, it might be necessary to 
complement its use, in certain cases, with assessments of the psychological competency of 
agents. Yet, its limits do not entail that understandings of autonomy that concentrate exclusively 
on the competency for self-government are, after all, more adequate. As I have attempted to 
demonstrate, when autonomy is exclusively understood as in internal competency agents 
possess, it becomes all too easy to frame structural problems as if they were caused by the 
abnormal psychology of some incompetent individuals. This, in turn, often results in 
consolidating the structure of oppression in place, fuelling existing prejudices against vulnerable 
people and leading to ignore the unequal constraints they face. In this respect, the fact that my 
framework has limitations simply means that, in some cases, its use might be complemented by 
an assessment of the competency for autonomy that individuals manifest. However, as I have 
tried to show, these instances are much less common than we might be tempted to think; and 
the resources we have for assessing interiority are themselves deeply limited. In view of the 
significant political and legal consequences of framing agents as incompetent to make their own 
choices, we should be wary of resorting to such a solution. 
Of course, it would be naïve to assume that the agnostic and structural framework I 
propose here would magically prevent autonomy from being co-opted to fuel exclusionary 
dynamics and consolidate the existing injustices caused by existing power structures. As Khader 
(2011, 174) aptly notes, ‘[a]ll moral concepts are susceptible to rhetorical co-optation, and all 
require significant empirical knowledge and goodwill to be appropriately applied in practice’. 
The framework I propose is not immune to the risk of being used in unpalatable ways that are, 
at present, still unimaginable to me. Yet I would maintain that, as it systematically forces us to 
refocus on social and structural conditions in which individuals exercise their autonomy rather 
than on whether or not agents should be considered competent to lead their own lives, 
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employing an agnostic framework makes such co-optation less likely. If taken seriously, the 
systematic presumption of autonomy encourages a more respectful dialogue with those we 
mean to help. Rather than regarding them as poor victims that need saving, such a presumption 
encourages us to see and treat everyone as our equals and to recognise that the limits and 
exhortations of our confusing social world affect us all. It encourages us, in other words, to 
consider that the ‘other woman’ is, in fact, just like us: governing herself through bargaining 
with the constraints she faces and creatively engaging with the current regimes of meaning and 
power she encounters. 
It could be thought that the price to pay in order to minimise the risk of co-optation is 
too high. One could argue that what I have ended up with is not an understanding of autonomy 
at all. Since it postulates agnosticism towards the competency needed for autonomy and 
refocuses instead on the social conditions needed for self-government, it could be thought that 
it is an understanding of freedom I have ended-up with (albeit a very substantive one). If this is 
so, then the thesis I defend becomes much more radical. I would have shown that in order to 
account for the social dimension of self-government in a way that addresses the problem of 
oppression without simultaneously leading us back to the problem of exclusion, we need to 
abandon the concept of autonomy altogether. My own framework would then figure among 
that of feminists who repudiate the use of the ideal of autonomy.  
I do not think, however, that this is the message that should be taken from my thesis. 
The understanding of autonomy I put forward does not deny that autonomy consists of a set of 
internal competencies. It simply argues that if it is to serve on the political and legal level, it is 
neither necessary nor useful to seek to assess these competencies. Given that what is important, 
within a liberal society, is to ensure that everyone truly has the opportunity to lead a life of their 
own choosing, I have sought to refocus autonomy on the social conditions needed to do so. 
The concept at which I arrive serves the same basic normative roles as traditional 
understandings of autonomy. It guards individuals against unwanted intrusions in their lives and 
fixes limits to legitimate state action.  It can serve as a basis to devise laws and policies or to 
assess existing ones. Moreover, it can serve as grounds to protect individual self-determination 
and to ensure that everyone has the means and option to lead a life of their own choosing. 
Nevertheless, the question of whether the understanding of autonomy I propose would 
be a better understanding of autonomy to employ in transnational context, or to guide political 
action within societies which do not subscribes to liberalism, remains open. 
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